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Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2005 12:58 pm

The Battle of Manzikert, August 26, 1071 AD

...or the Turkish migration to Asia Minor

The Battle of Manzikert occurred on August 26, 1071 between the Byzantine Empire and Seljuk Turkish forces led by Alp Arslan (Muhammed ben Da'ud) , Alp Aslan means "Valiant Lion")

resulting in the defeat of the Byzantine Empire and the capture of Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes

Emperor Romanus Diogenes is captured by Alp Aslan

During the 1060s the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan allowed his Turkish allies to migrate towards Armenia and Asia Minor, where they sacked cities and plundered farmland.

In 1068 Romanus IV led an expedition against them, but his slow-moving infantry could not catch the speedy Turkish cavalry, although he was able to capture the city of Hierapolis. In 1070 Romanus led a second expedition towards Manzikert, a city in eastern Turkey's province of Muş, now known as Malazgirt, a Byzantine fortress that had been captured by the Seljuks, and offered a treaty with Arslan – Romanus would give back Hierapolis if Arslan gave up the siege of Edessa. Romanus threatened war if Arslan did not comply, and prepared his troops anyway, expecting the sultan to decline his offer, which he did.

Accompanying Romanus was Andronicus Ducas , an odd choice as Ducas was an old enemy of the emperor. The army consisted of Byzantine troops from the western provinces, and probably about the same number from the eastern provinces; French mercenaries under Roussel de Bailleul ;

11th Century French Cavalryman

some Turkish, Bulgarian, and Pecheneg mercenaries;

Pecheneg mercenary cavalry

infantry under the Duke of Antioch; a contingent of Armenian troops; and some (but not all) of the Varangian Guard . Also, from Balkans and around the empire, Russians, Khazars, Alans, Uzes (Oghuz Turks), Cumans (Kypchak Turks)

11th Century Cuman

Georgians, Franks, Crimean Goths, Bulgars

11th century Bulgarian warrior

and Patzinaks

Patzinak mercenary

In addition, the elite Tagmata Cavalry units accompanied Emperor Romanus. The total number was about 100.000 men .
The march across Asia Minor was long and difficult, and Romanus did not endear himself to his troops by bringing a luxurious baggage train along with him; the Byzantine population also suffered some plundering by Romanus' German mercenaries, whom he was forced to dismiss. The expedition first rested at Sebasteia on the Halys, and reached Theodosioupolis in June of 1071 . There, some of his generals suggested continuing the march into Seljuk territory and catching Arslan before he was ready. Some of the other generals, including Nikephoros Bryennios , suggested they wait there and fortify their position. Eventually it was decided to continue the march.
Thinking that Arslan was either further away or not coming at all, Romanus marched towards Lake Van

expecting to retake Manzikert rather quickly, as well as the nearby fortress of Khliat if possible. However, Arslan was actually in Armenia, with 30 000 cavalry from Aleppo, Mosul, and his other allies

Seljuk Warrior. Like all the Warriors of the Eurasian steppes, they
were capable horsemen able to use the bow while horse riding

Arslan's spies knew exactly where Romanus was, while Romanus was completely unaware of his opponent's movements.
Romanus ordered his general Ioannis Tarchaneiotes to take some of the Byzantine troops and Varangians and accompany the Pechenegs and French to Khliat, while Romanus and the rest of the army marched to Manzikert. Although it is unknown precisely what happened to Tarchaneiotes and his army after this, they apparently caught sight of the Seljuks and fled, as they later appeared at Melitene and did not take part in the battle.

Seljuk Banner
Romanus was unaware of the loss of Tarchaneiotes and continued to Manzikert, which he easily captured on August 23 . The next day some foraging parties under Bryennios discovered the Seljuk force and were forced to retreat back to Manzikert. The Armenian general Basilaces

was sent out with some cavalry, as Romanus did not believe this was Arslan's full army; the cavalry was destroyed and Basilaces taken prisoner. Romanus drew up his troops into formation and sent the left wing out under Bryennius, who was almost surrounded by the quickly approaching Turks and was forced to retreat once more. The Turks hid among the nearby hills for the night, making it nearly impossible for Romanus to send a counterattack.
At the night of 24th August Alp Arslan's light raiders attacked the Byzantine camp. At the camp, they established contact with their Pecheneg and Kypchak relatives, and the Turkish mercenaries switched sides and joined the Seljuk Army. After this, Alp Arslan sent an envoy to Romanus and requested peace. Romanus rejected the Seljuk embassy and attempted to recall Tarchaneiotes, who was no longer in the area. There were no engagements that day, but on August 26 the Byzantine army gathered itself into a proper battle formation and began to march on the Turkish positions, with the left wing under Bryennios, the right wing under Theodoros Alyates , and the centre under the emperor. Andronicos Ducas led the reserve forces in the rear. The Seljuks were organized into a crescent formation about four kilometres away, with Arslan observing events from a safe distance. Seljuk archers attacked the Byzantines as they drew closer; the centre of their crescent continually moved backwards while the wings moved to surround the Byzantine troops.
The Byzantines held off the arrow attacks and captured Arslan's camp by the end of the afternoon. However, the right and left wings, where the arrows did most of their damage, almost broke up when individual units tried to force the Seljuks into a pitched battle; the Seljuk cavalry simply fled when challenged. With the Seljuks avoiding battle, Romanus was forced to order a withdrawal by the time night fell. However, the right wing misunderstood the order, and Ducas, as an enemy of Romanus, deliberately ignored the emperor and marched back to the camp outside Manzikert, rather than covering the emperor's retreat. Now that the Byzantines were thoroughly confused, the Seljuks seized the opportunity and attacked and surrounded the whole Byzantine army with a crescent formation. The Byzantine right wing was routed; the left under Bryennius held out a little longer but was soon routed as well. Romanus was injured, and taken prisoner when the Seljuks discovered him.
Alp Arslan, treated him with generosity, and terms of peace having been agreed to, dismissed him, loaded with presents and respectfully attended by a military guard. This famous conversation is recorded to have taken place after Romanus IV was brought as a prisoner before the Sultan:

Alp Arslan: "What would you do if I was brought before you as a prisoner?"

Romanus: "Perhaps kill you, or exhibit you in the streets of Constantinople."

Alp Arslan: "My punishment is far heavier. I forgive you, and set you free."

The terrible fate of the defeated emperor from his countrymen made the mercy of Alp Arlsan a curse. Romanus was blinded and finally killed after great torment.
Years and decades later, Manzikert came to be seen as a disaster for the Empire; later sources greatly exaggerate the numbers of troops and the numbers of casualties. Byzantine historians would often look back and lament the 'disaster' of that day, pinpointing it as the moment the decline of the Empire began. It was not, however, an immediate disaster; most units survived intact and were fighting in the Balkans or elsewhere in Asia Minor within a few months. On the other hand, the defeat showed the Seljuks that the Byzantines were not invincible — they were not the unconquerable, millennium-old Roman Empire (as both the Byzantines and Seljuks still called it). The usurpation of Andronicos Ducas also politically destabilized the empire, and it was difficult to organize a resistance to the Turkish migrations that followed the battle. Within the next few decades almost all of Asia Minor was overrun by the Seljuks.

The Empire after Manzikert
Nevertheless, in hindsight historians are practically unanimous in dating the decline of Byzantine fortunes to this battle. It is also considered one of the root causes for the later Crusades: the West saw Manzikert as a signal that Byzantium was no longer capable of being the protector of Eastern Christianity




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Posted: Sat Oct 01, 2005 8:48 pm

Byzantine Army Ranks (6th-15th Century AD)


- Commander in Chief of the Byzantine armed forces was offcourse the Emperor/Vassileus or Autocrator. When the Emperor was CiC of the armed forces on campaign, was called Protostrator/Head of the Army .

-Second in command in the Army was the Strategos/General of the Thema Anatolikon * who was something like the Chief of Staff.

-Supreme Commander of the armed forces (Army & Navy) on campaign was the Megas Domesticos/Grand Domesticus (if the Emperor was absent). If the Emperor was in charge of the campaign then Grand Domesticus was his lieutenant.
-Supreme Commander of the land forces on campaign was the Domesticos/Domesticus (if the Emperor was absent). If the Emperor was in charge of the campaign then Domesticus was his Chief staff officer.
- Strategos/General was the military commander of the Thema (equivalent to the modern lieutenant general). This was the title of the Dukas/Duke , the civil administrator of the Thema, in war times. He was in charge of a force of 9,000 men. Generals carried a silver baton called matzuka (lit. truncheon, matsuki in modern Greek), or dikanikion

A Strategos wearing the grand uniform. Note that he's carrying the general's matzuka

- Ypostrategos was the Strategos' XO.
- Stratelates (either Merarches or Turmarches, division commander) was the military commander of the Turma (infantry) or Moira (Cavalry). He was equivalent to the modern rank of major general.
-Chief of Infantry was the Magistros tou Pezikou, from the roman magister peditum, master of foot .
-Chief of Cavalry was the Magistros tou Ippikou, from the roman magister equitum, master of horse .
- Megas Hetairiarches/Grand Commander of the Companion troops , was the commander of the mercenary forces.
-The Drungarios (the rank sometimes appears as Drungares or Moirarches or Phalangarches-commander of a phalanx) was a rank equivalent to the commander of 3,000 men.
- Viglator was the CO of the garrison troops in the capital.
- Akolouthos (lit. attendant) was the CO of the Varangian Guard.

An Akolouthos. The Akolouthos & his Varangian Troops had the privilige to wear red uniforms

- Tagmatarches (early rank: Tribunos, from the roman Tribunus. 8th-10th century AD: Tagmatarches. 12th-13th century: Taxiarches. 14th century: Komes ton Tagmaton/Count of the Battalions. Palaeologean period: Tagmatarches) , was the CO of the Tagma , the basic Byzantine unit to conduct war (battalion).
- Mensor or Mensurator was the surveyor in charge of the troop encampment.
- Anticensor was the officer in charge of the enginners.
- Sacellarios was the army paymaster (from the latin sacellium: The Imperial Mint)
- Cleisouriarches was the officer in charge of the troops guarding the mountain passes (from the Greek Cleisoura, mountain pass)
- Komes tes Kohortes/Count of Cohort was any Staff Officer.
- Komes/Count was the CO of a unit equivalent to 300 men (Kometeia/County). Note that the County was a military unit & not a district or province.
- Kentarchos/Centurion was the CO of 100 men (from the roman centurio). This rank appears also as Ekatontarchos , the Greek translation of Centurio.
- Dekarchos was the commander of 10 men.
- Pentarchos was the commander of 5 men.
- Ouragos , the rearrank soldier.
- Stratiotes/soldier was the common soldier.
- Spatharios (lit. sword bearer) was the heavy armed soldier of an elite tagma or kometeia.
- Hetairos/Companion was the mercenary soldier.
- Tetimemenos Cyris was the noble Knight (lit. noble lord).

NOTE: Within the various rank groups (field, superior, general officers), it was common to address rank officers as Archon, Archontes in plural (dominator or ruler, ruler is perhaps more accurate). To distinguish a civil from a military archon, a military officer would be addressed Archon apo Spathiou (Ruler of the Sword). The common people used to call the military archontes, "kephalades" (bullheaded, a depreciative remark).
The Historian Genessios , in 873 gives us an interesting episode, when describing the last moments before the soldiers of the Armeniakon (Armenian) & Chersianon or Chersonos (Cherson in the Crimea) Thema, attack the Persians:
"This is about a quarrel among the archontes [meaning the generals], which of the two armies is more gallant; and then the soldiers of the Armeniakon, the aristocrats of our army, said: Gallantry is not measured in speechies; let us both rush headlong to the enemy and then we'll see who is the most valiant. The two generals asked the gathered troops: Men, are you ready to compete with each other, and attack on the enemy, so Help us God? And they answered: Yes, in the name of our Emperor. And with the thrilling cry "Stavros Nenikeken" [The Cross is the winner], they assaulted the enemy lines"

*The Thema, Themata in plural. Established either by Heraclius or his successor Constas II on the model of the Italian and African exarchates, the themes were administrative divisions of the empire in which a general exercised both civilian and military jurisdiction. The name is peculiar; Treadgold's closest guess is that thema was being used to denote "emplacements."
In the 10th century, 28 themata are listed (in order of grandness):
Thema Anatolikon (of the Orient), including parts of Phrygia, Lycaonia, Isauria, Pamphylia and Pisidia;
Thema Armeniakon (of Armenia), including parts of Armenia, Chaldia, and Cappadokia;
Thema Thrakesion (of the Thracians), established by Leo III in Phrygia, Lydia and Ionia and named after the Thracian troops rotated there;
Thema Opsikion, including Mysia and part of Bithynia and Phrygia;
Thema Optimaton, named after the Tagma ton Optimaton ('"Battalion of the Best"') stationed there, formed out of Opsiakian Bithynia;
Thema Bucellarion, named after the Tagma ton Bucellarion ('"Battalion of the Companions"') stationed there, formed out of Opsiakian Galatia;
Thema of Paphlagonia;
Thema of Chaldia, the country about Trebizond and formerly called Pontos after the Black Sea;
Thema of Messopotamia, the trifling possessions of the empire on the Messopotamian frontier;
Thema of Colonea, the country between Pontos and Armenia Minor, through which the Lycus flows, near Neocaesarea;
Thema of Sevasteia, consisting of the rest of Armenia;
Thema Lycandon, a theme formed by Leon VI the Wise on the borders of Armenia;
Thema of Cibyrraeoton, the naval theme established by Leo III in Caria, Lycia, Rhodes, and the coast of Cilicia that replaced the earlier Thema Caravisianon;
Thema Cypriakon, the naval theme for Cyprus; and
Thema Aigaeou Pelagous, the naval theme for the Aegean Sea.
Thema Thrakes (of Thrace), the area around but not including Constantinople;
Thema Makedonikon (of Macedonia), the area around but not including Thessaloniki;
Thema Strymonos (of the Strymon river);
Thema Thessalonikes (of Thessaloniki), the second city of the Empire;
Thema Helladikon (of Hellas), created between 687 and 695, consisted of Greece between Makedonia and the Isthmus, the former regions of Attica, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Aetolia;
Thema Peloponnesou (of Peloponnese);
Thema Cephallenias, including the Ionian islands (Corfu, Zakynthos, Cephallenia, Zakynthos, Lephkas)
Thema Nikopolitikon (of Nicopol, a city in Epirus);
Thema Dyrrachion, on the shore of modern Albania (modern day city of Durres);
Thema Sicelias, a naval theme in Sicily
Thema Longibardias (of Lombardy, also called Calabrias, of Calabria) in Italy; and
Thema Chersonos in the Crimea


Click HERE for a better illustration



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Posted: Mon Oct 03, 2005 11:04 am

The Battle of Pelagonia, September of 1259

The Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople and the end of the Latin Empire (1261). The Byzantine recovery of Greece



The Latin Empire, the Empire of Nicaea, the Empire of Trebizond (Trapezous) and the Despotate of Epirus

In 1204 the knights of the Fourth Crusade set up a Crusader state known as the Latin Empire, or Romania , based in Constantinople, after sacking the city ( April 13, 1204 ). They intended it to be a Roman Catholic successor to the Byzantine Empire. Baldwin IX, Count of Flanders , was crowned the first emperor of Romania on May 16, 1204 .



The Empire of Nicaea/Autokratoria (pron. Aphtokratoria) tes Nikaeas was the largest of the states founded by refugees from the Byzantine Empire after Constantinople was conquered during the Fourth Crusade. It lasted from 1204 to 1261 . In 1204 , Byzantine emperor Alexios V Ducas "Murtzouphlos" (his nickname Murtzouphlos/Unsavoury, referred to his extremely bushy eyebrows) fled Constantinople rather than face the crusader army in battle. Theodoros Lascaris , was proclaimed emperor, but he too fled, to the city of Nicaea in Bithynia , realizing the situation in Constantinople was hopeless.

The Standard of the Nicaean Empire

The Empire of Trebizond/Autokratoria tes Trapezoundos was the second successor state of the Byzantine Empire founded in 1204 immediately before the fall of Constantinople. Queen Tamar of Georgia provided troops to Alexios I for the conquest of Trabizond/Trapezous, Sinope and Paphlagonia . Alexios I , a grandson of Byzantine emperor Andronicos I Comnenos and a descendant of King David the Builder of Georgia through his great grandmother Katay (daughter of David the Builder) , made Trebizond his capital and asserted a claim to be the legitimate successor of the Byzantine Empire.

Empire of Trabizond Crest (left) & Standard (right). Note that the eagle's head looks at the West, at Constantinople

The Despotate of Epirus/Despotaton tes Epirou was founded in by Michael Ducas , cousin of the Byzantine emperors Isaac II Angelos and Alexios III . At first Michael allied with Boniface of Montferrat , but then went to Epirus, where he considered himself the Byzantine governor of the old province of Nicopolis and revolted against Boniface. Epirus soon became the new home of many Greek refugees from Constantinople, Thessaly, and the Peloponnese , and Michael was described as a second Noah, rescuing men from the Latin flood. Ioannis Camateros , the Patriarch of Constantinople, did not consider him a legitimate successor and instead accompanied Theodore I Lascaris to Nicaea ; Michael instead recognized the authority of Pope Innocent III over Epirus, cutting ties to the Orthodox Church. The Despotate of Epirus was the closest ally of the Latins of Greece. Finally it is sudjected to Byzantine rule, after the intervention of Ioannis Syryiannis , who convinced the population to submit to the Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus , so as to gain his favor. This capitulation is the cause of the two Chrysobulls (1319 and 1321) of Andronicus II

Despotate of Epirus Standard

The Battle of Pelagonia took place in September of 1259 , between the Empire of Nicaea and the Principality of Achaea .


Nicaean emperor Theodore II Lascaris died in 1258 and was succeeded by the young Ioannis IV Lascaris , under the regency of Michael VIII Palaeologus , who was determined to restore the Byzantine Empire and recapture all of the territory it held before the Fourth Crusade. In 1259, William II Villehardouin married Anna Comnena Ducaina (also known as Agnes) , daughter of Michael II of Epirus , cementing an alliance between the Despotate of Epirus and Achaea against Nicaea . They also allied with Manfred of Sicily who sent them 400 knights .

In 1259 the Nicaeans invaded Thessaly and in September the Achaean and Epirote army marched north to meet them. The Nicaeans were led by the Sevastocrator ("Venerable Ruler," a title created by Alexios I as a combination of Autokrator-Emperor and Sebastos-the Greek translation of the Latin Augustus-it was essentially a meaningless title, which signified only a close relationship with the emperor. The feminine form was Sevastokratorissa) Theodoros Ducas , the brother of Michael II of Epirus. According to the French Chronicle of Moreas , The Nicaean force consisted of the main Byzantine army,
with Turkish mercenaries, 2000 Cumans, 300 Germans, 13,000 Hungarians, 4,000 Serbs and Bulgarians, and some Vlachs (latin speaking nomadic peoples).

Vlach Warrior. They fought for the Ottomans in the 15th Century (Vlach Vojnuks or Martolos, one of the most feared element in the Ottoman military machine

There were suppposedly 27 cavalry divisions . Theodoros also gathered all the local peasants and their flocks and placed them on the hilltops, so that from far away they might appear to be part of the army.
Theodoros then sent a false deserter to Michael II and William , exaggerating the number of Nicaean troops and chastizing Michael for attempting to attack a family member. The duke of Carinthia

Ulrich III, Duke of Carinthia


who also had 300 Germans with him, did not believe the deserter, and convinced the Achaeans to stay when they decided to flee. Still, Michael and his troops deserted during the night and fled to the Nicaean side.
On the next day, the Germans under the duke of Carinthia attacked their fellow German mercenaries on the Nicaean side. The duke was killed in the fight. The Hungarian archers then killed all the Achaean horses, leaving the knights effectively defenceless. The Achaean foot soldiers fled and the knights surrendered; prince William fled as well and hid under a nearby haystack where he was soon captured. Theodore brought him to Ioannis Palaeologus , brother of Michael VIII , who was in command of the expedition, and William was forced to give up strategic fortresses in Achaea before he was set free.
Ioannis Palaeologus went on to capture Thebes. The Principality of Achaea, which had become the strongest French state in Greece in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, was now reduced to Nicaean vassalage; the Duchy of Athens soon became the dominant French state. Michael VIII took advantage of the defeat to recapture Constantinople in 1261.

The flag of the reconquested Byzantine Empire. The two crowns stand for the Empire of Nicaea (the legitimate successor of Cinstantinople) & the reconquested Constantinople

NOTE: Early Byzantine Empire flags had nothing to do with the two-headed byzantine eagle. Early Standards (as they are displayed in the Cretan Naval Museum in CHania), depicted either the Cross with four B-shaped firesteels

Each letter B stands for Vassileus Vassileon Vassilevon Vassilevonton (King of Kings ruling over Kings)

or the Greek abbreviation (Christogramma in Greek) for Jesus-Christ (Christos/XPICTOC in Greek) on red, yellow or blue field




Emperor Isaacius Comnenus 1057-1057), the first ruling member of the Comnenus dynasty, was the first Emperor who adopted the two headed eagle as the symbol of the Empire

Comneni, descended from [b]Paphlagonia . Paphlagons believed that the double-headed eagle known as Haga was the symbol of their military merit & the protector of their province. Thus, Isaacius impropriated Haga as the Byzantine symbol, demonstrating the military virtues of his empire in difficult times (the Empire was threatened by the Seljucs & the Patzinaks)

Byzantine War Colours

Click HERE for the Byzantine Empire in 1265



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Posted: Mon Oct 03, 2005 1:30 pm

May 29, 1453

The Fall of Constantinople

As he stood there erect before the Gate
and impregnable in his sorrow

Far from the world where his spirit sought
to bring Paradise to his measure
And harder even than stone
for no one had ever looked
on him tenderly--at times his crooked teeth
whitened strangely

And as he passed by with his gaze a little
beyond mankind and from them all
extracted One who smiled on him
The Real one
whom death could never seize

He took care to pronounce the word
sea clearly that all the dolphins
within might shine
And the desolation so great it might
contain all of God
and every water drop ascending steadfastly toward
the sun

As a young man he had gold glittering
and gleaming on the shoulders of the great
And one night
he remembers
during a great storm the neck of the sea
roared so it turned murky
but he would not submit to it

The world's an oppressive place to live through
yet with a little pride it's worth it.

II

Dear God what now
Who had to battle with thousands
and not only his loneliness
Who?
He who knew with a single word
how to slake the thirst of entire worlds
What?

From whom they taken everything
And his sandals with their crisscrossed
straps and his pointed trident
and the wall he mounted every afternoon
like an unruly and pitching boat
to hold the reigns against the water


And a handful of vervain
which he had rubbed against a girl's cheek
at midnight
to kiss her
(how the waters of the moon gurled
on the stone steps three cliff-lengths
above the sea ...)

Noon out if night
And not one person by his side
Only his faithful words that mingled
all their colors to leave in his mind
a lance of white light

And opposite
along the whole wall's length
a host of heads poured in plaster
as far as his eye could see

"Noon out of night -- all life a radiance!"
he shouted and rushed into the horde
dragging behind him an endless golden line

And at once he felt
the final pallor
overmastering him
as it hastened from afar.

III

Now
as the sun's wheel turned more and more swiftly
the courtyards plunged into winter and once
again emerged red from the geranium

And the small cool domes
like blue medusae
reached each time into the silverwork
the wind so delicately worked as a painting
for other times more distant

Virgin maidens
their breasts glowing a summer dawn
brought him branches of fresh palm leaves
and those of the myrtle uprooted
from the depths of the sea

Dripping iodine
while under his feet he heard
the prows of black ships
sucked into the great whirlpool
the ancient and smoked sea-craft
from which still erect with riveted gaze
the Mothers of God stood rebuking

Horses overturned on dump-heads
a rabble of buildings large and small
debris and dust flaming in the air

And there lying prone
always with an unbroken word
between his teeth
Himself
the last of the Hellenes!

The last of the Hellenes (Odysseus Elytis, 1979 Nobel Prize winner for literature)[/i]



The Fall of Constantinople was the conquest of the Byzantine capital by the Ottoman Empire under the command of Sultan Mehmed II "Fatih" (the conqueror), on [b]Tuesday, May 29, 1453

(the Apophras Hemera/black-letter day ). This marked not only the final destruction of the Eastern Roman Empire, and the death of Constantine XI, the last Roman Emperor, but also the strategic conquest crucial for Ottoman rule over the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans.


Sultan Mehmed in Constantinople

The following two centuries after the Byzantines re-establish themselves in Constantinople, the empire was gradually taken piece by piece by a new threat, the Ottomans.
In 1453 the "empire" consisted of little more than the city of Constantinople itself and a portion of the Peloponnese (centered on the fortress of Mystras* )

Mehmed planned to attack the Theodosian Walls, the intricate series of walls and ditches protecting Constantinople from an attack from the west, the only part of the city not surrounded by water. His army encamped outside the city on Easter Monday, April 2, 1453 . For weeks Mehmed's massive cannon fired on the walls, but it was unable to sufficiently penetrate them, and due to its extremely slow rate of reloading the Byzantines were able to repair most of the damage after each shot. Meanwhile, Mehmed's fleet could not enter the Golden Horn due to the boom the Byzantines had laid across the entrance. To circumvent this he built a road of greased logs across Galata on the north side of the Golden Horn, and rolled his ships across. This succeeded in stopping the flow of supplies from Genoan ships and demoralizing the Byzantine defenders, but did not help in breaching the land walls.

15th century italian warrior. 2,000 Genoan mercenaries under Giovanni Giustiniani fought the Ottomans in Constantinople

The Palaeologus family arms
The Turks then sought to break through the walls by constructing underground tunnels in an effort to sap them. Many of sappers were Serbians sent from Novo Brdo by the Serbian Despot. However, the Byzantines employed an engineer named Johannes Grant (who was said to be German but was probably Scottish) , who had countertunnels dug, allowing Byzantine troops to enter the tunnels and kill the Turkish workers. Other Turkish tunnels were flooded with water. Eventually, the Byzantines captured and tortured an important Turkish engineer, who revealed the location of all the Turkish tunnels, which were then destroyed.
Mehmed offered to raise the siege for an astronomical tribute that he knew the city would be unable to pay. When this was declined, Mehmed planned to overpower the walls by sheer force, knowing that the Byzantine defenders would be worn out before he ran out of troops.
On the night of May 22 there was a lunar eclipse, which must have seemed a bad omen to the defenders of the city. On the morning of May 29 the attack began. The first wave of attackers, the bashi-bazouks , were poorly trained and equipped, and were meant only to kill as many Byzantine defenders as possible. The second assault, consisting largely of Anatolians, focused on a section of the Blachernae walls in the northwest part of the city, which had been partially damaged by the cannon. This section of the walls had been built much more recently, in the eleventh century, and was much weaker; the crusaders in 1204 had broken through the walls there. The Ottoman attackers also managed to break through, but were just as quickly pushed back out by the Byzantine defenders. The Byzantines also managed to hold off a third attack by the Sultan's elite Janissaries (Turkish, Yeniçeri, meaning New Troops) -ironically, most of the Janissaries had been Christian children who were captured by the Ottomans at an early age and trained as warriors)-but the Genoan general in charge of the defense, Giovanni Giustiniani , was minorly wounded in the attack, and as he left the battlefield seeking a physician, the Greeks began to panic



Some historians suggest that the Kerkoporta gate in the Blachernae section had been left unlocked, and the Ottomans soon discovered this mistake (there was no question of bribery or deceit by the Ottomans; the gate had simply been overlooked, probably because rubble from a cannon attack had obscured or blocked the door). The Ottomans rushed in. Constantine XI** himself led the last defense of the city, dying in the ensuing battle in the streets. By 1461 the entire Greece was under Ottoman rule. 400 years of Turkish oppression, had just begun.


* Mystras

rises above the verdant valley of Eurotas near ancient Sparta. In about the Mid 13th century mail-coated Frankish knights built watch-towers on this "strange hill", from which they could defend fertile Laconia and control the unruly mountain dwellers of Taygetos. But they were unable to retain their hold on Mystras for long. A Byzantine "Vassileus kai Autocrator Romaeon/King and Emperor of the Romans"[/i] regained his throne at Constantinople in 1261 and henceforth Mystra became a center of culture and civilization destined to illuminate the art and spirit of the Byzantine age for the last time. The last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI, was despot at Mystras before he came to the throne. Demetrius, the last despot of Morea, surrendered the city to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II in 1460.

The Palace of the Despots in the Upper Town at Mystras. It was the real administrative center for the Byzantine Empire until it fell to the Turks in 1460

** Constantine Palaeologus Dragasses

Emperor Constantine XI wearing the Imperial ceremonial robe and holding the Sovereign's Scepter with the Cross

The last Emperor of the Byzantine Empire. To us Greeks, his refusal to Sultan Mehmed, when the Ottoman ruler offered Constantine the chance to rule unmolested in Mystra in exchange of delivering the City, is second only to Leonidas' refusal to surrender to the Persians in Thermopylae:
"To deliver the City it is not my own right nor any other person of her residents, because it is our common decision to die all of us and not to spare our life"

The last Byzantine Standard

The Emperor, when realising that the end had come, discarded his purple cloak and charged into the breach. Some sources record that he was only recognized afterwards by his purple boots; others that the Turks were never able to identify his body, and so the last emperor of Rome was buried in a mass grave along with his soldiers




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Posted: Wed Oct 05, 2005 7:29 pm

Ancient Greek States Episema

In ancient times there were no flags. The Ancient Greeks in place of flags had shields bearing distinct and symbolic signs, which they called ΕΠΙΣΗΜΟΝ/ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑ in plural, ΠΑΡΑΣΗΜΟΝ/ΠΑΡΑΣΗΜΑ, ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ/ΣΗΜΕΙΑ, ΜΕΣΟΜΦΑΛΙΟΝ/ΜΕΣΟΜΦΑΛΙΑ (Episemon/Episema-Standards, Parasemon/Parasema-Orders, Semeon/Semea-Marks or Signals, Mesomphalion/Mesomphalia-Shield Bosses) and through which they recognized their fellow-soldiers in battle. These signs were in the center of the shield, for example various symbolic figures. On their shields, they gave their military oath, and that oath-giving was a sacred ceremony; The man who abandoned his shield was called ΡΙΨΑΣΠΙΣ (Ripsaspis, he who abandons his shield, the recreant) and was disesteemed by all. The greatest dishonor was a shield fallen into the hands of the enemy (like today when the flag falls into the hands of the enemy). The Shield (Hoplon, meaning weapon), was made of wood, which was hollowed inside to allow for the soldiers to fit into it. The surface of the Hoplon was covered in bronze or leather or both and the design was painted or etched accordingly.
City-States Episema:
Athens: The letter A (alpha, for Athens), or the owl (Glaphx, the owl was the symbol of goddess Athena the patron goddess of Athens) , or the Medusa's head (when Perseus killed Medusa, he dedicated her beheaded head to Athena's temple in Athens)
Sparta: The letter Λ (lamda, for Lacedaemon, Sparta's ancient name), or the Dioscuri (The Dioscuri were Castor and Polydeuces , the twin sons of Leda and Zeus and the brothers of Helen of Troy . Polydeuces was a formidable boxer, and Castor was a great horseman. The cult of the Dioscuri was indigenous of Sparta)

Arcadia: The letters AP (alpha-rho, for Arcadia)
Messenia: The letter M (mu, for Mantinea)
Mantinea: The Trident (for Poseidon, the patron god of the city)
Corinth: Pegasus (the winged horse of Greek myth, named for the Pegae , water-priestesses who tended the sacred spring in Pirene in Corinth)
Thebes: The Heracles' club (Heracles was Thebean), or the Sphinx (the monster sent by Hera to guard the pass to the city. Sphinx had the body of lion and the upper part of a woman), although the Thebans used individual shield designs most of times
Thespiae: The Crescent (the symbol of goddess Artemis , the patron goddess of the city)
Tegea: The letter T (tau, for Tegea)
Elis: The Eagle killing a snake (eagle was the symbol of Zeus , the patron god of Elis & Olympia)
Sicyon: The letter Σ (sigma, for Sicyon), or the Dove (the family arms of Sicyon of Attica who married Zeuxippe , daughter of king Lamedon , and became king of the city which was named after him)
Argos (the second oldest city of Greece): The Water Snake. Argive distintive feature was Hydra (water-snake) symbol , which is associated with Argos after Heracles killed the water-snake at Lerna, near Argos
Samos island: A facing lion's head. Lion was the symbol of Cybele , the goddess of motherhood, mountains and wild-beasts (worshipped in Samos)
Euboea island (except Eretria): The bull's or cow's head, for Euboea means "Island of Fine Cattle"
Eretria: A large Eye. Eretria was Athens' closest ally. The eye was one of Athenas' symbols
Thessaly: A bull's foot. Thessalians venerated god Dionysus, who was also hailed as "Axios Tauros" ("Worthy Bull")
Crete: A bull's head, one of Zeus' symbols. Zeus grew up in Crete
Epirus (especially the Molossi, the most prosperous Epirote tribe): The Standing Eagle, one of Zeus' symbols (the oracle of Dodone in Epirus , was the second most important oracle of antiquity, after Delphi, and the oldest. The Delphi oracle was dedicated to Apollo; the Dodone oracle to Zeus, the father of the Gods)
Macedonia: The Eagle (for Zeus), or the Macedonian 8 or 16-rayed Sun (the emblem of the first royal dynasty of Macedonia, the Argeads of Argos)
Rhodes island: A rose in bloom, which is a punning reference to the island's name




Click HERE for a map of classical Greece



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Posted: Wed Oct 05, 2005 8:23 pm

Valtrex, have you ever played the computer game Rome: Total War? Its a very good game and I suggest you get it.



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Posted: Thu Oct 06, 2005 9:54 am



Yes I have and indeed it's a very good game



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Posted: Thu Oct 06, 2005 11:01 am

Byzantine Navy Ranks


4th-11th century AD, forked Byzantine naval colours

-Commander in Chief of the Byzantine Imperial Fleet was offcourse the Emperor/Vassileus or Autocrator
-Chief of the Royal Fleet ( Vassilikon Ploimon ) was the Megas Drungarios tou Ploimou/Grand Drungarius of the Fleet , rank equivalent to the modern Fleet Admiral
- Topoteretes (Supporter, perhaps a more accurate translation would be Suffragan ). Rank similar to the modern Vice-Admiral
- Drungarios . Officer with specific duties (Drungarios tou Kolpou/Drungarius of the Gulf, for example, who had the duty to guard the entrance to the Bosporus)
- Turmarches tou Ploimou/Turmarch of the Fleet . This officer administered the Turma , a division of a Thematic Fleet
- Komes/Count . The captain of detachment (one naval detachment equalled 3 or 5 ships) of a Thematic Fleet. In the Imperial Fleet, this officer held the title Protospatharios/First of the Sword or, Spatharokandidatos/Candidate of the Sword .
- Sacellarios was the director of the fleet's financial resources (from the latin Sacellium )
- Chartoularios was the caretaker of the fleet and head of the secretariat of the fleet (Senior Secretary)
- Protomandator was the head of the corps of messengers (Senior Messenger)
- Mandator was the officer entrusted with the delivery of orders and information (Messenger)
- Protocaravos was the leader of the oar-bearers (Chief Oarsman)
- Kentarchos or Ekatontarchos was the captain of a ship, who directed it from the prow, where his quarters (the Cravatos ) were located
-The fleet's finances were regulated by the Secreton Tou Ploimou, Secretariat of the Fleet or by the Secreton tes Thalasses, Secretariat of the Sea which mostly looked after the affairs of the merchant fleet

Byzantine Vessels

The most important Byzantine naval ship was the Dromon/ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, which is the ancient Greek word for runner , a light and swift boat which came in many different forms and sizes. It had two or three masts, was two-decked, and could be up to 55 metres/180 feet long and 6 metres/20 feet wide. The ship was manned according to its type and dimensions. Some could carry 100, 160, 200 or even 300 men of whom some were marines ( Pezonaphtes ) who in battle were supported by a number of the rowers

Dromon

Dromons were each equipped with a Xylocastron (Greek for "wooden castle") , a tower around the main mast from which the marines hurled their spears and used their bows, or threw stones and pieces of metal at the enemy. At the prow and stern were fixed mechanical devices known as Toxovolistra-es (arbalest) which were used to fire small arrows named Myia-es, lit. "flies" . These ships are described in the sources as tube-bearing dromons because of the pipe-like weapons they bore (siphon) to douse enemy ships with Greek fire


The marines also used smaller dispensers of liquid fire that could be operated by a single person, the Cheirosiphon-es, hand-held siphons
By the 10th century AD , a new type of Dromon appears, the Chelandios Dromon (chelandios from the Greek Chelion, the Eel ).
Chelandia in certain instances were used as horse carriers, each capable of holding twelve horses
The pamphyloi were larger ships than the dromons. As a ship, was the flagship of the Imperial fleet. It was very fast, well equipped and had a select crew and experienced marines

Pamphylos

Scouting ships were single-deck minor dromons. Galleas-ses/Galleys , likewise single-deck ships, took messages and executed various missions. The Sachtourae were similar ships to these. Auxillary boats included the Sandalion , with five pairs of oars and a single mast. The main transport ships were the so-called Camatera Caravia , used for siege machinery. These were well equipped and usually sailed next to the dromons. These were the warships of the Byzantines, of which an important number took part in various battles.

Single-deck minor dromon scouting ship

The standard formation used by the warships in battle was the semicircle (formation of Aspelagolemen ). The flagship would sail in the centre while the strongest dromons were situated at the extremities.
Other types of attack involved the ships arranged lengthways with their prows pointed at the enemy, and the division of a naval unit into three parts with one attacking in the centre and the other to the side. Rushes were often used to defeat the enemy. Furthermore, the marines were well trained since they often took part in mock battles.





11th-15th century AD, byzantine naval colours



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Posted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 6:49 pm

Hi i was just reading some of this history and i like looking these old names that are some still in use in Iceland but with some changes in ending of the names. the name Greece is in Icelandic "GRIKKLAND" and the people of " GRIKKLAND " is " GRIKKIR "
Names of Vikings who went South & served in the Varangian Guard of Grikkland, Grikkar, Grikkinar as they named the powerful Byzantine Empire, men mentioned in the treaties or in the Sagas: (These names are taken from http://www.vikinganswerlady.com/VarangianNames.htm#TreatyNames)
Farlof
Karl or Karli (Karl)
Hróðleifr (Rulav) " Hróðleifur "
Steinviðr (Stemid) " Steinviður "
Vermundr (Velmud) " Vermundur " " Hermundur "
Farleifr (Farlo)
Fréleifr (Frelav)
Gyði (Goudy)
Hróaldr (Rouad) " Hróaldur "
Hróaldr (Roal)
Hrœrekr (Rurik) " Hrærekur "
Hrolleifr (Rulav)
Ingjaldr (Inegeld) " Ingjaldur "
Kári
Karl (Karly) " Karl "
Vermóðr (Veremoud) " Hermóður "
Eilífr Þorgíls son sprakaleggs
Eindriði ungi (The byname ungi is "the younger")
Gríss Sæmings son Hallfreðar
Halldórr Snorra son Haralds
Haraldr harðráði (Joined the Varangian Guard under the alias Nordbrikt. Became King of Norway after leaving the Varangians)
Kolskeggr Hámundar son Njáls
Ásbjôrn
Áskell
Ásmundr(?)
Eyvindr
Eyvísl(?)
Geirbjôrn
Gunnarr
Halfdan
Ingimundr
Ingvarr
Juli
Styrbjôrn
Tófi
Þorkell ( still tipikal Icelandic name )
Ingifastr
Grímmundr
Gulleifr
Arnfast
Farulfr
Slagvé
Þorsteinn ( many people in Iceland have that name and it is exactly same as here )
Ásgautr
Haraldr broður Ingvarrs
Skarði
Sæbjôrn
Hróðgeirr
Gunnleifr
Þorsteinn
Ônundr ( Önundur )
Bjórsteinn son Lífeyjar
Ormr ( Ormur )
Ósníkin
Banki or Baggi
Már Húnrøðar son Morkinskinna
Ulfr Óspaks son Haralds
Víga-Barði Guðmundar son Heiðarvíga ( famous person in hostory )
Þorbjôrn ôngull Þórðar son Grettis
Þorgestr or Gestr Þórhallz son
Þormoðr Eindriða son or Ásgeirs .
Þorsteinn drómundr Ásmundar son Grettis
Þorir helsingr

greetings
Kaldi
_________________
kaldi
Olafur B Olafsson CEO and owner of Kaldi Security, Explosive specialist, and Rescue Team Member (ICESAR).



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Posted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 7:28 pm

One thing i forget to say.
this is very good info about Hellenic armyes

Kaldi
_________________
kaldi
Olafur B Olafsson CEO and owner of Kaldi Security, Explosive specialist, and Rescue Team Member (ICESAR).



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Posted: Mon Oct 10, 2005 5:07 pm



Kaldi, I appreciate your remarks :wink:



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Posted: Mon Oct 10, 2005 5:30 pm

Greek Uprisings during the 400 years of Ottoman yoke of slavery

The War between Serenissima Republica (Venice) & the Ottoman Empire (1463). The first Greek uprising


La Serenissima Republica di Venezia (the Most Serene Republic of Venice). The Doge's Palace (left), the republic's colours & CoA

By 1461 , Greece (with the exception of some parts in the Peloponnese that were under Venice)

The Venetian Republic in 1470

was under the Ottoman rule. In January 1463 , Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II with his army, attacked & captured the Peloponnesian city of Argos (under Venetian dominion). The Turkish aggressiveness directly challenged Venice, then the dominant seapower in the eastern Mediterranean. On January 25, 1463 , a Venetian fleet under Luigi Loredano arrived in Argos. With this show of force, Venetians believed that the Ottomans would leave Argos without war. The Ottomans were not impressed. Thus, the first war between Venice & Ottoman Turkey outbroke. Venetians immediately made a public proclamation, actively seeking the Greek uprise. Almost immediately, Spartans under Michael Rhalles-Drimes, Arcadians under Theodoros Bouas (or Bougas) & the Maniats under Crocodile (Crocodilos. Some sources name him Corcondilos or Acrocondylos) Kladas

Crocodile Kladas

opted to fight in favor of Venice. Rhalles' men attacked & captured Mystras, while Kladas, after raising the Imperial Byzantine Colours of War


and a new flag, with a simple white cross on blue field


defeated the Ottomans in several battles in the SE Peloponnese. By 1465 , the entire Peloponnese (except Corinth & Patras) had been liberated. In 1466 , a joint Venetian & Greek force, marched against Patras, the capital city of the Peloponnese & the seat of the Ottoman Bey (military commander of the region) , under Rhalles & a Venetian officer named Barbarigo . 10,000 troops under Omar Bey , came out of the city & concentrated their attack on Rhalles' men. Though, outnumbered, the Greeks defeated the Ottomans. Barbarigo, after the battle, asked Rhalles to take his troops & hunt down the Ottoman Turks retreated. Rhalles denied by saying that this would be a reckless thing to do, due to the harsh terrain. Barbarigo then, heartlessly accused Rhalles of cowardice & treachery. Rhalles, infuriated, gathered his troops & started a pursuit of the enemy forces. Unfortunately, Rhalles was right. Omar, seeing the Greeks & Venetians disjointing forces, he reorganized his army & with an encircling movement, surrounded the opposing forces & annihilated them. Bargarigo was lucky: He fell in the battle. Michael Rhalles, was captured alive. The Ottomans tortured him & executed him by impalement.
The Greek & Venetian disaster at Patras, heartened the Turks. They immediately sent reinforcements & laid siege on the city.
The besieged Greeks & Venetians after repeated attacks and a number of ferocious battles, were defeated & left Patras, to avoid captivity. The Venetian CiC Bertoldo d'Este , alarmed, ordered his troops to built a fortress at Hexamilion on the isthmus, to prevent an Ottoman invasion on the Peloponnese. 10,000 Venetians & Greeks, troops & civilians, managed within the next two weeks to build a fortress of 136 towers. 90,000 Turks, invaded Peloponnese in the coming weeks. D'Este & his troops, from Hexamilion, with sporadic attacks, tried to harry the enemy forces, gaining time for the arrival of forces from Venice. During one of these attacks, d'Este was hit by a slingers' shell on the head & died a couple of days later. The Venetians, received word that their CiC was dead, left the fortress & withdrew to Argos. The Turks under Mahmud Pasha , attacked & captured Argos. Every Venetian or Greek inhabidant of the city was captured & sent to Istanbul & sold as slave in the slave market. The remaining defenders still alive, (70 Venetian soldiers & 50 Cretan harquebusiers) were captured & executed on sight. Mahmud, with his forces, left Argos for Naphplion. During the siege of Naphplion (defended by Venetians, Greeks of the mainland, Cretans, Greeks of the Heptanese-Corfu, Zakynthos, Cephallenia, Ithaca, Paxi, Antipaxi, Lephkas-and Greeks of the Aegean isles), Mahmud lost 5,000 (!!) men. Outraged by his unsuccesful attempt to capture Naphplion, Mahmud left & began to pillage the Peloponnese. At the area of Korone, he captured 500 Greeks, men, women & children. He ordered to cut them to pieces with a saw. Almost the entire Peloponnese peninsula was under Ottoman control.
The Turkish then, advanced towards Sparta. In the area of mount Taygetus, the reamaining Ralles' troops, organised guerilla Taifedes (Taife: Turkish for squadron). The first squadrons of Klephtes (lit. the thief, the symbol of Greek independence during the dark ages of Ottoman yoke. They were mountain rangers who reaped havoc on the Ottomans)

Greek Klephtes

were organised.
Meanwhile, Crocodile Kladas, had become the symbol of the Greek resistance. Mehmed II tried to allure him with promises of land benefits. Kladas answered proudly: "I will never allow the Turks to dirt the sacred soil of Mani" .
On October 9, 1479 , Kladas with 1,600 men, marched against the Turks of Mani. Reaching the Mystras castle, he hoisted the Byzantine flag & his personal banner. Thousands of Greeks, "dashed" delirious to enlist. Within the next month, Kladas had 16,000 men under his commands. With unabating enthusiasm & with the cry "Kyrie Eleison" the Greeks attacked the Turkish garrisons stationed in Mani (Megalochori, Oetylon, Trigophyllos, Castania, Gastela, Leptinion, Andrussa, Vaskos, Piaga, Papafingo). Mani was free yet again. Venice, though, exanimated after the long war, decided to show a good will sign: Venetian troops arrested Kladas' family & held his wife & his children captive, serving a sentence of imprisonement. Then, Venice made a public proclamation, condemning Kladas' actions:
"January 23, 1480.
The case of this epistle is the behaviour of Crocodile Kladas, a most infidel & outrageous man, a diverter, who does not recognise the Turkish dominance over Mani. We, hereby, declare Kladas to be a mutineer. We send this letter of regret to the Turkish master of Mani as a proof of cordial discontent"

The Sultan, rest assured that Venice would not interfere with the Greeks of Mani, sent Ali-Boumikos , the Beylerbey of Rumeli (beylerbey: The Bey of Beys, the regent. Rumeli: The land of Rums, i.e the Greeks) , with 6,000 men to top off with Kladas. On January 16, 1481 the Turks invaded Mani & attacked the castle of Trigophyllos. Trigophyllos was defended by three Kladas' men & 16 civilians. The small force put up a good fight, but in the end the castle was taken. All 19 Greeks were captured alive & cut up to pieces. Then, Boumikos marched to central Mani. On January 19 Kladas, having gathered his entire force, attacked the Turks at Oetylon. Protected by the mountainous area, Kladas' men, mostly armed with arbalests, broke down all opposition. The Turks withdrew leaving behind 700 dead & countless wounded. Mehmed II, appointed Sancakbey Ahmed (pron. Santzak-bey, the district governor), to attack on Kladas' forces. Ahmed, gathered an army of 10,000 & on April 4 , he attacked Kladas' troops. Kladas relied almost entirely on a few hundred of his Stradioti & Zagradori troops.
With this limited force it is certain that he could not face Ahmed. Ahmed though, made a crucial mistake: He devided his forces & he ordered 2,000 men to attack Kladas' troops, stationed in a village named Castania . Kladas' men, withstood several attacks, before they launched a strong counter attack. More Turkish attacks continued until Kladas' men attempted a suicidal exodus: Only 50 Greeks (Kladas was one of them) managed to escape. For 9 years Kladas & his men rouse a number of revolts in Epirus, Peloponnese, Mani. In 1490 Kladas & his men were in Epirus, organising a new revolution by colluding with Venice. 3,000 Turkish troops, appeared out of nowhere & attacked Kladas & his 1,000 men. Kladas was captured alive. The Sultan ordered that he would put to death by fragmentation

One of Kladas' stradioti. He's armed with a sword & a lance. He wears a mail-clad cuirass and a German Barbuta helmet

A Greek Zagradoros. Zagradoros was the Stradioti's jackman. Zagradori armed themselves with harquebus, sword & small arbalest. The Zagrodoros here, wears an Italian helmet

Between 1463-1821 (the year the Greek war for independence began), 90 bloody uprisings took place in Greece



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Posted: Mon Oct 24, 2005 12:20 pm

The Armatols



The Armatols (Greek, Armatolos/Armatoli in plural), also known as Palikars or Pellekars were Greek militiamen. In the midst of the 16th century , the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (the Kanuni in Turkish, meaning "the Lawgiver")


perturbated because of the constant raids of the uneased Greeks who kept attacking & raiding the Ottomans in the Greek mainland, decided to grant them certain rights (including the right of land ownership) with the exchange to undertake the implementation of public order. These were the Armatols (Greek for armed men), mercenaries who had the obligation to fight Klephtes (i.e. Greek raiders). The region in which armatols had the juristiction to implement law, was called Armatoliki/armatolikia in plural (an armatoliki was a settlement given special privileges by the Turks, including the right to bear arms).
In 1537 the first ever reference is made to the Armatoliki of Grevena , in northern Greece, where the legendary Kapetan Vergos was based. Each armatoliki had a familial & hereditary system of command.
By the 18th century , some armatolikia had gained territory & prestige, forcing the Ottomans to take measures in order to diminish their strength & influence over the oppressed Greeks. Souli is such an example. Souliots were armatols, in the employment of the Pasha of Epirus Ali


Ali-Pasha, apprehensive for the strength & pride of the Souliot armatols, in 1803 , launched an attack on the region of Souli. Souliots, under Photos Tzavelas , thought they fought gallantly, ultimately were forced to leave Souli or suffer, following Ali-Pasha's promise that he would do them no harm if they left. Thus, approximately 2,000 Souliot warriors under Photos Tzavelas, Demos Drakos & Demetrios Zervas , headed for Parga (a town in Epirus by the sea), while 1,000 others (mostly women & children), under Kitsos Botsaris & Koutsonikas , headed for the highlands of Zalongon

Kitsos Botsaris

Unfortunately, Ali-Pasha did not keep his promise and launched a savage attack on Botsaris' Souliots. Only 80 men (including Kitsos Botsaris) managed to escape. 55 women, holding their infants, chose death rather than slavery & jumped of the cliffs of Zalongon

The monument errected on Zalongon for the women who sacrificed themselves for freedom

Thus, cut off from their own armatolikia, many armatols joined other revolutionary bands & turned against their former "employers". Famous armatols who fought for the Greek cause in 1821 were Markos Botsaris, Ioannis, Nicholaos, Constantinos & Demetrios Kontoyannis (of the famous Kontoyannis family), Georgios Karaiskakis & many others

The death of Markos Botsaris in 1823

NOTE: Souliots were very famous for their pride & gallantry in battles. They were also very capable marksmen with a rifle. It is said that they were able to fire and hit the target, passing the bullit through a wedding ring, from the distance of 200 paces

Souliot warriors


The white flag of the Souli Armatoliki, with St. George slaying the dragon. On the flag are written the words, Freedom (Eleutheria)-Religion (Threskea)-Homeland (Patris)



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Posted: Tue Oct 25, 2005 10:25 am

Constantinos Koukidis




As we approach the 65th anniversary of the "Okhi Day" ("No Day", commemorates the Greek rejection of Mussolini's ultimatum on October 28th 1940 , which led to an Italian attack on the country. The Greek Army counterattacked and pushed the invaders back through Albania), I feel it's my duty to pay tribute to the Greek Euzone soldier, the guardian of the Greek flag on the Athens Acropolis: Constantinos Koukides , a young soldier in his early twenties, from the provincial town of Naphpaktos, in the morning of April 27th, 1941 (the day the Germans entered Athens), when the German Officer ordered him to haul the Greek flag down and replace it with the swastika banner, he wrapped in the Greek flag and fell off the Acropolis, refusing to hand it to the invaders. In 2000 , a monument in memory of Koukides, unveiled on the Acropolis

The article describing the incident, as it was published in The Guardian , the well known British newspaper, a couple of months later



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Posted: Tue Oct 25, 2005 11:23 am

October 28th 1940: The Italian Ultimatum to Greece, presented at 3:30 AM by Count Emmanuele Grazzi, Italian Ambassador to Athens

"The Italian Government has repeatedly noted how, in the course of the present conflict, the Greek Government assumed & maintained an attidute which was contrary not only with that of formal, peaceful, good neighborly relations between two nations, but also with the precise duties which were incumbent on the Greek Government in view of its status as a neutral country. On various occasions the Italian Government has found it necessary to urge the Greek Government to observe these duties and to protest against their systematic violation, particularly serious since the Greek Government permitted its territorial water, its coasts and its ports to be used bythe British fleet in the course of its war operations, aided in supplying the British air forces and permitted organization of a military information service in the Greek archipelago to Italy's damage.
The Greek Government was perfectly aware of these facts which several times formed the basis of diplomatic representations on the part of Italy to which the Greek Government, which should have taken consideration of the grave consequences of its attitude, failed to respond with any measure for the protection of its own neutrality, but, instead, intensified its activities favoring the British armed forces and its cooperaticn with Italy's enemies.
The Italian Government has proof that this co-operation was foreseen by the Greek Government and was regulated by understandings of a mllitary, naval and aeronautical character. The Italian Government does not refer only to the British guarantee accepted by Greece as a part of the program of action against Italy's security but also to explicit, precise engagements undertaken by the Greek Government to put at the disposal of powers at war with Italy important strategic positions on Greek territory, including air bases in Thessaly and Macedonia designed for attack on Albanian territory.
In this connection the Italian Government must remind the Greek Government of the provocative activities carried out against the Albanian nation, together with the terroristic policy it has adopted toward the people of Ciamuria and the persistent efforts to create disorders beyondits frontiers.
For these reasons, also, the Italian Government has acceptedthe necessity, even though futilely, of calling the attention of the Greek Government to the inevitable consequences of its policy toward Italy. This no longer can be tolerated by Italy.
Greek neutrality has been tending continuously toward a mere shadow. Responsibility for this situation lies primarily on the shoulders of Great Britain and its aim to involve ever more countries in war.
But now it is obvious that the policy of the Greek Government has been and is directed toward transforming Greek territory, or, at least permitting Greek territory to be transformed, into a base for war operations against Italy.
This could only lead to armed conflict between Italy and Greece, which the Italian Government has every intention of avoiding.
The Italian Government, therefore, has reached the decision to ask the Greek Government, as a guaranty of Greek neutrality and as a guaranty of Italian security, for permission to occupy with its
own armed forces several strategic points in Greek territory for the duration of the presert conflict
with Great Britain.
The Italian Government asks the Greek Government not to oppose this occupation and not to obstruct the free passage of the troops carrying it out.
These troops do not come as enemies of the Greek people and the Italian Government does rot in any way intend that the temporary occupation of several strategic points, dictated by special necessities of a purely defensive character, should compromise Greek sovereignty and independence.
The Italian Government asks that the Greek Government give immediate orders to military authoritles
that this occupation may take place in a peaceful manner. Wherever the Italian troops may meet resistance this resistance will be broken by armed force, and the Greek Government would have the responsibility for the resulting consequences"

London, October 28th, 1940: The message sent by the King of Great Britain & Northern Ireland to the King of the Hellenes:

"In this hour of Greece's need, I wish to say to the heroic Greek nation and to my cousin George,
King of the Hellenes, this :
We are with you in this struggle-your cause Is our cause -we shall be fighting against a common foe.
There are doubtless hard trials to be borne, but we shall both meet them in the firm faith that ultimate victory is assured by the ever increasing strength of the free peoples.
We may hope indeed that we are already near the turn of the tide when the power of the aggressor will begin to ebb and our own growing might to prevail.
Long live Greece and her leaders.
Long live the King of the Hellenes."

London, October 28th, 1940: Prime Minister Winston Churchill's message to Premier Ioannis Metaxas of Greece

"Italy has found threats and intimidation of no avail against your calm courage. She has therefore resorted to unprovoked aggression against your country, seeking justification for a wanton attack in baseless accusations.
The way in which the Greek people under your trusted leadership have faced the dangers and provocations of recent months has gained far Greece the admiration of the British people; the same qualities will uphold them in their present hour of trial.
We will give you alI help in our power. We fight a common foe and the will share a united victory."


Initial Italian Offensive (28 Oct 1940- 13 Nov 1940)






President Roosevelt to King George of Greece, December 5, 1940

"I thank Your Majesty for your friendly message which comes at a time when all free peoples are deeply impressed by the courage and steadfastness of the Greek nation.
The American Red Cross has already sent substantial amounts of funds and supplies for the relief of suffering in your country and I am sure that my countrymen will give generously to the new organizations which are being established for the same purpose.
As Your Majesty knows, it is the settled policy of the United States Government to extend aid to those governments and peoples who defend themselves against aggression. I assure Your Majesty that steps are being taken to extend such aid to Greece which is defending itself so valiantly."
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT


Greek counter-offensive (14 Nov 1940 - 8 March 1941)


March 25, 1941, French General Charles De Gaulle:
"In the name of the captured yet still alive French people, France wants to send her greetings to the Greek people who are fighting for their freedom. The 25th of March, 1941 finds Greece in the peak of their heroic struggle and in the top of their glory. Since the battle of Salamina Greece had not achieved the greatness and the glory which today holds".


Italian offensive (Operation "Spring"/"Primavera") March 1941 (9 March 1941-5 April 1941)

Translation of an open letter to Hitler from M. Georgios Vlachos, published in the Kathimerini of Saturday, March 8th, 1941.

To His Excellency, Adolf Hitler,
Chancellor of the German Reich
Excellency,
Greece, as you know, wished to keep out of the present war. When it broke out she had barely recovered frim the wounds that she had suffered from various wars and dissensions at home. She had neither the strength nor the intention, nor any reason to take part in a war, the end of which, no doubt, would be of great importance to the whole world, but at the start did not offer any direct threat to her integrity. Let us ignore her declarations on this point, let us ignore the official documents published in the White Book, let us ignore the speeches and articles which bore witness to her permanent desire to keep out of the war. Let us take into account one fact only. When, after the Italian sinking of the Elli in the port of Tenos, Greece found the remains of torpedoes, when she had proof that these torpedoes were Italian, she kept silent. Why? Because if she had disclosed the truth she would have been forced either to declare war, or to see war declared against her. Greece never wished for war with Italy, neither by herself nor with allies, whether these be British or Balkan. She wished only for her small part of the world to live as quietly as possible, because she was exhausted, because she had fought many wars and because her geographical position is such that she could not have as an enemy either the Germans on land or the English on sea.
At the moment of the sinking of the Elli, Greece, apart from her pacific longings, had a guarantee as well, bearing two signatures. The Italian signature, which had guaranteed her against all aggression on the part of Italy, and that of Great Britain, which was a spontaneous guarantee of Greek integrity. Nevertheless, when, some time after the sinking of the Elli, Italy had shown clearer signs of her future aggression, Greece, convinced that the first signature was valueless, did not turn, as she should have turned, towards the country which had given her the second. She turned - do you remember, Excellency? - towards yourself, and she asked for your protecion. What was the reply we were given then? What was said I do not know exactly, but this I know, because I heard it from the lips of our late President himself, that Germany replied to our request by advising us not to offer any pretexts - that is to say, not to mobilise - and to stay quiet.
We did not offer any pretexts,we did not mobilise; we slept quietly, or rather we were sleeping quietly - for that evening the Italians had invited us to dinner - when the Italian Minister appeared with his ultimatum. To whom and where then would you have liked us to turn? Towards Italy, whose valueless signature we had in our pocket with the remains of the torpedoes? But it was the Italians who had declared the war. Towards yourself? But unfortunately that very morning of October 28th, you were in Florence. To remain alone? We had no air force, no material, no money and no fleet. We turned then to the signature left, to the English. And those whose own homeland was in flames, those were keeping anxious watch and ward on the Channel, those who, they said it themselves, had not sufficient material for their own defence, they came, and they came immediately. Without haggling, without excuses, they came, and a few days later on the front in the mountains of Epirus, where the brutal Italian aggression had begun, fell together the Greek troops and the first English airman.
What happened after that you know well, you and the whole world. The Italians have been thrashed. They have been thrashed there man to man by us, the weak and Feeble Greeks. Not by the English, because no English soldier has set foot in Albania. The Italians have been thrashed. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they had no heart in the fight, because - but this is another story. In the face of this victory, it is sure because we have been told so, you have remained a spectator. "This affair," you said, "does not interest me. It concerns the Italians only. I will only interfere when the English army lands at Salonika in numbers." We could have asked your Excellency: "Florence? Is it a fact that on the very day that the Italians attacked us you were meeting them on the banks of the Arno, and you handed over to them the Greeks?" But we did not wish to ask. Hidden away with the remains of the Italian torpedoes we hid Florence also, and when indiscreet people brought it to our notice we said, "They were not in agreement, the Italians deceived them." Why?
Because thatis what we wished to believe. That is what it was our interest to believe. So at the same time as we were advancing in Albania, our relations with Germany went smoothly on their way. The swastika flew from your Legation on New Year's day, it came to half-mast when Metaxas dies, and your Minister paid his respects to the new Prima Minister. Commercial dealings were renewed, and you yourselves protested strongly on one occasion when an American paper announced that German tanks had appeared in Albania. You as spectators, and the English, our allies, with their air force and their fleet. Only that. You know how we tried to keep that "Only that" a reality. Enough to say that when an English aeroplane crashed at Salonika we asked the English not to salvage it themselves, in order that not even ten British soldiers should appear there, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, no pretexts. You laugh? How right you are.
But all the time that our relations were like this, while a certain calm due to the German attitude remained, you had begun to concentrate forces in Rumania. But the first contingent were to teach the Rumanian army, the second to protect the oilfields, the third the frontiers. The fourth... but the fourth contingent was 300,000 men. The writer went as a journalist to Bulgaria, covering the road over which now pass your soldiers. And when he came back he said to the late President, "The road to Sofia has just been widened. The wooden bridges have just been strengthened, the shavings of the carpenters are still lying on the ground. It is clear that the Bulgarians have got ready hastily the road on which an army passes."
And after that what was Greece to do? To see the Germans on the frontiers of Bulgaria? To count their ships on the Danube, to see them entering Sofia and allying themselves with the Bulgarians? To hear the Bulgarians talking of their national claims, and to keep calm in the knowledge that the Germans are at Koula to guard the Rumanian oilfields?
But enough. Forget the past. Come to facts. According to every witness station in the world it appears that the Germans wished to invade Greece. Why? If an attack on Greece was from the beginning essential to the interests of the Axis, M. Grazzi would not have been alone four months ago at three o'clock in the morning. Germany and Italy would have been together. From the beginning, therefore, the attack on Greece does not seem to have been necessary for the Axis. Apparently now it is. But why? Is it an order that a front was not to be created in the Balkans against Germany? But this comes out of a fairy story. Neither the Greeks nor the English - this was stated officially in a communique of March 6th, and is shouted from the housetops by logic - nor Serbia nor Turkey have any reason for spreading the war. The war as it has been is big enough for all these countries. Is it, then, in order to save the Italians in Albania? But what sort of salvation is this? The Italians have been thrashed openly and for all eternity, and will not the public opinion of the world be certain of this thrashing as soon as a single German soldier steps on to the soil of Greece? Will not the whole world shout that forty-five millions of Italians after having attacked our poor eight millions, have now to call for help to another eighty-five millions? But if the Italians wish to be saved, why should others come to their help in a way which is particularly humiliating for them when we could save them ourselves with pleasure and without exposing them to ridicule? Let the Italians evacuate Albania, let them shout from the housetops that they are tired of chasing us and are satiated with glory and have decided to retire. We will help them. But, Excellency, perhaps you are going to say to us, "This is all very well, but what about the English?"
But it is not we, your Excellency, who made the English come to Greece. It was the Italians. And now you wish us to say farewell to those whom the Italians brought here. So be it. Let us say it. But to whom? To the living. But how can we throw out the dead? Those who died on our mountains. Those who, wounded, fell to earth in Attica and drew there their last breath. Those who at a time when their own country was in flames came to Greece and fought there, died there, and there found their graves. Listen, your Excellency, there are deeds which cannot be done in Greece, and that is one of them. We cannot throw out either the living or the dead. We will throw out no one, but we shall stand here upright by their side until the day when the sunshine breaks through the storm.
Everyone is saying that you intend to invade Greece. But we do not believe it, and we are an ingenuous people. We do not believe it of your army, with its history and its traditions which even its enemies do not deny. We do not believe that your army is willing to disgrace itself by such an action. We do not believe that a great power armed to the teeth, with a population of eighty-five millions fighting to create in the world a "New Order," an Order which we thought to be founded on right, we do not believe that this great power wishes to attack on the flank a little country which already struggles for its liberty against an Empire of fourty-five millions.
What would your army do, your Excellency, if instead of horse and artillery we sent to receive them on the frontier our twenty thousand wounded in their bloody bandages? But no, that cannot be. Small or great, that part of the Greek army which can be sent there will stand in Thrace as they have stood in Epirus. There they will await the return from Berlin of the Runner, who came five years ago to light the torch at Olympus. We shall see this torch light a fire, a fire which will light this nation, which has taught all other nations how to live, and will now teach them how to die












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Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 2:32 pm

The fourth battle of Thermopylae, April 1941



We were nearly the last British troops they would see and the Germans might be on our heels; yet cheering, clapping crowds lined the streets and pressed about our cars … They threw flowers to us and ran beside us crying "Come back — you must come back again — Good-bye — Good luck"

(Lieutenant Colonel RP Waller, 1st Armoured Brigade, quoted in Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p.155)


German infantry marching through Bulgarian mountains toward the Greek border

Following the entry of German forces into Bulgaria, most of the Greek troops were evacuated from western Thrace, which was defended by the Evros Brigade , a unit consisting of three border guard battalions, when the Germans launched their attack. Adjacent to this unit, in eastern Macedonia, stood the Nestos Brigade in the area around Xanthi . The Metaxas Line was held by three infantry divisions, the 7th and 14th east of the Strimon, the 18th west of that river. The 19th Motorized Infantry Division was in reserve south of Lake Doiran . Including the fortress garrisons in the Metaxas Line and some border guard companies, the total strength of the Greek forces defending the Bulgarian border was roughly 70,000 men . They were under the command of the Greek Second Army with headquarters in the vicinity of Salonika.
The Greek forces in central Macedonia consisted of the 12th Infantry Division , which held the southern part of the Vermion position, and the 20th Infantry Division in the northern sector up to the Yugoslav border. On 28 March both divisions were brought under the command of General Wilson


The bulk of the Greek forces-First Army with its fourteen divisions was committed in Albania (400,000 men).
From 7 through 31 March the headquarters of I Australian Corps with corps troops, the 6th Australian* and 2nd New Zealand Divisions* , and the 1st Tank Brigade of the 2d British Armored Division , as well as service troops, disembarked at the ports of Piraeus and Volos. These forces had been assembled near Alexandria, Egypt, and shipped across the Mediterranean at the beginning of March. Immediately upon arrival, the tank brigade moved to the lower Vardar west of Salonika, the New Zealand division took up positions north of Mount Olympus in the bend of the Aliakmon River, and the Australian division blocked the Aliakmon Valley up to the Vermion Range. General Wilson established his headquarters northwest of Larissa. The Royal Air Force continued to operate from airfields in central and southern Greece. There were few planes that could be diverted to this theater in addition to defending Malta, providing air cover for the widely dispersed ground forces fighting in North Africa, and safeguarding the naval convoys across the Mediterranean.
The British forces were almost fully motorized, but their equipment was suitable for desert warfare, not for the steep mountain roads in Greece. There was a shortage of tanks and antiaircraft guns. The lines of communication across the Mediterranean were very vulnerable

German tanks get stuck during the crossing of the Pinios River

The Last Stand at Thermopylae


The Germans advance through Thermopylae Pass on April 25, 1941

To permit the evacuation of the main body of British forces, General Wilson ordered the rear guard to make a last stand at Thermopylae Pass, the gateway to Athens. Between 20 and 22 April 1941, Australian, British and New Zealand units dug in on the Thermopylae Line and waited for the German advance across the plain from Lamia. The New Zealanders defended the famous Pass of Thermopylae where the Spartans had fought the Persians. By 1941 this area was no longer the narrow defile between land and sea it then had been, for the silting of a local river delta had since pushed the coastline eight kilometres away from the mountains. The Australians took over the left of the line, occupying positions in the Brallos Pass and on the surrounding mountains. At that moment the opinion of senior commanders such as General Mackay was that at Thermopylae they were going to stand and fight. In the colourful words of Brigadier Vasey in his response to a question from one of his men — "Here you bloody well are and here you bloody well stay!"
But despite the determination of the soldiers, Greece was collapsing.

At a meeting between Generals Wilson and Papagos on 16 April, the Greek commander-in-chief had suggested that the British should leave Greece. Hurrying down to Athens, Wilson, on 17 April, met with King George and his advisers. He found a growing mood of despair about the country’s morale and the situation of those Greek armies in the north-west now being supplied by a long and exposed road along the west coast. Defeatism, Wilson wrote, ‘was now getting widespread’. That evening the Greek Prime Minister, Alexandros Koryzis , went into his study and shot himself after telling the King that "he felt he had failed him in the task entrusted to him"


Greek PM Alexandros Koryzis

On 19 April, General Archibald Wavell


arrived from Egypt and a conference was held at the Royal Palace in Athens to determine the future of Greece and the British force. General Wilson was in favour of a determined defence at Thermopylae. The Greek government’s willingness to prolong the nation’s suffering in the face of ever-increasing German strength, however, was waning. Another month of war and Greece’s armies and her civilian population would be devastated. The decision was now taken that the British should evacuate, that the Greek armies in the north-west should fight on for as long as possible.
On the night of 24–25 April , the evacuation began with the removal of over 12,000 British and New Zealand troops from Porto Raphti and Naphplion . Between 21 and 24 April , the rearguard at Brallos Pass and Thermopylae fought back the German advance from Lamia. A minor epic of this four-day action involved two guns of the 2/2nd Field Regiment . They had been sited on a "mere ledge" on the forward slope of an escarpment to cover a key bridge across the Sperkhios River on the plain between Lamia and Brallos. At 6.00 pm on 21 April , a line of German trucks emerged from Lamia and raced towards the bridge. The Australian gunners opened fire and inflicted enough damage to cause the enemy to flee back into Lamia.

Construction of an emergency bridge near Thermopylae

Throughout the night the lights of hundreds of German vehicles were observed coming down the pass into Lamia and on the morning of 22 April German guns opened fire on the Australian positions. Throughout the day an artillery duel ensued as the enemy trucks raced across the plain and their gunners tried to range in on the Australian gun pits. By 1:00 pm one gun was out of action. At this point Lieutenant John Anderson , in charge of the Australian guns, saw German infantry getting out of trucks at the foot of the escarpment. The enemy had found another route to the Brallos Pass out of sight of the Australians. Anderson and his men now lifted the tail of their one remaining gun on to the edge of the gun pit and depressed it sufficiently to allow close range bombardment of the German infantry below them. They fired 50 rounds at the enemy until German shelling destroyed their gun and forced them to withdraw. During the engagement six gunners had been killed and three seriously wounded. The 2/2nd Field Regiment’s historian wrote:

Their action had undoubtedly saved a more precipitate retirement of the Anzac Corps … For these dead gunners there could well be repeated and paraphrased, the message of Leonidas: "Go stranger, tell at Melbourne that we who lie here died content"

On the evening of 21 April German air reconnaissance information indicated that the British defense line consisted of light field fortifications, the construction of which did not seem to have progressed beyond the initial stage. Other air reconnaissance reports showed that British troops were being evacuated from Salamis; 20 large and 15 small ships were loading troops in the port of Piraeus, 4 large and 31 small ones at Khalkis. Heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered over the ports of re-embarkation.
By 22 April a flying column of the 5th Panzer Division was attacking the Thermopylae positions that were defended by British infantry supported by well-camouflaged artillery and single tanks. The initial German probing attacks were without success. On the next day a wide enveloping movement was undertaken by 6th Mountain Division troops crossing the difficult terrain west of the British positions. This operation took place simultaneous with another outflanking maneuver performed by a tank-supported motorcycle battalion advancing via Molos. After offering strong resistance along the Molos road, the British troops abandoned the Thermopylae Pass during the night of 24-25 April .



The panzer units launching a pursuit along the road leading across the pass made slow progress because of the steep gradient and a large number of difficult hairpin bends. Occasional landslides hampered the repair of British demolitions. The railway tracks at the top of the pass were so thoroughly destroyed that repairs were estimated to take three months.
331 Australians died at Thermopylae, representing 56% of the Australian dead of the Greek campaign (including Crete):
WE, WHO TO CLOTHE HELLAS IN FREEDOM FOUGHT, LIE HERE AT REST IN PRAISE THAT FADETH NOT


The Australian memorial at Stavromenos, Crete

On April 27th, 1941 , four long years of famine, exhaustion, oppression, executions, began for Greece. The German airborne operation "Merkur" for the capturing of Crete continued (20-31 May, 1941). It is estimated that in four years of occupation over 500,000 Greeks died from malnutrition . A further 30,000 were executed for guerilla activities or during reprisals for partisan activities . Of Greece’s pre-war 80,000 Jews, only 10,000 survived the war . Greeks also remember the harshness of the Bulgarian occupation of Thrace during those years.

NOTE: There's a debate still going on in Greece, between Greek & German historians, concerning the German casualties during the German campaign in the country. Hitler himself, announced officially on May 4, 1941 that "the German casualties in the Balkans (excluding Crete), are accounted for 5,236 men " (minous 558 killed in Yugoslavia, 4,678 Germans down & out in Greece). In 1945 , Greek CiC Marshal Alexandros Papagos


in his memoirs, accounts the German losses in the Greek mainland for 15,000 men, which is an exaggerated number. In 1959 , the US Army Center of Military History , in its work "The German Campaign in the Balkans", accounts the German losses for 1,100 men KIA, 4,000 wounded in the Greek mainland, while in Crete, the Germans lost between 3,986-6,453 men . This report though, is based on German sources. German historian H. Richter , writes in his book ("The Italian & German Campaigns in Greece", published in 1998):
The first 5 days of the battle (April 6-10) . Page 463: "...German casualties were enormous. XVIII Mountain Corps, under General der Gebirgstruppen (Lieutenant General) Franz Boehme, had 480 dead, 1,750 wounded and 70 MIA in the battle of Metaxas line" (Büchner gives different numbers: 555 dead, 2,134 wounded, 170 MIA). Page 451: "..Infanterie-Regiment Nr.125 suffered heavy losses. Its 2nd Battalion lost more than half of its force. On April 7, it had only 200 men fit to bear arms" (i.e therefore, it lost between 500-600 men).
For the German losses in the brutal battle of Nevrokopi, Papagos writes: "72 Infanterie-Division, based on information given to us by German Officers, in the 4-day battle, lost about 1,800 men" (Büchner on the other hand, gives 700 men).
The contradiction is based on this historical fact: 72nd German Infantry Division, attacked on the Greek fortresses of the Metaxas line, by deploying its forces according to the classic German way. Two Regiments constituted the first line of attack, one was in reserve (6,500 first line troops). Papagos gives a ratio of casualties 1:3.6. Buchner a ratio 1:9. The German CO though, Generalleutnant Philipp Müller-Gebhard stated after the battle that "I've never experienced such an effective defence in my carrer" . Therefore he must not have had in mind a reasonable ratio of casualties.

The crest of 72 Infanterie-Division

According to modern Greek historians, and after the official German edition of the Chronicles of WWII (Bernard & Graeffe, Frankfurt, 1966), the Germans lost in Greece from April 6th-May 30th:
1-German casualties in the 4-day battle of the Metaxas line, 1,700 KIA, 3,800-4,000 wounded, 1,000 MIA
2-German casualties in the battles in the Greek mainland, 850 KIA, 1,800-2,000 wounded, 2,100 MIA
3-German casualties in Crete, 3,214 KIA (as many as the men burried in the German military cemetary at Maleme-Chania), 4,055 wounded, 731 MIA.
Thus, in Greece, the Germans lost about 19,548 men (1/9 of the total force of 170-180,000 men used for the German invasion)




*6th Australian Infantry Division
2/1st Field Regiment, RAA (New South Wales)
2/2nd Field Regiment, RAA (Victoria)
2/3rd Field Regiment, RAA (South Australia, Western Australia, Darwin and NSW)
2/5th Field Regiment, RAA (Queensland and Tasmania) - Converted to 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment in 2/40
2/1st Australian Machine-Gun Regiment
2/1st Australian Pioneer Battalion
6th Australian Divisional Cavalry
2/1st Field Company, RAE - Sydney, New South Wales
2/2nd Field Company, RAE - Melbourne, Victoria
2/3rd Field Company, RAE - Tasmania/Western Australia/South Australia
2/1st Field Park Company, RAE - Queensland

16th Australian Infantry Brigade
2/1st Australian Infantry Battalion (New South Wales)
2/2nd Australian Infantry Battalion (New South Wales)
2/3rd Australian Infantry Battalion (New South Wales)
2/4th Australian Infantry Battalion (New South Wales)

17th Australian Infantry Brigade
2/5th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria)
2/6th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria)
2/7th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria)
2/8th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria)

18th Australian Infantry Brigade - To 7th Infantry Division after reorganization
2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion (Queensland)
2/10th Australian Infantry Battalion (South Australia)
2/11th Australian Infantry Battalion (Western Australia)
2/12th Australian Infantry Battalion (Queensland/Tasmania)

*2nd New Zealand Division
Papakura:
18th Infantry Battalion (from 7 November 1939)

Ngaruawahia:
Divisional Cavalry Regiment ('A' and 'B' Squadrons)
HQ Divisional Artillery
4th Field Regiment, NZA
HQ NZE
5th Field Park Company, NZE
6th Field Company, NZE

Trentham:
HQ NZ Division
Divisional Intelligence Section
Divisional Signals
HQ 4th Infantry Brigade
19th Infantry Battalion
Divisional Employment Platoon

Burnham:
20th Infantry Battalion
27th Machine-Gun Battalion



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Post subject:

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2005 12:23 pm

The battle of Kalpaki-Kalamas river, October 28-November 8, 1940


The Kalamas river

The Ioannina Prefecture



The river Kalamas or Thyamis (its ancient Greek name) springs from Mt. Merope of the prefecture of Ioannina, Epirus. Near the village Lithinon it passes under a natural bridge called Theoghefyron , then it crosses the plain of Mazaraki , outside Ioannina and finally empties into the Ionian Sea opposite to Corfu, between the bays of Sayiada and Igoumenitsa



By October 28, 1940 , Albania has already been conquered by Italy. The Italians since the summer of 1940 have been preparing for the attack on Greece

Band and cannons under review by Mussolini in preparation for Greek invasion

The Army Group Albania was created under the command of General Ubaldo Soddu

It comprised the 9th Army/Armata (General Mario Vercellino) , and the 11th Army/Armata (General Carlo Geloso):

9 ARMATA
(Generale Mario Vercellino)
-IV Corps
24th Infantry Division "PINEROLO"

53rd Infantry Division "AREZZO"

-XIV Corps
4th Alpini Division "CUNEO"

41st Infantry Division "FIRENZE"

7th Cavalry Regiment
19th Cavalry Regiment
-XVII Corps
18th Infantry Division "MESSINA"

32nd Infantry Division "MARCHE"

38th Infantry Division "PUGLIE"

-III Corps
Infantry Division "TARO"

Infantry Division "FORLI"

Infantry Division "AREZZO"

Infantry Division "VENEZIA"

Infantry Division "PINEROLO"

"RICAGNO" Brigade
-XVI Corps
Infantry Division "PIEMONTE"

Infantry Division "PARMA"

Alpini Division "TRIDENTINA"

11 ARMATA
(Generale Carlo Geloso)
Infantry Division "FERRARA"

Infantry Division "SIENA"

131st Armored Division "CENTAURO"


On the Greek side, in the Epirotic sector, where Greeks had to face the Italian invasion, Epirotan volunteers under the guidance of Colonel/Syntagmatarches Panayotis Mavroyiannis , an outstanding artillery man, built fortifications along the border to make the Kalpakis' narrow passage impregnable

The army headquarters sent Major/Tagmatarches Georgios Grivas to Ioanina (Epirus' capital), to advise the Epirotan army commander (8th "EPIRUS" Infantry Division) Lieutenant General/Antistrategos Haralambos Katsimitros about their plans in case of an Italian attack. The orders were:
1-Mobilization of the youth of Epirus;
2-if attacked, the Epirus army was to withdraw its units for a two fold purpose, part of the army was to occupy Zygos passage near Metsovo and block the eastern advance of the Italians towards Thessaly and the other half of the army was to withdraw east of Arta and block the passages of the Pindus Mountain in order to stop the Italian advance towards Acarnania and capture it;
3-any deviation from these orders of the general staff was left to the commanders of the Epirus army, their discretion and judgment.
Lt.Gen. Katsimitros had a hard choice to make, following orders or his own conscience, as Greece's destiny was up to his decision. He decided to follow his instincts and decided to fight at the Kalpaki pass . He foresaw Italy's plans which were to capture loannina, Epirus' capital. To do this, the Italian army had to go through the Kalpaki pass, crossing the Kalamas river . This pass was suitable to be defended with small forces. Katsimitros had just two infantry regiments under his command.

Greek Army in 1940

Greek Infantry Division in 1940

When October 28, 1940 arrived, at 5:30 a.m. , on the left of the border, Colonel Siapence's first Italian contingent is deployed at the left edge of the borderline near Pepeli Village . Near the village Hepiskopi the second contingent of General Giannini is stationed. Near the village Sopini the third contingent of Colonel Trizzio is deployed. Finally on the right edge in Leskoviki Area , the fourth contingent of Colonel Solina is stationed

Italian troops gather to begin an assault against Greek positions

The Greek front line forces are deployed on their battle positions near the border. From the village Kastiani at Mourgana until the village Stratsani at Konitsa there are four battalions. The Italian army attacked the Greek border soldiers who retreated, according to plans to positions along the Kalpaki pass. In less than 24 hours, the Italian army appeared before the Greek line at Kalpaki . The Italians, despite fierce assaults for four days, failed to break the Greek line. On November 2, the fifth day , an Italian infantry battalion managed to climb the Grambala, a steep mountain 1,219/4,000 feet high


They reached the top and occupied it. This barren mountain to the right of Kalpaki was not fortified and was left unprotected by the Greeks. It was a great chance for the Italians to outflank the entire Greek army, but they could not get additional troops so they could cut off the Greek army's only road of escape to Ioannina and Metsovo.

The battle of Kalamas river


Italian Assault

After a violent bombardment by field artillery and Air Force, the Italian forces started attacking on the Kalamas area.
From the left, the Italians of Colonel Siapence advanced to Haravghi, Stratinista, Kala-Dendra hill . The second contingent of General Giannini advanced following the paths to Argirohori, Stavrodromi, Hani-Delvinaki, Limni hill . The third of Colonel Tritcio had been forwarded to Drimades, Merope, Roupsia, Ano Ravenia . The fourth contingent of Colonel Solina moved on the right edge to Aedonohori and the hill Scopia . Until the night, the Italian FERRARA Division, had achieved its objectives

Italian Machine-gunners in Greece


Blackshirts using a 47mm Gun

At four o'clock in the afternoon of Novenber 3rd , the CENTAURO Division entered the battle with about 80 tanks

131st Centauro Armoured Division (Generale Giovanni Magli)

31st Armoured Regiment
5th Bersaglieri Regiment
14th Motorized Battallion
22nd Motorcycle Battalllion
24th Motorized Battallion
131st Artillery Regiment
131 other Units (including two Albanian battalions)

They concentrated their attacked on the Kalpaki hills. The tanks were targeted and destroyed by the Greek artillery, also being impeded by anti-tank obstacles. So some of them stopped their movement, some were destroyed and the others withdrew in disturbance.


Italian Assault

This was the first important success for the Greeks, a hope for the final battle. In the night of November 3rd to 4th , the Aghios Athanasios hill was occupied by the Italians, until then held by the Greeks. The unique and incomparable bravery of the Greek forces continued during the next two days too. The general attack of the Italian Forces anticipate for the 4th November, was finally postponed for the next day. The main burden of the attack was undertaken the CENTAURO Division, assisted by the FERRARA Division. In the night of 4th to 5th November , the Greek units deployed north to Kalamas withdrew in the South, in order to avoid the enemy tanks. On November 5th at about 10:00 o' clock in the morning a strong enemy attack was launched against the hills Koumata, Palaiokastro and Velas Convent without any result. An attempt to cross Kalamas river near the village Parakalamos by at least 60 enemy tanks failed, while 15 of them were trapped and stuck inside the swampy area. The battle got intensified every day, every hour. The Greeks fought more decisively. On November 6th , a new attack was launched by the Italians on the sub-sectors of Kalpaki and Vrontismeni without any success due to the strong resistance of the Greek troops. By the morning of November 7th a new bombing began on the whole sector. At about 10:30 o'clock in the morning the enemy attacked on the hills of Assonisi, Psilorachi . The battle was intensified but the Italians were succesfully pushed back by the Greek forces.


Greek Cavalry in Albania

Greek Infantry Attack in the snow

Elements of the Italian cavalry rode on the Vrontismenis' hill, but were dispersed by accurate firing of the Greek artillery. By the evening, the north side of Grambala's hill was occupied by the enemy, but soon was recovered by Greek troops. By November 8, 1940 the enemy pressure is limited, as well as the activity of the Air-Force and artillery. The Italian forces started getting defensive deployment. The Greek troops crossed Kalamas river and recovered the Siasti hill and Sossinos Convent . Then they counter attacked the Italians and threw them out at the border line. So the Kalpaki-kalamas battle finished with an absolute triumphant victory for the Greeks




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Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2005 2:10 pm

Colonel/Syntagmatarches Mardochaeos (Mordechai) Frizis



In the battle of Kalamas, Colonel Frizis' detachment played an enormous role in defeating the advancing Italians. Stationed near the Kalamas bridge, Frizis and his men, little more than 300 feet/100 metres away from the Italians, were the first who opposed the Italian assault. The fighting lasted several hours and this deadly encounter left hundreds of Italians dead and 700 prisoners of war.
On 4 December 1940 , Mordechai Frizis and his command were 10 kilometres/6 miles pas kalama. The next day, Frizis gave the order for these soldiers to move out quickly to the Albanian town of Premet to block the Italian retreat. He also ordered that the horses for the unit's officers should be prepared.

During the fighting on the December 5th , Frizis rode into battle on his horse. A squadron of Italian aeroplanes attacked his unit. He gave the order for his men to dismount, he himself remaining in the saddle, a proud horseman riding everywhere to ensure his men were safe.
The planes started bombing the soldiers, followed by an attack by the Italian forces. The Greeks were a perilous position, and only a bold counter attack would save the situation.
Frizis on his own went around his men, encouraging them to make a general attack. One of Mordechai's officers suggested that he took cover from the bullets and mortars, adding that a soldier on horseback would provide an easy target for enemy planes. Frizis simply asked in reply, "How can I leave my men? Aren't they a target? " Indeed, Frizis never left his men, and always though of their interests first.

During the crossing of the Vistrica River , two squadrons of Italian planes dived into the attack against Frizis' boys. They could strafe the unit in the safe knowledge that the Greeks had no anti-aircraft fire at their disposal. The Greek soldiers ran for cover. Officers were ordered by Frizis to dismount. One officer alone refused to dismount – Mordechai Frizis himself, riding along the entire front line to encourage and inspire his troops.

At 11.20 exactly, an enemy shell, which exploded close to Frizis, wounded him in the stomach. Even then, he refused to dismount, choosing to rally his soldiers with the cry "Come on lads, courage, with the help of God we'll blow them up".

When the Italian planes had withdrawn, and the Greeks had left their trenches they found Frizis dead. A second burst of fire had killed him.
The detachment's priest arrived at the scene. What could he do? The colonel was a Jew. There was no hesitation. The priest placed his hand on the bloodstained head and prayed: "Hear, O Israel, the lord our God, the Lord is one" .
And so his men carried Colonel Mordechai Frizis , the first officer in the Greek Army to be killed in World War, with pride to his battlefield graveyard.
Greece had lost not only a brave soldier but also a brilliant tactician who could motivate his men.
Such was the affection in which he was held that one of this soldiers, Private Michael Tapas , wrote to Mordechai's wife on December 9 1940, not knowing of his commander's death, and asking after him, because he believed that "Frizis was better to him than a father could be" .
Vradhini newspaper (December 17, 1940) declared that Mordechai Frizis' name was written in golden letters in the Pantheon of Heroes who had sacrificed their lives for the independence of Greece… Frizis was a Jew, and his sacrifice was an example of the dedication his co- religionists showed for the Greece.
Most impressive of all, both Monarchy and Government combined in their praise for Mordechai. From the Court of Kind George II of Greece, came the following note: "On the glorious death for his country of your beloved husband, the heroic Colonel Mordechai Frizis, His Majesty the king has instructed me to convey to you and you family his deepest condolences" .
From Ioannis Metaxas, Premier of Greece since 1936, this letter came "I learnt of the death on the field of honour of your husband, before you knew of it and I did not know how to inform you. Now from your letter I see that not only was he a hero, but he had a wife worthy of him. You and your family as well as those families, who have lost their protectors, will become the families of this state of ours. Please be assured that the protection of Greece will never leave you or your children. The children of Colonel Frizis will be revered by our nation's youth. With feelings of honour and love" .

Vassilios' Kremmydas interview (Acropolis newspaper, December 6,1979)

Since November 29, 1940, I was responsible for the normal fuction of the IIb Field Hospital at Hani-Mercek , a place captured just a few days before by an impetuous assault of Frizis' men on the Italians stationed at Aoos river valley.
On December 5 , at noot, I've heard the bad news that Frizis' was killed at approximately 11:20.
It's true that in Albania, our troops fought gallantly and with indestructible unity. And countless are the anonymous heroes who have fallen there fighting for freedom.
Of all those men though, two are distinguished:
Colonel Constantinos Davakis

and colonel Mardochaeos Frizis


The defender of Pindus the first, the heroe of Kalpaki the second. Davakis' words "I will show them" and Frizis' cry "I will blow them up", will remain undying, as a reminder of two incomparable staff officers with peerless bravery



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Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2005 5:20 pm

The battle of Trebeshin, January 1941


Greek Soldiers at Trebeshin, above the Cleisoura straights


General Hugo Cavallero with Italian wounded soldiers


Trebeshin, January 1941
The Apotheosis

Trebeshin; a huge mountain complex. Spread of 26 km/16 miles. Heights 1285, 1620, 1923. Toward the south, the Aoos river. In the opposite direction, the Ludjerica mountain. Between them, the Cleisoura straights. The road to Vlore. Trebeshin; its view is awe-inspiring.



The Italians occupied it to intercept the Greek advance. They had assessed its crucial strategic significance. The entire 25th Army Corps-4 Infantry divisions in total and one of blackshirts, had been deployed on it. With independent alpini battalions. With Mountain and Field Artillery. With complete air superiority. 18 Regiments in all. The Greek Army HQ suggests that we should capture Trebeshin, to hold the front. The Epirus Command, orders the B' Corps (I, XI, XV Division) and one regiment from the V Cretan Division (10 Regiments in all) to attack on the Italian positions.
In January, one battalion from the 36th IR, manages to step on a small part of the mountain chain. Due to the blizzard, it moves eastwards. The Italians avail themselves of the fresh alpini units and recapture the ridge. With combine attacks on Cleisoura, they aim at the capturing of the road to Vlore and offcourse to Greece. The B' Corps stood up and fought obstinate. The determinant of the Greek success in this encounter, was the HQ's decision to throw into the battle, in a critical moment, in the sector seen as inaccessible or unapproachable by other units, the 14th "Chania" Infantry Regiment of the V Cretan Division, not for a static defence posture, but rather to launch an offensive and capture the most unconquerable peak.
The order was given in a polite manner. It was an entreaty more or less, an appeal to the drenched to the skin men:
"Please, when you reach the top, stay there at all costs. God be with you. I will be following you."
(Colonel Nicholaos Spendos, the youngest-40 years old-superior officer and the bravest of the brave).
Heroism, craze and despair. Self-sacrificies, hopelessness, defiance of death. I've seen and experienced the limits of human stamina, I've wittnessed the last gasp of my comrades. I could do nothing. I tried to help but I could nothing, not even seal their dead eyes. My fingers were frozen. If the two were to fight, who would win? The enemy or the cold?

Greek advance to Trebeshin

Imagine, to try to dig a trench on the thick ice, or to climb a couple of metres up to to the slope and then, when the mortar or the artillery shell explodes, the force of the explosion thrust topple you over down the slope. And again to struggle to your feet and continue to climb up the slope. Hunger, thirst, sleet. Frostbites, frozen feet and breath. And yet, we've reached the top. The Italians had abandoned it. The night came. A few lucky men and fewer those who outlived the freezing night. Waking the dead cold. Now its dawn, we can see the sun. We are gathering the machine guns and ammunition and the grenades left by the Italians.

The Command Post of the 53 Infantry Regiment of the SFORZESCA Division at the altitude of 500m/1640 feet

We tried to be invisible to the Italian eye. They were near. We decided to lie in ambush. The machine guns are ready that same moment when we saw the Italians begin a final assault. They could never have thought that on the opposite brae face, the Greeks were expecting them. It was unimaginable to them, that it was humanly possible to climb up the mountain under such a blizzard. They kept coming to us almost the entire morning, without ever thinking of what was waiting for them at the top. They are so near now, we can hear their voices. "Whoever shoots without my command, I will kill him!" I said.
"But they're coming, they're near, they're hundreds of them!" one of my men replied. They are now about 20m away from us. I was pointing my beretta at the two impatient men of my unit, Markos Hatzidakis and Markos Doukakis...I mean my threat! The Italians by now, are 3-5m away. "Fire", I shouted. Within the next moments, the snow white slope changed to black and red. It was the beginning of the end for the Italians..."Fix bayonets!"...

In the snow: In the Albanian front

...our Captain, Artemios Kourtesses, a jocund man from Corfu, came to a standstill after the first 100 yards...I met him wear two wooden legs a few years later.
Reservist Lt. Nicholaos Katzourakis, was bleeding to death after the battle. We layed him down inside the dugout to die. He survived the war.
Reservist 2nd Lt. Petros Varoudakis, badly wounded, kept giving orders, despite his condition. He survived the war.
Nobody can describe the apotheosis of the Cretan soul, the deeds of heroism unthought-of, of the 11th Company of the 14th Regiment of the V Cretan Division.

Hesiod Tsingos,
Reservist 2nd Lieutenant and Platoon leader,
of the 11th Company, of the 14th Regiment, of the V* Cretan Division.
Gold Medal for Valour


Italian POWs after the battle of Trebeshin

* NOTE: The V Cretan Division, by January 29, 1941, had lost 3,350 men (KIA, MIA and wounded, mostly from frostbites)



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Posted: Mon Nov 21, 2005 9:03 pm

The Epic on 731 (A more detailed presentation)


in March 1941 , the Italian HQ launched a last & helpless assault to break the Greek resistance on the Albanian front. This offensive known as "Operazione Primavera" (Operation Springtime) was planned to its last detail and was supervised by Mussolini himself who arrived in Albania on March 2 . For 17 days, a number of intense attacks were launched on the Greeks positions. For 17 days, the attacks were repeled by the Greeks. The strategic importance Height 731 , stood at the center of the Italian effort. The Italians made every attempt possible to step on the hill. The Greeks, exceeded all hopes and stopped the enemy.


The Italian plan anticipated an offensive action with a front of 6 km/4 miles, by the entire XiX Corps under Generale Gastone Gambara


The primary assault was launched by 3 infantry divisions and 2 blacksuit battalions, with 2 more divisions in reserve. The secondary assault was launched by 3 infantry divisions with 2 more in reserve. There were also, 15 independent battalions of Bersaglieri, Alpini and blacksuit battalions at the General's disposal. The Italians aimed at the breaking of the Greek defence line, at the breaking of the defence line held by the men of the I "Thessaly" Infantry Division , between Trebeshin-Bubeshi , at the area of 731 and Breghu-Rapit


Greek forces were rather prepared to stop the advance of the enemy. The Italian preparations had been known for some time to the B' Corps Command and counterpreparations had already begun. The orders given to the B'Corps units included the following suggestions:
-To hold on the captured territory
-To conduct offensive activities and mostly launch counter-attacks if possible
-To motivate the fighting troops .

At the area where Greek HQ expected the Italian main effort to be launched, these units had been deployed:

I "Thessaly" Infantry Division (I Merarchia Thessalon) under Major General/Ypostrategos Vassilios Vrachnos


with 6 frontline battalions and 3 in reserve, divided into 2 sectors with 2 subsectors each:

-A' SECTOR (Colonel Georgoulas):
-Ketseas' Subsector (3 battalions of the 5th "Trikala" Regiment), under Lieutenant Colonel/Antisyntagmatarches Themistocles Ketseas

II/5 Battalion was on 731, under Major/Tagmatarches Demetrios Kasslas

Major Kasslas on 731 (right)
III/5 Battalion was on Breghu-Rapit, under Major/Tagmatarches Chimariotes

I/5 Battalion was in reserve (Major/Tagmatarches Perrakis) stationed at Spi-Kamarate
-Baldoumis' Subsector (III/4 Battalion of the 4th "Larissa" Regiment under Major Baldoumis)

-B' SECTOR (Colonel Papadopoulos):

-Katsimetros' Subsector (under Lieutenant Colonel/Antisyntagmatarches Katsimetros)
-Ioannou's Subsector (under Lieutenant Colonel/Antisyntagmatarches Ioannou).
-I/51 Battalion of the 51st "Trikala" Regiment was in reserve (Major/Tagmatarches Tzanetis)

The order issued by Lt.Col. Ketseas on March 9:
"Hold on to your posts at all costs. I'm expecting reports, either by liaison or by phone, for the tactical situation to your left, to your right and upfront. Nobody will abandon his position or move to the rear. We will all die here.
The Battalion CO"

THE BATTLE

March 9th: The Italian attack begins at 06:00 with Mussolini observing the battlefield. Within the next two-three hours, 100,000 artillery shells are fired against the Greek positions. 190 planes also bombed the Greek entrenchments.
At 08:00 , Italian infantry launches a primary attack on the Ketseas sector and a secondary attack on the Baldoumis & Papadopoulos subsectors. At 09:00 the main offensive begins against 731 & Breghu-Rapit Heights. Despite the intense Greek artillery fire, Italian troops manage to reach the steep slopes of both heights (II/63 Battalion of the CAGLIARI Division). The Greeks after an initial attempt to stop the Italian attack by firing against them with their rifles and machine guns, counter-attacked the upcoming Italians with bayonets, under the cover of dense smoke. By late afternoon, Italians had launched four consecutive attacks, all repulsed by the Greeks. Height 717, ("731's watch-dog" according to major Tzanetis), was finally captured by the Italians, despite a series of Greek atempts to recapture it (attacks organized by Major Tzanetis). A new Italian attack is launched on the heights 1308 (Trebeshin) & 1030 (Qjafe-Luzhit) , to no avail. At the same time, a diversionary Italian assault on heights 709 & 710 was also repeled by the Greeks. During the night, Greek troops dug new ditches and deep holes (known as "fox nests") to ambush the enemy troops.
March 10th: The Italians (BARI Division), tried to break the Greek defence line at Trebeshin & Sendeli mountains. Almost simoultaneously they launched three consecutive attacks on 731. The first 2 days, Greek losses accounted for 98 KIA and 357 WIA .
March 11th: Activity continued all day along the front-line with barrages of artillery fire. In the night, 2 battalions of the 26th Blacksuit Legion advanced through the gorge between the Proi-Math & Qjafe-Luzhit heights, creating a really dangerous situation for the defenders on 731 (they formed a confined space around it). Their advance, accidentally, was noticed by the Greeks (some Greek fighters later explained that the blacksuits attracted their attention by an accidental rifle or pistol shot), who began firing at them by the neighboring heights (the Italians were caught between two fires). By the morning, both battalions had been completely annihilated: 250 blacksuits were dead, 501 were captured alive (20 officers-3 majors-among them). Italian frontal attacks were launched, to help the blacksuits evade the slaughter, but failed. In this encounter, the men of the Greek III/19 (of the 19th "Serres" Regiment) Battalion under Captain/Lochagos Koutrides, distinguished themselves. This battalion, had been deployed at the entrance of the gorge on the day before, as a reserve unit to the troops fighting on 731. This blacksuit effort, was a "forerunner" of an Italian effort for by-passing 731. This plan of the Italian HQ, foresaw a speedy conclusion of the battle by sending the 72nd Regiment (PUGLIE Division) and elements of the 26th Blacksuit Legion to infiltrate into the gorge, surrounding 731 and by-passing it.
By the end of March 11th, I Division had 46 men KIA and 135 WIA.
March 12th: At early dawn, elements of the BARI Division, launched an attack on the heights 709, 710, Breghu-Rapit, Qjafe-Luzhit and 731 . Ketseas' men repeled the Italians and in some cases, counter-attacked the Italians. In the morning, the Italians concentrated their main effort on 731. They failed again. At Trebeshin (heights 1030-1060) after an Italian artillery barrage, the attacking troops reached the steep slopes. The Greeks counter-attacked and a hand-to-hand fight started. Men were fighting each other with every weapon possible: Bayonets, pistols, rocks. In the afternoon, B' Corps, sent at the area the entire 19th "Serres" Regiment (Colonel/Syntagmatarchis Balis) to relief Ketseas' troops (Ketseas' subsector till then had 586 officers & men down & out). One battalion from the XVII Division (Major Elephtheriades) was also sent in reserve. By the end of the day, I Division had 99 men KIA & 313 WIA.
March 13th: The Italian effort begins with a heavy artillery barrage. On this day, the Italian assaults were almost entirely concentrated on 731. A series of Italian attacks on the hill, were repeled by the Greeks. In one case, elements of the III/19 Battalion ( 9th Company under Lieutenant/Ypolochagos Isaac Lavrentides )


counter-attacked the advancing Italians
and Reservist 2nd Lieutenant/Ephedros Anthypolochagos Tzomalos ) and expeled the Italians. 2nd Lt Tzomalos was killed in the clash.
March 14th: The Italians, based on 717 height, launched a new assault on 731. A Greek section under Captain/Lochagos Koutrides & Reservist 2nd Lieutenant/Ephedros Anthypolochagos Hatzikyriakos counter-attacked with such a fury on the Italians that the Italian troops named this assault "Contrataccato dei Animali" (Counter-attack of the beasts). When the Greek troops runned short of ammunition, they threw away their rifles and attacked the Italians with their bayonets. Shortly, more Italian & Greek units arrived at the scene & the hand-to-hand combat was generalized. Koutrides who was leading the assault, was injured twice but he did not stop giving orders to his troops. Hatzikyriakos was killed in the clash.
March 15th: On this day, the Italians switched to new methods. They launched a series of night attacks. Yet again, the were forced to withdraw the battle field. Since March 9th, according to a report on the situation by Generale Carlo Geloso


Italians had almost 12,000 men down & out.
March 16th-18th: Activity continued along the front-line with sporadic artillery barrages. No Infantry efforts.
March 19th: On this day, the Italians threw in the battle, elements of an elite assault unit of the SIENA Division, the ARDITI D'ITALIA (Bold, Vehement Troops, Italian STURMTRUPPEN)


with the support of 4 tanks. The Greek troops on 731 (10th company of the III/19 Battalion) were caught by surprised and despite the effective fire of the Greek artillery, the first tank accompanied by the Arditi troops, managed to step on 731.


A Greek small unit under 2nd Lt/Anthypolochagos Mademles , was force to withdraw its positions, under the Italian pressure. Shortly later, a platoon from the 10th company under Reservist 2nd Lt/Ephedros Anthypolochagos Georgios Tzathas


counter-attack the Italians on their left wing and penetrated into enemy ground. There, with grenades & bayonets, confounded the Italians, "buying" time for the Greeks to launch a counter-attack.
The main Greek attack was launched by the 9th Company under Lieutenant/Ypolochagos Isaac Lavrentides . Greek troops carrying just 20 bullets each, attacked with fury on the Italians. Soon, the Greek troops runned short of ammunition & used their bayonets. With incredible vehemence, 2nd Lt Tzathas, climbed on an enemy tank with two soldiers & tried to destroy it by throwing a couple of grenades through the hatch! Two long hours had passed, when Captain/Lochagos Koutrides threw in the battle his remaining units, hitting the Italians with Mademles' reorganized unit. Again, the bayonet proved to be the lethal weapon in the hands of the Greeks. A fact which shows the fierceness of the Greek attack is that, from the about 300 Italians who originally stepped on 731, just 4 (!) survived. Greeks on that day lost 150 men (29 KIA).
March 20th: Activity continued along the front-line with sporadic artillery barrages. No Infantry efforts.
March 21st: A group of Italian stretcher bearers escorted by Catholic clergy men, holding a white flag, reached the foothill of 731, seeking for a short cessation of hostilities, to bury their dead. The sight of the battle field exceeded the limits of human imagination: Human limbs scattered everywhere, weapons, rocks, close-cropped trees. The stench caused big problems on both sides: When the breeze was carrying it toward the enemy position, either Italian or Greek, the troops were celebrating.
March 22nd: The last large scale Italian attack was launched on that day, on Goliko mountain (behind 731) , defended by the Greek II "Athens" Division . The Italians concentrated their effort on height 1615 & on a hill named "Donti" (Tooth) . 2,000 artillery shells hit Donti on this morning. The men of the II Division held on their positions.
March 23th-24th: Activity continued along the front-line heavy artillery barrages on 731. Small scale attacks on 731, were broken down by the men of the 19th Regiment.
March 25th: Heavy artillery barrages aimed at 731. 2nd Lt Mademles was killed by an artillery shell.
March 26h: At sunrise of March 26th, Greeks troops advanced toward height 717. When they reached the top, they encountered with no enemy troops. 717 was abandoned by the Italians. The battle was over.

5th "Trikala" Regiment & 19th "Serres" Regiment" , during the 17-day battle for 731, had 7 Officers and 249 NCOs & men KIA, 20 Officers & 603 NCOs & men WIA. After this battle, I Division earned the name "the Iron Division"

731 after the battle



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Posted: Mon Dec 12, 2005 3:25 pm

The Presidential Guard/Proedriki Phroura



The Presidential Guard (Euzones) has a history which stretches over more than a century. It was founded on 12 December 1868 as a combatant and at the same time ceremonial force. Gradually its role became solely ceremonial, as can be seen by its changing names: The Palace Guard/Anaktoriki Phroura, the Flag Guard/Phroura tes Semaeas, the Guard of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier/Phroura Agnostou Stratiotou, the Royal Guard/Vassiliki Phroura and finally, since 1974 and the restoration of democracy, the Presidential Guard/Proedriki Phroura.
The barracks where the Presidential Guard is based has been in the same place since the force was founded. It is situated close to the present Presidential Mansion (formerly the Palace) on Herod Atticus st. and is called after the chieftain and hero of the Revolution of 1821, George Tzavellas (George Tzavellas Camp)

Today the Presidential Guard has the following duties:

-the deployment of a guard of honour on a round-the-clock basis at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*, at the Presidential Mansion and at the gate of the barracks

-the official raising and lowering of the flag on the Sacred Rock of the Acropolis

-serving as guard of honour to the President of the Republic and to the leaders of foreign countries

-serving as guard of honour to the ambassadors of foreign countries while they present their credentials to the President of the Republic

The Euzone uniform

The uniform of the Evzones has a long history, which begins with the warriors (euzones) at the time of Homer and culminates in the "phoustanella" and "tsaroukhi" at the time of the Turkish Occupation. From 1821 onwards the Evzone uniform was established as the official Greek national costume.

The making of the Evzone uniform is not a simple procedure. It requires knowledge and experience on the part of the makers, as well as a great deal of time and expense. The uniforms are completely hand-made. There are two types of uniform: that of the officer and that of the private and each has a summer and a winter version.

The main parts of the Evzone uniform are:

-The pharion, a scarlet garrison cap with a long black tassel, similar to the Ottoman fez. However, it is totally inapropriate, and not allowed, to anyone in the guard to call it a fez


-The shirt (ypodetes), white with very wide sleeves
-The waistcoat (phermeli), hand embroidered with great skill. Various designs of great traditional and folklore importance are embroidered on the waistcoat in white or gilt thread


-The kilt (phoustanella), made from 30 metres/98 feet of white material, with 400 pleats, representing the 400 years of the Turkish occupation
-Τhe breeches (periskelis), the long red trousers for the officers and the white woollen stockings for the Euzones
-The cartridge belt
-The garters (epiknemis), black for the Euzones and blue for the officers
-The gaiters (touzloukia), the red boots (stivalia) and the 1821 sabre (1821 spatha) of the officers, and the inside garter (anaspastos), which holds the stockings in position, the fringe (krossia, blue and white coloured braids, the colours of the Greek flag)


and the "tsaroukhia", the traditional shoes of the Euzones


The shoes are completely hand-made from hard red leather and each sole has 60 nails. Each pair weighs about three kilos/7 lbs. The toe of the shoe turns up in a point which is covered by a black pompom
The uniform described above is the official uniform of the euzones & officers of the Presidential Guard, worn on special occasions. The daily euzone uniform is one-piece, dark blue for winter, desert khaki for the summer. This uniform is called Doulamas

Winter Doulamas


Summer Doulamas


1st Lt/Ypolochagos of the Presidential Guard. Note that the rank insignia is worn on the pharion


From the left: Cretan Uniform, Winter Doulamas, Ceremony Uniform, Summer Doulamas, Pontian Uniform

*The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
In 1925 Greece decided to build a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, an idea which had first been proposed and implemented by the French after the end of the First World War
In 1926 a panhellenic competition was announced for a design for a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. It was to be built in front of the main entrance of the Parliament building, facing Constitution Square.
On 9 October 1926 the Ministry for the Military with ordinance number 219188 awarded the prize to the architect Emmanuel Lazaridis . However the decision to erect the tomb in the afore-mentioned place was delayed as it met with many objections and differing opinions. A new committee was formed in June of 1928 and the Cabinet accepted its proposals. In April 1929 work began and the monument was completed on March of 1932 . Its inauguration took place at the time of the National Holiday (March 25th) of the same year

The tomb for the unknown soldier depicts a carved or anastatic figure of a fallen ancient Greek hoplite. The names of all places where Greek soldiers have died, are engraved on the wall. On the left side of the tomb is written: "One empty bier decked for the missing" (Mia Kline Kene Pheretae Estromene ton Aphanon). On the right side of the tomb is written: "Heroes have the whole earth for their tomb" (Andron Epiphanon Passa Ge Taphos. Both are taken from Pericles' Funeral Oration).
The Tomb contains the remains of unknown Greek soldiers from the Balkan Wars




Last edited by valtrex on Tue Nov 21, 2006 3:08 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Posted: Mon Dec 12, 2005 6:58 pm

Does the Presidential Guard have an actual combat function or is it just ceremonial?



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Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 10:22 am



Greetings, ChrisWI..no, it's current function is just ceremonial



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Posted: Sat Dec 17, 2005 11:19 am

The insubordination of the Maliagha Fortress, April 9, 1941


Inside a Greek Fortress of the Metaxas Line

The Maliagha Fortress was part of the Karadag battle Compound under Colonel/Syntagmatarches Georgios Salvanos. During the battles of the Metaxas line, the Karadag compound fought the Germans with remarkable gallantry. Not one of its fortresses (Persek, Babazhora, Maliagha, Perithori, Partaluska) fell into the enemy's hands. On the contrary, the defenders of the fortresses, forced the German 72 INFANTERIE DIVISION (Infantry Division) to stem its advancing in the Serres valley, after having suffered heavy casualties (250 Germans were held as prisoners at the Karadag HQ at Kato-Vrontou, 102 more troops were captured & held inside the Perithori fortress. Hundreds of Germans were lying dead before the obstacles or the barbwire of the Karadag Compound Fortresses)


A Greek Fortress during the battle of the Metaxas line


The main entrance of the Nymphaeon Fortress. The bust is of its heroic CO Major Alexandros Anagnostos

The marks on the wall, are actual bullit holes of the period


Blue-print of a machine-gun nest:
1-machine-gun chamber
2-firing panel
3-antechamber
4-bolt hole stairs
5-auxiliary exit
6-niche with lighting fixture
7-loophole
8-observation post

At noon of April 8, the Germans, after the collapse of the Yugoslav resistance, invaded Greece from the Greek-Yugoslav border, by-passing the Metaxas line. At 14:00 the first German armored personnel carriers, entered Salonika. Thus, on 9 April, the Greek Second Army capitulated unconditionally. In the morning of April 9, Colonel Salvanos calls his sector's commanders (Lt.Col/Antisyntagmatarches Andreas Georgopoulos, Lt.Col/Antisyntagmatarches Charalambos Krassanakis) for an emergency meeting. They all reached to a unanimous decision: The struggle must continue . Col. Salvanos issues the following order to the still fighting units: "The resistance must keep on. All units are ordered to hold on to their positions till the night comes...in the night all units must withdraw the fortresses & move further to the South. We shall continue fighting the intruder" .
When Lt.Gen/Antistrategos Panayotis Dedes, XO of the Division Group Command, heard of Col. Salvanos' decision, dashed at Kato-Vrontou, and ordered Col. Salvanos to obey instructions. Col. Salvanos, refused to comply. Lt. Gen./Antistrategos Constantinos Bakopoulos, CO of the Division Group Command of the Second Army, ordered Salvanos personally, to comply with the capitulation. Col. Salvanos, threatened with dishonourable discharge & with execution for insubordination, finally obeys: He orders his units to move to the town of Serres. There, with discipline, the troops will parade in the streets of Serres for the last time. Then, the troops moved in the encampment of the 19th "Serres" Infantry Regiment and while singing the national anthem, they laid down their weapons


Blue-print of a machine-gun nest and observation post:
1-observation chamber
2-observation panel
3-machine-gun chamber
4-soundproof door
5-bolt hole stairs
-6-niche with telephone


Archway uniting two machine-gun nests


Nest corridor. The marks on the wall, are actual bullit holes of the period. Machine-gun fenestra


Machine-gun fenestra with enemy bullit holes

The last interview of the 97-year old General/Strategos (ret.) Eustathios Theodoropoulos, CO of the Maliagha Fortress (as Captain/Lochagos), published in the magazine "Polemos kai Istoria (War & History), April 2001



Q: General, what was the situation in the Maliagha Fortress when the Germans invaded?

Gen: Well, I had almost 600 men under my commands. A few days though before the major Italian offensive, in March of '41, almost 200-250 men were ordered to move to Albania. So, in the eves of the German invasion we were 350 officers, ncos & men inside Maliagha. Maliagha was built on the Nevrokopi plateau, at a distance of 2 km/1.2 miles from the Greek-Bulgarian borders

Q: Were you in touch with the rest of the fortresses of the Karadg compound?

Gen: Yes we were, through the radio & the wire. Maliagha had the obligation to support Perithori fortress with our fire, because Maliagha was at the peak of a bulge, above the Perithori & Partaluska fortresses. We had 42 "St. Etienne" 8mm heavy machine guns & two 81mm mortar tubes

Q: When did the Germans attack on Maliagha?

Gen: The Germans attacked on Maliagha in the morning of April 6, at 05:00. The attack was launched by elements of the 125th German Infantry Regiment

Q: What were the first reactions after the German assault? How did your men react?

Gen: When the Germans attacked us, I was CO of the fortress for 14 months already. So, I had the time to train my men, to have them ready to overcome this difficult situation. I have to tell you this: the Greek fighter when he defends the motherland, is second only to wild beasts. He thinks nothing else but this: how to thrash the enemy. That's the only way to overcome a better-equipped enemy


Greek Major/Tagmatarchis, CO of a fortress. He's armed with the Spanish made Ruby Martian 7.65 mm pistol

Q: Can you remember a few incidents from your struggle with the Germans?

Gen: When the Germans attacked us, their first artillery shell hit on the observation post. A shrapnel from this shell hit me on my forehead, above my eye. It was nothing, just a scratch. The doctor came, examined my wound & told me that I had to leave for the field hospital. I became furious: "Doctor, are you of Greek descendance? you are sending your CO to the field hospital while his men are fighting?". The Germans kept attacking us, with assaults around the clock, to finish with us quickly. Their first attack was launched by one battalion. This assault was of no avail. A second consecutive assault was also repelled. Then the Germans launched a night assault. They managed to pass through the barbwire & climbed on top of the fortress. I called immediately on the phone Major/Tagmatarchis Kourouklis of the artillery: "Kourouklis, I want extensive artillery fire against the Germans...the target is Maliagha". He agreed and asked for a 10-minute artillery barrage. I agreed. Then, for 10 minutes, all hell broke out. After the 10-minute barrage, I shot up a flare & with a limited force, we came out of the fortress with fixed bayonets to counter-attack the Germans...the sight shocked me: Germans, dozens of them, were lying dead on the fortress and around it..youngsters, 19-20 years old..we attacked on the remaining german troops, expelled them with the bayonet & we captured a few prisoners too


In numerous occasions, the Greek garrisons of the fortresses, had to exit & counter-attack the Germans


German troops, pinned down before a Greek fortress

Q: General, when did your resistance end?

Gen: Maliagha was never captured. We left the fortress in the night of the fifth day of the battle. We were ordered to do by the Karadag HQ. For five days and nights the Germans were trying to capture Maliagha

Q: How did the Germans behave when you meet them after you left the fortress?

Gen: When we left the fortress we encountered with no German troops. In the morning of the fourth day of the battle though, the Germans sent some messengers carrying a white banner. I ordered my men to hold fire & with a corporal who could speak the language, accompanied with 2-3 other men, came out to meet them. I asked them what they wanted & the Germans replied that they order me to cease fire & to leave the fortress, for the Greek Second Army capitulated at Salonika. I said that I wasn't aware of the latest developments & that, after all, I receive orders only by Greeks. That's why they must leave the fortress area because the battle will continue. Then, the corporal who spoke German, took the initiative and said to one of the messengers: "Listen pal, tell your officers that Maliagha will never surrender. The last standing soldier will keep fighting". when I asked him later to tell me what he said to the Germans, I congratulated him for his remark.
During the fourth day of the fighting, Colonel Salvanos called me on the phone: "Listen Theodoropoulos. Our Army capitulated. Take your brave men & leave the fortress. Go to Serres, I'll meet you there"
I answered back: "Sir, can you repeat because I couldn't get it?" When I heard his order I shouted at the top of my voice: "What's going on Sir...are you asking me to leave the battlefield? Are you ordering me to withdraw the field? The defeated withdraw the battlefield...Sir, in the language of the defenders of maliagha, the word defeat is absent! Only the words victory or death exist" and I ordered the phone operator, to avoid giving me the phone when Salvanos is at the end of the line. After repeated calls by Salvanos, the soldier came to me shivering with fear & said: "Captain, Colonel Salvanos has called many times, he says it's urgent". I took the phone & said: "Yes, sir, your orders sir". "What orders", Salvanos replied "I give orders & you refuse to comply"...one of Salvanos' staff officers was a friend of mine, Major Christeas. He, as he told me later, prompted Salvanos to keep trying calling me on the phone, because, as he said to Salvanos "He (meaning me) will burn Maliagha down" [a short pause, the General is touched with emotion]..because our mission was simple as that: "to defend Maliagha to the last man".
Salvanos continued: "listen Eustathios my son, please, take your brave men & come to Serres". "Sir, I have a big problem with my men too...they cherish this fortress more than their own homes, their own families". Salvanos then replied: "You are their god, they'll listen to you". I immediately gathered my troops & revealed them the interlocution I had with the Colonel. "We're going nowhere", "this is our home", they all started shouting. "Hold on guys" I said, "is there anyone among you who believes that I want to surrender?" "no" they all replied. "Then, let's all calm down. Each one of you has a father, a mother, a wife, children who are waiting for your return...just imagine, when all of your relatives find out that you got killed here, to no avail, what will they do? They'll start blaming me. They'll start blaming my soul 'cause I'll be dead too: This evil man who took our beloved with him...so, this is it...we've done our duty, now we must leave & fight the Germans elsewhere". So, we agreed to leave the fortress. In the night, we took our weapons, we climbed on the top of the fortress, sang the national anthem, we fired three shots as a fair well to our dead comrades & left

Q: Sir, what were the casualties from April 6 to April 9?

Gen: We had 25 men dead and about as twice as that wounded. We had three doctors, one surgeon & two pathologists. We had a full equipped preventorium. We had generators that provided the fortress with electricity for the lights & the ventilators that ventilated the fortress

Q: Did the Germans use poison or asphyxiating gas?

Gen: No, they used dynamite, hand grenades, flame throwers & offcourse their artillery
Let me tell you one more incident: On the second or the third day of the battle, the Germans captured a small hill, Syllas was its name, a few hundred yards away from Maliagha. A small fortress was on top with a small garrison, under 2nd.lt/Anthypolochagos Xenidis. This small fortress was under my commands. Xenidis informed me of the situation & I came to the conclusion that the German entrenchment occured threatening developments. So, I've decided that we should launch a night assault to clear the danger. Night operations bear great risk though, so I've decided that this assault will be carried out by volunteers. Xenidis had about 20 men. We needed 20 more. I gathered my troops & I asked for 20 men to volunteer for a risky night operation. All my gathered troops made one step forward [a short pause, the General is touched with emotion]. I picked 20 men. One of my 1st.lts. came & said to me: "I 'll go with hem sir". I suddenly realise that my picking was most distressing..."Sir, what are we, the rest of us are useless or cowards?" Seeing the distress & trying not to cause a general collapse in morale, I've decided to organise a draw. 20 men were drawn to launch the attack. These men fixed bayonets & in conjunction with the 20 men of the Syllas fortress, attacked the Germans. After a while, Xenidis called me on the phone and gave me a detailed report of the clash: We had 5-6 dead, the 1st.lt. included and about 20 wounded. The Germans had 80 dead. We captured five Germans (among them a Captain). The reason for this successfull operation is that we knew the surrounding area very well. My men, even blind-folded & in the night, could climb on Syllas undetected by the Germans


A German tank in flames, after a direct hit from the Greek artillery


Greek Sergeant Major. Note that he is armed with the M1928 Thompson sub-machine gun, a weapon perfect for close encounters


German Gebirgsjager (mountain hunters) of the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions



General Theodoropoulos is presenting his medals*

*The medals (from left to right):

The Order of the Phoenix is an Order of Greece, established on May 13, 1926 by the then Republican government. The Order was retained by the revived Monarchy, and continues to be awarded by the current Republic. The Order has five classes in civil and military divisions:

-Grand Cross
-Grand Commander
-Commander
-Gold Cross
-Silver Cross



Gold Medal for Valour/Chrysoun Aristeion Andreias, is the highest recognition for valour "in the face of the enemy" that can be awarded to members of the Greek armed forces of any rank in any service. It is also the highest award in the Greek Honours system, together with the Medal for Gallantry/Aristeion Andragathias. The Gold Medal for valour is equivalent to the British "Victoria Cross" or the US "Medal of Honor"


Medal for Gallantry/Aristeion Andragathias



Order of King George I, instituted on 16 January 1915 by King Constantine I. Knight's Gold Cross


Greek War Cross in Gold


Medal for Outstanding Acts


War Medal 1940-1941



Hellenic Army History Directorate
The Battle of ROUPEL [official chronicles], April 6-10, 1941

The following extract, from the official archives of the Hellenic Army History Directorate, is the Greek perspective on the Greek-German conflict at ROUPEL, in April 1941:

A.The Kingdom of Bulgaria, by March 1, 1941, had allowed the German troops to enter into its territory. In exchange, after the battle & the German victory, Bulgaria was allowed to annex the Greek area of the Strymon valley to the Aegean sea.
B.Greece, since October, was in a state of War with the Kingdom of Italy. Despite the fact that almost her entire armed forces had been engaged in the War with Italy, Greece, without hesitation, decided to defend herself against the German agression, remaining faithful to her traditions, whatever the cost.
C.The battle of the fortresses at the Roupel gorge, took place from April 6-10, 1941.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. German Forces: The Twelfth Army (12.Armee-Oberkommando) under the command of Field Marshal (Generaloberst) Wilhelm List

This army composed of the following units:
-XVIII Mountain Corps (XVIII Gebirgsarmeekorps), under General der Gebirgstruppen (Lieutenant General) Franz Boehme, consisted of the 2d Panzer Division/2.Panzer-Division (at Marianopol)

5th and 6th Mountain Divisions/5.-6.Gebirgs-Division (at Petritsi & Meleniko)

72d Infantry Division (at Nevrokopi)

and the reinforced 125th Infantry Regiment (at Marianopol)

These troops moved into assembly areas in southern Bulgaria opposite the Greek frontier.
-XXX Infantry Corps (XXX. Armeekorps)

under General der Artillerie (Lieutenant General) Otto Hartmann, composed of the 50th and 164th Infantry Divisions/50.-164.Infanterie-Division (at Pasmakli & Kridjali)

-XL Panzer Corps (XL.Panzerkorps)
under General der Panzertruppen (Lieutenant General) Georg Stumme, composed of the 9th Panzer Division/9.Panzer-Division

the reinforced 1st SS Motorized Infantry Regiment (Leibstandarde SS-Adolf Hitler)

and the 73d Infantry Division/73.Infanterie-Division (at Dubnica)

In total, Germans attacked Greece with 3 Panzer Divisions, 2 Mountain Divisions, 4 Infantry Divisions.
To drive the Greek forces from the Roupel neck, Germans used the 5th Mountain Division & the independent 125th Infantry Regiment. More specifically, the responsibility to attack the direction from Roupesko to Paliouriones was taken by the 5th Division & the responsibility to attack Roupel was taken by the 125th Regiment (reinforced with one battalion of the 5th Division, plus one Engineers Battalion). 200 Airplanes supported the attacking units.
2. Bulgarian Forces: The coverage of the Greek-Bulgarian border was undertaken by the VII Infantry Division (at Sveti-Brats), by the X Infantry Division (at Dospat) & the I Infantry Division (at Pasmakli). Bulgarian forces, did not engage the Greeks.
3. Greek forces: The defence of the area Beles-Nestos river was put under the responsibility of the units of Eastern Macedonia Army Command or TSAM . This army was composed of the following units:
-The XIX Mechanized Infantry Division (at Kilkis).
-The Division Group (XVIII & XIV Infantry Division), covering the three-nations borderline form Beles to Strymon river-XVIII ID and from Strymon river to Nevrokopi valley-XIX ID .
-The VII Infantry Division (at Drama).
-The Nestos Brigade (at Xanthi).
-21 fortresses or bunkers, from Beles to Nestos river with 8,500 Officers and men.
In total, the Greek forces composed of a Division Group Command, 3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Brigade & 1 Mechanized Infantry Division.
-The defence of the Roupel gorge, was undertaken by the XVIII ID (at Neon Petritsi). More specifically, the Greek fortresses had been under the protection of the Oulaka Subsector under Colonel/Syntagmatarches Georgios Karpenitsiotis (at Detsista). The Oulaka Subsector composed of the I/70 Infantry Battalion, 4 companies from the 81st & 91st Infantry Regiment, 2 field artillery batteries (75mm), 2 batteries of heavy artillery (6"), an artillery squadron of 85mm guns, 4 A/T artillery squadrons (75mm) and the fortresses ISTIMENE, KELKAYA, ARPALUKI & PALIOURIONES. In total, 2 Infantry battalions, one Infantry company, 24 artillery guns & the garrisons of the fortresses.
-At the eastern bank of the Strymon river, was stationed the XIV ID (at Serres), with the Subsector of Siderokastron under Colonel/Syntagmatarches Epameinondas Zesimopoulos. The Siderokastron Subsector composed of:
II/81 Infantry Btn, one Infantry Company & the fortresses ROUPEL & KARATAS. Two Infantry Companies & the fortress KALES. The 41st Infantry Regiment (minous one Btn). In total, the Siderokastron subsector had 3 Infantry Btns, 64 artillery guns and the garrisons of the fortresses ROUPEL, KARATAS & KALES.

THE BATTLE

April 6, 1941:
1-PALIOURIONES FORTRESS
The German attack started at 08:30 on the area TOPOLNITSA-Advanced Post 148-Advanced Post 147-Height 205 . From 07:30-08:30 , heavy artillery bombardment & air bombings. Greek forces intercepted the German advance before the line Height 248-Height 158 . German Motorized Artillery tried to penetrate moving from the west Strymon bank to the main road. They were destroyed by direct hits from the fortress guns. German attempts to penetrate the fortress continued during the day. In the night, new attempt was stopped with heavy casualties.
2-ROUPEL FORTRESS
The German attack started at 05:30 with heavy artillery bombardment. From 06:00, waves of 12-40 Stuka aircrafts, attacked the fortress. At 06:00 the main German attack began with elements of the 125th IR (one battalion) trying to cross river BISTRICA toward the direction KULA-PROMACHON-ROUPEL & with a second btn advancing toward the direction NOVO HODJOVO-KAPNOTOPOS-KAPINA. Both btns advanced & reached a distance of 200m/660 feet away from ROUPEL. One Greek Infantry Company, trying to slow down the progression of the enemy, withdrew southward, near KAPINA. The bridge on river BISTRICA, was destroyed by a direct artillery hit. Small enemy units managed to reach USITA & climbed on top of the MOLON LAVE fortress, they were detected by our forces though and eliminated. 18 assault boats appeared on the Strymon river. The first boat, carrying 14 troops & one officer, was caught on the barbwire & pinned down. The rest of the boats were fired upon by the fortresses USITA & PALIOURIONES. Many Germans killed or got drowned. Few survivors swimmed back & reached the advancing units of the I/125 Btn. The attacking II/125 Btn, managed to penetrate in the area between the fortresses ROUPEL & KARATAS (one German Company). This Company was eliminated. The survivors withdrew toward KLEIDION. Two more Companies of the same Btn, had the same fate, the survivors withdrew toward the TSUKA Height. By 12:00 the troops from TSUKA, began to harass our artillery set at KLEIDION. More Germans advanced & captured KLEIDION at 16:00 and continued to harass our artillery during the night. To eliminate the german forces at KLEIDION, was sent on sight an Infantry platoon & a squadron of light armored cars of the 191st Mechanized Regiment from SIDEROKASTRON. They failed to eliminate the German threat. To the aid of the Germans at KLEIDION, the 6th Company of the II/125 German Btn arrived on time.
3-KARATAS FORTRESS
Enemy activity limited to air & artillery bombardments.
4-KALES FORTRESS
Enemy activity confined to air bombardment
OTHER ACTIVITIES
In the night of April 6, the CO of TSAM ordered the withdrawal of all the units-with the exception of the forces defending the fortresses-of the XVII ID, to BELES, in the area southward of the Strymon river, at MEGALOCHORION. The II/41 Btn, received orders to move & hold the area of the Strymon eastern bank, from the SIDEROKASTRON BRIDGE to ROUPEL. Enemy casualties were serious. 3 planes were shot down by the USITA FORTRESS A/A guns.

April 7, 1941:
PALIOURINES FORTRESS
No serious enemy activities. Sporadic machine-gun fires & light air bombings
ROUPEL FORTRESS
The German attack started at 05:45, with heavy artillery bombardment. Waves of 30-40 Stuka aircrafts attacked the KAPINA area. To eliminate the Germans at KLEIDION, more Greek units (two companies) arrived & attacked. Enemy troops facing destruction, withdrew at GOLIAMA HEIGHT. There, they organized their defence. During the day, the German troops on GOLIAMA, received food, ammunition & medical supplies by air. Greek II/41 Btn attacked GOLIAMA (16:00). It met heavy resistance and was pinned down at a distance of 300m/1000 feet away from the GOLIAMA top. III/41 Btn attacked GOLIAMA from the area LOUTRA HILL, managed to pursuit the enemy troops, failed to capture the ridge though.
KARATAS FORTRESS
Enemy activity confined to air bombardment. With its artillery fire, supported ROUPEL.
KALES FORTRESS
Minimun enemy activity.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
On April 7th, Germans captured the FORTRESSES ISTIBEY, KELKAYA & ARPALUKI & by-passed the POPOTLITSA FORTRESS. Elements of the XVIII ID, withdrew toward the Strymon river, destroying the MEGALOCHORION BRIDGE & the PETRITSI RAILROAD BRIDGE.

April 8, 1941:
PALIOURIONES FORTRESS
The Germans, after the capturing of ISTIBEY, KELKAYA & ARPALUKI FORTRESSES, concentrated their efforts on PALIOURIONES FORTRESS. In the night, enemy units penetrated in the area between HEIGHTS 368-224 & occupied the area around 368 HEIGHT. The Germans on GOLIAMA, with artillery & air support, repeled various Greek attacks. III/81 Btn of the XVIII ID moved toward GOLIAMA.
KARATAS FORTRESS
Enemy activity confined to air bombardment. With its artillery fire, supported ROUPEL.
KALES FORTRESS
Enemy activity confined to artillery bombardment.

April 9, 1941:
PALIOURIONES FORTRESS
More German attempts to occupy the fortress. Paliouriones remained surrounded by German forces.
At 17:30 German messengers announced the Greek Officer incharge of the PALIOURIONES defence, that the capitulation of the Greek Army is in effect. Through negotiations, they reached to a cease fire agreement.
ROUPEL FORTRESS
From 14:00-15:00 enemy artillery & air bombardment.
At 17:00 German messengers announced the capitulation of the Greek Army. A cease fire was agreed, effective immediately.
A detachment of the 41st Regiment under the Regiment's CO, arrived at GOLIAMA & commenced an offensive operation against the German troops there. At 05:30, III/81 & III/41 Btns attacked the German positions on GOLIAMA. Both Btns suffered serious casualties due to the constant enemy artillery & air bombardment. Two German counter-attacks repeled. The struggle continued for the whole today.
KARATAS FORTRESS
In the morning, supported ROUPEL with artillery fires against German detachments trying to penetrate inside it from the East.
KALES FORTRESS
Minimum enemy activity.

April 10, 1941:
PALIOURIONES FORTRESS
A German delegation arrived to accept the surrender of the fortress. The German Colonel congratulated its garrison. He expressed his admiration of the heroic resistance. Then, accompanied with the Greek CO, they inspected the lined up troops. The Germans stroke the Greek flag only after the depart of its garrison.
ROUPEL FORTRESS
The German Officer, commissioned to accept the surrender of the fortress, congratulated its CO and expressed his admiration for the heroic resistance. The German CO of the 125 Infantry Regiment, said to Lt.Col. Plevrakis: "I do not weep for my men, as a soldier, because their sacrifice was necessary; I weep for my men as Human, because my Regiment sufferd a disaster of huge proportions"



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Post subject:

Posted: Sun Dec 18, 2005 4:05 am

Great topic, Greek bro! :)



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Post subject:

Posted: Tue Dec 20, 2005 9:46 am

The Ancient Macedonians such as Perridikas, Filipos II and Alexander III The Great.
Ancient Macedonians had Greek names :

Ematios = First Macedonian in Exsistance
Peridikkas = First in the blood line of Alexander the great
Filipos II = Father of Alexandros the Great
Alexandros III The Great = Macedonian (Hellene) King
Filotas = Macedonian Campanion (Cavalry man)
Keranos = Macedonian King

Ancient Macedonians did not have names like modern Slav - Skops go :

Gotse Delchev = Freedom fighter
Kiro Glirorov = Former President (Who admited his "Macedonians" arnt related to alexander the great and his Macedonians"
Yane Sandanski = Freedom fighter



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Post subject:

Posted: Wed Dec 21, 2005 6:00 pm

The battle of the Metaxas line: The German persective

APRIL 6

Hitler orders 12.Armee to cross the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian-Greek border.

XVIII.Armee-Kommando


Men of the Leibstandarde SS-Adolf Hitler, observe a Stuka attack on the Greek fortresses

The Corps has orders to break through the Greek border defenses on both sides of the Strymon/Struma valley , to open the Roupel-pass , to advance fast towards Salonika and establish bridgeheads across the Axios/Vardar river .

5:20 . The Corps begins to attack with 2.Panzer-Division & 6.Geb.Div. on the right, 5.Geb.Div. plus I.R.125 in the middle and with 72.Inf.Div. on the left.

2.Pz.Div.: The division is positioned on the right flank of the Corps in the three-country corner, west of Neon-Petritsi .
The division has orders to cross the Yugoslav border to the west and advance to Strumica through the Strumica valley . From there the division should advance together with elements of XXXX.A.K. towards Stip and with the mass of the division towards Salonika . At the same time, some of its units should advance into the Kumli-valley to cover the back and the flank of the 6.Geb.Div. against attacks from the Krussia mountains and establish bridgeheads across the Axios/Vardar river .
Attached to the division: Pz.Jg.Kp. of Geb.Jg.Rgt.141, Pz.Jg.Zug, Gesch.Zug of Geb.A.A.112
The division sets up in two battlegroups at Zlatarevo & Gabrene .
After breaking through the border, the northern group encounters serious resistance at Novo-Selo at 8:00 . Artillery fires on the road and a random grenade, destroys the bridge in the middle of the town at the same moment as a 37mm AA-gun passes it. Four of the crew killed. After a ten-minute salvo, the enemy artillery is silenced. The witdrawing borderguards and elements of the Yugoslav Bregalnica division put up occasional resistance but the bad road conditions are a bigger problem. One bridge collapses under the weight of a German tank. The tank is stuck between the two piers and can be recovered after hours of hard work


Mountain jager of a Mountain Division crossing the Greek-Bulgarian border

The southern group has big problems to overcome and the division decides to order this group to use the better road of the northern group. So this road is now the only advance route of the division.
Around noon, Strumica is taken after short fight.
15:00pm . The mass of the division reaches Strumica . Here the witdrawing Yugoslav forces try to set up a new defense line on the heights south and southwest of the city to prevent the German forces from entering the Vardar valley .
The mass of the division turns south but cannot continue because the roads and bridges to Valandovo are destroyed. It is not possible to continue the advace today.
In the afternoon and in the night all available forces try to make the roads and bridges passable for the next day. Enemy harassment is light and rare.
Elements of the division, advancing from Strumica towards Stip reach the neck of Kalugjerica (half way to Stip) in the evening and is blocked there, between enemy attacks from the rear of the division and enemy forces withdrawing in front of XXXX.A.K.
6.Geb.Div.: The Division Command Post is stationed at bulgarian border post 20. The division (left to 5.Geb.Div.) is positioned on the right of the three-country-corner (Bulgaria – Yugoslavia – Greece). It has orders to cross the Belaschitza mountains in the sector between Kongur and the Greek borderline , to bend and advance to the railway in the Kumli valley .
The division forms two assault groups:

Right: Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 (+ 1.Kp. Geb.Pi.Btl.91, I./Geb.A.R.118 (75mm). Positioned on the hillside south of Gabrene.
Left: Geb.Jg.Rgt.141 (+ 1.Kp. Geb.Pi.Btl.91, II./Geb.A.R.118, I./Geb.A.R.95), one platoon 3./Flak-Abt.85 (three 20mm guns at Karetten), Geb.A.A.112 had to follow behind the regiment. The group is positioned on the hillside south of Kolarevo.
Divisional reserve: 1./Geb.Jg.Rgt.141.
If the attack is successful, all horse-drawn elements had to follow behind 5.Geb.Div. and all motorized elements behind 2.Pz.Div.
5:20am . The first shots are fired as both battlegroups start the attack.
5:30am . German artillery starts to fire.
The first Greek borderguard posts are taken immediately.
At the end of the day the division achieved all objectives and stands with the mass of the units in the Kumli valley . This success forces the Greek HQ to take back the 18th Greek infantry division behind the east and south bank of the Strymon/Struma river .
In late evening, Geb.A.A.112 arrives at Kumli valley. Also six motorcycles with lots of fuel reserves arrive. They were used to drive around and make the Greeks believe that large motorized units are present (Which works according to Greek reports).
In the night, the division brings transport columns forward. About 90 wounded soldiers have to be recovered in the mountains and carried back to medical facilities. The regiments take defensive positions to be prepared for enemy counter-attacks.
From the Kumli valley, the division will attack towards the Krussia mountains . The orders were given out at 21:25 .
The night (6-7, April) is very quiet.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.141:
The Greek defenders are not surprised by the attack. Immediately heavy enemy fire from all sides starts. The regiment encounters with unrecognized camouflaged bunkers right in front of them.
At 6:20am , the forward elements of I/141 and II/141 reach the half of the mountainside in front of the “Kasernen“ plateau. The Greek positions are under constant fire by 3./le.Flak-Abt.85 . One gun is lost by a direct hit of a shell.
Bunker for bunker has to be knocked out in heavy fights which take several hours.

-I./GJR.141: At the evening the enemy in front of the Btl. is pushed back. The Btl. reaches the valley at around 20:00
- II./GJR.141: Encounters enemy resistance and is fighting until 14:00 when it receives order to send out a verst.Kp. to the left flank of III.Btl.
At 16:00 The Btl. takes the village of Kato-Poroia despite enemy resistance.
- III./GJR.141: The Btl. encounters heavy resistance at the so called “Kasernenviertel” which is a system of fortifications on the plateaus of the southern mountainside.
A Stosstrupp of 65 which should open the way for the battalion is pinned down by enemy fire. Enemy artillery starts to fire on the area where the battalion assembles for the attack. Mortars and excellent guided 150mm guns fire the whole morning. The units passing the coverless area at the Kapu-pass suffer casualties. Here the regimental commander Oberstlt.Ebeling is killed by a shrapnel.
At 7:45am the divisional commander decides to bring the only reserve (1./GJR.141) into action at the left wing of the III.Btl. It must take out an enemy mortar position which fires from the flank on the Btl.
At 10:00am the 4./A.R.118 joins the infantry battle with direct fires.
15:05 . The last enemy bunker of the “Kasernen” plateau is destroyed. Immediately the withdrawing enemy is pursued to the southwest. An attempt to set up a new defense line failed.
19:00 . The first elements of the Btl. reach Ano-Poroia at the same time as the divisional commander did.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.143:
The attack makes good progress from the beginning. At 5:55am the few bunkers taken are showing that the enemy was totally surprised.
I. & III.Btl. roll up enemy field positions in the rear. The attack of the two battalions makes fast progress and under evasion of fortified positions they reach the first objective, the railway in the Kumli-valley already at 10:30 . Here the mass of the regiment takes defensive positions to wait for the neighbouring regiment.
- II./Geb.Jg.Rgt.143: The Btl. under Major Raithel has the largest sector of attack (8km/5 miles). Stosstrupps take out all enemy borderposts up to height 1528 quickly. Elements turn south, move down the mountains to clear the area.
The mass of the Btl. attacks Kato-Chorio downhill. Interferring strong enemy elements were successfully attacked by four mortars and four s.M.G. from mountain positions.
11:00 . The Btl. reaches Kato Chorio and takes 480 prisoners. The Btl. takes position to secure the left flank of the division to the southwest.
An enemy counter-attack in the afternoon is stopped by Stukas. Additionally six enemy artillery batteries in the area Anatoli are taken out by Stukas in the evening.
5.Geb.Div.:
The division has orders to break up the Metaxas line west of the Strymon/Struma valley from the area south of Neon-Petritsi . The attack sector is Height 307.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.85 supported by II./Geb.A.R.95 (75mm) near the border, III./Geb.A.R.95 (105mm) south of Neon-Petritsi, IV./Geb.A.R.95 (150mm), II./A.R.52 (15omm) and Morser-Abt.732 (210mm) around and west of Neon-Petritsi.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.100 supported by III./A.R.118 (105mm) south of Neon-Petritsi, II./A.R.46 (150mm) and Morser-Abt.607 (210mm) east of Neon-Petritsi.
Artilleriegroup directly under Arko 109: II./A.R.818 (100mm), Art.Abt.602 (105mm, 150mm) west of Drangovo. Batteries of Flak-Abt.73 secure the artillery areas


German 150mm artillery battery fires against the Greek fortifications

Total artillery strength for the attack: 8x 75mm Geb.Gesch., 36x s.F.H.150mm, 9x Flak 37mm, 20x Kan.100mm, 18x Morser 210mm, 2x Flak 88mm, 12x le.F.H. 105mm, 60x Flak 20mm.
It was difficult to set the artillery guns into positions due to the harsh terrain.
-Right group: Geb.Jg.Rgt.85 with 2 Btls. III./85 with 3./Pi.695 at Istibey supported by 9 AT-guns 37mm of 16./85, 3 AT-guns 50mm from 13./16.Pz.Div., 6 light AA-guns from Flak-Btl.609, 2 Geb.Gesch. 75mm 4./Geb.Art.Rgt.95. The I./85 stands at the border off Popotlivitsa with 2./Pi.95, 3 AT-guns 37mm 16./85 and 1 Geb.Gesch. 5./Geb.Art.Rgt.95. One platoon of 2./85 with 1 s.M.G. platoon, 4 s.Gr.W. stands on the right flank to attack the top of the Kongur (1951m/6401ft). II./85 is regimental reserve behind III.Btl.
-Left group: Geb.Jg.Rgt.100 with III.Btl. and 1./Pi.95 northwest of Kelkaya. Supported by 6x s.I.G. (150mm-4 guns from 6.GD), 6 light AA-guns Flak-Btl.609, 6 AT-guns (37mm) 16./100, 3 AT-guns (50mm). II./100 with attached 3./100 stays in reserve.
3./Pi.95 with two light AT platoons and one heavy AT platoon has order to clear the border and turn left to cover the flank. Pz.Jg.Abt.95, Flak-Btl.609 (2 Kpien.) and Geb.Aufkl.Abt.95 are ready in the area of the Strumica estuary .
Stosstrupps of 3./Pi.95 secure border posts 151, 152 and 154 after short, heavy fire fight. But the Stosstrupps encounter heavier resistance at the “Fleckenberg” (Height 1224) which lies between Kelkaya and Istibey. This height would be a very important observation post. After the 12./100 outflanked the height from two sides, the fortifications are secured with help of a 37mm AT-gun and a 20mm AA-gun. The German attackers lost 9 wounded in this half hour engagement. Immediately several observation posts are setup and the heavy weapons are brought forward to fire on the Istibey.
During the fights for the borderhouses, a strong detachement from Geb.Aufkl.Abt.95 and another not as strong detachement of G.J.R.85 climb down to the entrances into the Sultanitsa valley. The two Stosstrupps have order to secure the bridges across the Struma at Loutra and Vyronia.
5:40am . German artillery starts to fire against the greek fortifications.
13:00 . German aircrafts attack enemy artillery position at Omalon. As a Hs.126 drops a bomb near the Rgt.Gef.Std., six soldiers are killed and more than six wounded.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.85:
5:20 . The fast occupation of all border guard posts did not work everywhere. 2./85 which advanced to the top of the Kongur is rejected. Casualties were 4 dead and seven wounded (7:30am). The garrison there has been reinforced during the night.
A Stosstrupp of II./85 takes Border post 158 (Burgberg) after short fight.
A Stosstrupp of 13./85 takes the Flaggenberg (height 1356) west of the Istibey and establishes a B-Stelle there.
- I./GJR.85:
6:10 – 6:20 . First Stuka attack on Popotlivitsa and Istibey. Shortly after the last bomb fell, the I./85 starts the attack. But the planed Stuka attack is not successful. The firepower of the fortress remained operational. 1./85 encounters enemy field positions which had to be taken out before it was possible to advance towards Rupesko. The positions are taken after heavy fighting. But the attack stagnates at the mountain because of well camouflaged enemy positions. The division stops the attack and orders to secure the west flank and to continue the attack towards Popotlivitsa.
Stukas had limited effect on the enemy fortifications and only the mountain guns of II./G.A.R.95 were able to hold down enemy positions with direct fire.
3./85 which attacks towards the northern hillside reaches the first bunkerline with just one platoon. All attempts to blow up the bunkers fail.
2./85 is able to take the first two bunkers at the foot of the northwestern hillside before it receives heavy enemy fire also, from its flanks from Sultanitsa and Istibey.
10:30 Geb.Jg.Rgt.85 requests for 88mm artillery fires on Popotlivitsa and Stuka attacks on Sultanitsa at 11:00 . Despite these attacks the I./85 cannot advance any further and has to stop with serious casualties at 12:00 .
I./85 reports 31 KIA and 91 WIA by 16:00.
I./85 receives order to send out a verst.Kompanie and outflank the enemy positions and to attack Popotlivitsa height from the southeast.
2./85 with one platoon engineers takes the height by 17:45 but has to withdraw from it because of heavy enemy counter-attacks in the night 6-7 April.
In the night the Btl. receives gas and explosives to take out the underground compartments. In the rainy and stormy night of 6-7 April, the wounded are brought to Neon-Petritsi.
Messengers climb up to the 1.Kp. on Rupesko because the telecommunication lines didn/t work.
- III./GJR.85:
After air attacks in two waves (6:40 – 6:50 and 7:20 – 7:25) on Istibey-west and east III./85 (Major Esch) starts to attack the fortifications. The air attacks did not take out any of the enemy bunkers. Several friendly targets are attacked. The position of a 88mm unit is hit with eight vehicles destroyed and a hit at the II./Geb.Art.Rgt.95, causes five soldiers killed and three wounded.
The artillery and AT-guns had better effect. Under heavy enemy fire they attack enemy bunkers. At the “Flaggenberg” two 37mm and one 50mm Pak of 4.battery are destroyed.
By 7:25 the bunkers to the north, northeast and western hillsides are heavily damaged. But the Greek resistance is still heavy.
III./85 attacks with four company groups with attached engineers from the valley in front of the Istibey.
7:55 . 11./85 reaches a greek camp 500m northeast of the fortress after passing the Istibey to the north. The bunkers to the north (Aspri Petra) are taken.
9:00 . II./85 has to take defensive positions to reject heavy enemy counter-attacks of battalion strength. Small detached Stosstrupps are stopped in front of forward positions at the northern hillside.
12./85 is under heavy fire and decides to try to attack from the northwest. There the Kp. is also pinned down in front of a bunkerline.
Gruppe L (Various elements of III.Btl.) followed by the Btl.Stab attacks the western hillside under enemy fire. The group can advance through the bunkerline which is suppressed by 88mm guns.
13./85 attacks via the “Flaggenberg” and reaches the top of the area at around 8:00 . A Stosstrupp on the far southeast reaches the area of the heavily defended fortress entrance and is destroyed there.
Soldiers try to take out the bunkers but the close-combat weapons fail. The flame-throwers don/t work (height?) and the explosives and grenades thrown into the bunkers are thrown back immediately . The only way to take them out is to block the bunkers with debris, stones and other things


A Greek mortar nest of a fortress

10:50 . The last Stuka attack on the Istibey takes place. Again one bomb hits friendly troops killing four and wounding several soldiers.
By 13:55 the mass of III.Btl. secures the top of the Istibey. But the underground system of the fortress is still undamaged. Some surface positions keep on fighting. Two enemy machineguns hold down the two 88mm guns wounding seven of the crew.
Then the Greeks start artillery fire on the Istibey knowing that it will not hurt its fortification. For five hours the soldiers of the III.Btl. are under heavy artillery fire from the areas southwest of Sultanitsa and from the western hillside of Letsitsa.
14:00 . The enemy battery is attacked by German artillery and German aircrafts (14:25 – 14:35) without obvious success. The guns were not visible at the hillside because of the bad weather.
The situation of the Btl. gets worse every hour. The attempt to advance over the Istibey fails because of unknown enemy positions.
11./85 is totally cut off at the eastern hillside. Several times the Batallion commander reports the desperate situation of his battalion.
Cheered up by their own artillery fire, the Greeks start to re-occupy bunkers and positions.
16:30 . A heavy enemy counter-attack from the southeast is rejected by 13./85. Several other small attacks.
The regiment HQ orders to hold on the positions around Istibey. German artillery and air support has to be cancelled because of the bad weather.
18:00 . 6./85 is moved into the back of the III.Btl. to counterattack expected Greek attacks. The rest of the II.Btl. stays at the northern hillside of the “Flaggenberg” at disposal and flank protection towards Popotlivitsa.
At around 19:00 the enemy artillery fire on the Istibey calmed down. By 20:00 , III.Btl./85 reports 3 officers, 37 men KIA, 4 officers, 137 men wounded.
21:00 . The badly shaken III.Btl. is replaced by 6./85 with attached Btl.Pi.Zug and three heavy machinegun groups. The replacement is finished by 2:00am .
But it is not possible to replace the cut off 11./85 at the eastern hillside which is still suppressed by enemy fire. Together with engineers of the 3./Pi.Btl.395 the company blocks all bunkers with debris. Carrier columns bring 200 liters/59 gallons of gas and 250 kg/551 lbs of explosive.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.100:
7:25 . Immediately after taking the “Fleckenberg” the regiment starts to attack from the bulgarian border post 24, towards fortress Kelkaya which was 2.5km/1.5 miles away. III./100 is leading followed by the II./100 with attached 3.Kp. (I.Btl.). An AT-AA-group (three 37mm Pak, two 20mm Flak and one 50mm Pak) covers the right flank towards the Istibey. Three 150mm I.G., two 50mm Pak and eight heavy M.G. on the “Fleckenberg” support the attack towards Kelkaya. Soon this support group receives fire from two directions. The enemy has the sun on his back so he is invisible for the German guns.
6:00am . After pushing back enemy forward positions the III./100 reaches the position for the attack on Kelkaya. The support group from the “Fleckenberg” followed. Then Greek artillery fire on the preparing units starts. German artillery fire is delayed because of the bad weather and cut communication lines to forward observers. Also the detached mortar-batteries which were supposed to fire on the Istibey, were not available yet.
The Stuka attacks (6:10 – 6:20 and 7:30 – 7:40) were not as successful as expected. A bomb hits the 11./100. The regiment is standing alone without artillery support in front of the fortress Kelkaya. The regiment decides to move the heavy weapons group forward to support the attack of the III./100. Under enemy fire the guns advance. Five s.I.G., three s.Pak and six l.Flak are providing close fire support.
7:45am . 11./100 starts to attack with this insufficient heavy weapon support. In the first minutes the enemy fire is weak but it increases as the company advances. The enemy heavy weapons can be suppressed for a short time. Flanking fire from the Istibey makes the situation worse. By 9:00 the attack of the 11./100 fails under heavy casualties, about 70m/230ft in front of the enemy bunkers.
9:45 . The 88mm guns that were firing on the Istibey, redirect the fire on Arpaluki. Now the 13./100 starts to attack under a smoke screen and advances east of the 11.Kp. towards the first bunkers via a plateau.
At the same time Stosstrupps of the 11.Kp. reach the first bunkers. Stukas attack Arpaluki, Vasano and Letsitsa between 10:10 and 10:35. But this attack fails also. 11. and 13.Kp. have to dig in on the hillsides under heavy enemy fire. Some elements are able to advance to the dead angles of the bunkers.
At around 12:00, heavy smoke from burning forests fills the valley southwest of Kelkaya and 11.Kp. makes it to the wire-obstacles. One group cuts a passage through two wire-obstacles and advances through a mined area to the first bunker. The attempt to blow it up fails but the rest of the company starts to attack.
13.Kp. and other elements of the Btl. join the attack. Several bunkers are taken out one by one. The s.I.G. are brought forward and pinpoint attack several bunkers. By 14:00 all surface fortifications are taken out but the entrance to the fortress was not found.
Soon enemy fire from rear positions and from the northern hillside of the Istibey starts. III./GJR.85 & III./100 are now cought under enemy fire between the surface fortifications of the Kelkaya & the hillside.
14:25 – 14:35 Stuka attack on Arpaluki.
11.Kp. tries to take a remote fortification at the Kelkaya but fails because of flanking enemy fire.
III./100 makes no further progress this day.
In the night (6-7 April), II./100 takes positions at the right flank from the “Fleckenberg” to Kelkaya opposite of fortress Istibey.
The decimated III./100 is reinforced by the 7.Kp. with a Stosstrupp of 1./Pi.95 and heavy M.G. half-platoon.
During the night the enemy fire on Kelkaya from Arpaluki continues. One bunker still fires on Istibey from the flank.
Inf.Rgt.125 (+ I./100):
The regiment has order to attack across the heights left and right of the Struma neck, while the left flank stays open. After the enemy lines are penetrated the regiment should establish contact with the 5.GD at the Loutra bridge (3km/1.8m east of Neon-Petritsi).
The main force (verst. I.R.125) sets up east of the Struma before the border river Bistrica at the road Kulata-Siderokastron–Serres (German advance road I) . Art.Rgt.49, II./Art.Rgt.40, Morserbttr.616 take position in the area Kula–Vranja . III./Stg.Abt.540 is attached to provide direct fire support.
I./100 (without 3.Kp.), I./Art.Rgt.231, 50mm AT-platoon of Pz.Jg.Abt.95 take position west of the Struma. The Kampfgruppe takes the enemy fieldpositions on height 140 and continue to advance northwest towards Werk-C on height 307. Despite air support all attacks on this day fail under heavy casualties.
8./Inf.Rgt.”Brandenburg” has order to cross the Struma with 60 men in Greek uniforms and secure the bridges at Loutra.
The main enemy defensive positions are Usita (Height 322) on the east and Paliouriones (Height 307) on the west of the Struma.
Right group (I./100) has order to take Paliouriones and protect the forces on the other side of the Struma from flanking fire.
Middle group (verst.I./I.R.125) has order to break up the barriers within the pass road and take out the bunkers of Usita-west.
Left group (II.-III./I.R.125) has order to break through to the southern mountainside by taking Height 350 between Usita-East and Karatas, take the Loutra bridges and block the pass road at the end. To cover the attack the III.Btl. shall attack from height 350 towards Usita-East.
8./”Brdbger.” did not arrive on time. One group of the Rgt.Pi.Kp. receives order to cross the Struma with assault-boats and take some enemy strongholds to help the advancing I./125.
9./125 stays back as regimental reserve behind II.Btl.
The attack should start with a planned preparation fire:
5:30 – 5:40 . Fire of all I.G., s. and light Flak, Pak on identified forward positions.
5:40 – 6:00 . Artillery fire on forward enemy positions.
6:00 – 6:10 . First Stuka attack on Usita-west.
6:10 – 6:30 . Artillery fire on Usita-west.
6:30 – 6:40 . Second Stuka attack on Usita-east.
6:40 – 8:00 . Artillery fire on Usita-east and Karatas.
7:00 – 7:10 . Third Stuka attack on Karatas and Height 1044.
8:05 – 8:15 . Fourth Stuka attack on Usita-east and Karatas.
At 4:00am , first elements of the regiment reached the assembly area at Bistrica.
-6:00am . An officer and 14 men board the first assault boat and start to cross the river. The water is not deep enough and the men have to tow the boats. At the point where the Bistrica meets the Struma, the boats receive machinegunfire. One by one all three boats are sunk by fire from all weapons. The surviving soldiers reach the riverbank and meet the forward elements of the advancing I./125.
- I./125 advances in broad formation after crossing the Bistrica. 1.Kp. (with two platoons engineers) which advances on the right towards the neck, reaches the road through fog and smoke without problems. There the Kp. meets two Stg. and a AT-platoon which crossed the already secured border bridge.
As the Kp. approaches the first concrete tank obstacles the Greek defensive fire starts from many camouflaged positons. Under cover of the heavy weapons the engineers blow away the obstacles of the first barrier. But the attack stagnates at the second barrier because of the high above bunkers of Werk-A on the west riverbank (Paliouriones). The AT-guns and the two Stg. are taken out and the Kompanie is suppressed. The company has high casualties. The commander is killed. For the whole day the Kompanie stays under heavy fire. An enemy counterattack is rejected with heavy casualties. After sunset the Kompanie withdraws. But two enemy searchlights find the withdrawing soldiers and again the Kp. has casualties. I.G. and Flak try to destroy the searchlights. One Flak receives a direct hit.
The main attack against Werk-A fails also on this day. After the enemy fieldpositions southeast of Promachon are taken, the attack makes good progress under light enemy fire. The heavy weapons (2 le.I.G. platoons, 1 s.I.G. platoon, 1 AT-platoon, 1 s.Flak-Kampftrupp) take forward positions through a ford in the Bistrica because the engineers still work on the bridge.
At Promachon the heavy weapons come under flanking artillery fire from Paliouriones and suffer casualties.
In the meantime the companies attacking Werk A are suppressed before Usita by heavy enemy fire. The Stg. are destroyed, the Btl. commander injured and the Btn XO killed. The disrupted Btl. has to withdraw to Promachon and occupies the heights to the east. The heavy weapons withdraw also and take positions to fire on eventual enemy counterattacks.
- At the left attack group (II., III./125) a Stosstrupp secured the Bistrica bridge before tha attack. The anti-tank obstacles there are destroyed and the way for the heavy weapons free. Hidden in the smoke of the artillery fire the Kampfruppe advances and reaches Kapnotopos without problems


The command post of a mountain unit

6:40 . II./125 approaches the north of height 350 which was the key to the attack on Usita. The height is taken after short fight and the enemy withdraws to the southeast. Now the III./125 moves to the right of the II.Btl. to attack towards Usita-east. The two Btls. Move into the attack positions nearly unharmed by enemy fire. Small bunkers before height 322 are given up by the enemy as the Germans get closer.
At 8:15 , after the last Stuka attack, 10.Kp. (with 1 flamethrower-platoon, 1 s.M.G.platoon, 1 s.Gr.W.platoon, 1 Pz.B. squad) should attack towards Werk-E from the northeast. But the company starts 10 minutes too late and soon enemy fire from the left flank (Werk-D) stops the advance.
7./125 (II.Btl.) sends out five Stosstrupps to attack towards Usita-east. They pass the first bunkers without enemy resistance. The crews seem to wait for the next bombs. The Stosstrupps assemble behind a hill. About 60 men, 1 s.M.G.group, 1 Gr.W.- and one radio-squad. Other Stosstrupps missed this lucky moment and came under heavy fire in which the commander of the 7.Kp. is killed.
Commanded by a Oberfeldwebel the small Kampfgruppe advances towards the village Kleidi . In the meantime the rest of the II./125 comes under heavy enemy fire from the heights. The companies tried to advance between two fortifications to reach the valleys south of Usita. One and a half platoons of the 6.Kp. reach the safe valley. In the afternoon the Btl. commander with the 8.Kp. In the evening the 5./125 tried to follow but comes under heavy fire and is disrupted. Elements reach the other companies but some are captured by counterattacking Greeks.
9:45 . The second attack after artillery preparation fire and Stuka attack, starts. Under heavy fire the assault groups can reach the first line of bunkers but the attacks stop again because of heavy casualties. All flamethrowers are taken out and the assault groups have high casualties. The Stg. haven't reached the scene yet because of the heavy terrain.
16:00 . 7./125 takes Kleidi. The following 6.Kp. comes in the right moment to attack Greek forces on their flank. 7. and 6.Kp. (~ 120 men) advance in the evening to reach height 520.
18:20 . The third attack with four Stg., three light AT-guns, 2 platoons 11.Kp., one platoon 13.Kp., one Pz.B. squad and one Gr.W.group attacks after Stuka and artillery preparation. Friendly bombs hit friendly troops and enemy fire from unknown flanking positions stop the attack again and the Btl. takes defensive positions. After sunset, 10.Kp. was able to withdraw.
The attack of the regiment failed at all locations. Not a single fortification was taken out and casualties are high. During the rainy night several Greek counterattacks had to be rejected.
72.Inf.Div.:
Has order to attack along the road Libjahovo – Kato Vrontou towards Serres, to cross the Struma and attack towards Salonika. If necessary, elements can turn northwest to support the attack on the Roupel gorge. To secure their own flank, elements are ordered to attack east on the road via Mikropolis and take Drama at the southern edge of the mountains.
The division sets up without friendly troops on the left and right, along the road to Kato Vrontou (German advance road II). The division expected light enemy resistance by border guards and a weak second defense line. This was not the case and the division encounters heavy resistance from heavily fortified positions.
5:20 . The division starts to attack the enemy positions between Vathytopos-Nevrokopion with three battle groups.
-III./Inf.Rgt.124 (radfahr-Btl.) with other mobilized units, stays back as advance unit.
[b]-I./Inf.Rgt.266 is Korpsreserve.
Right attack group east of Akrinon: verst.Inf.Rgt.124 with I. and II.Btl., II./A.rt.Rgt.172, 1./Pi.Btl.72, one platoon 20mm Flak and one platoon Stg.) has order to take Perithorion and advance towards Serres via Kato Vrontou. After three border posts taken, the group advances to the valley of Vathytopos. I.Btl. overran enemy positions on height 887 from the left. No serious enemy resistance by now. Then the Stg. are ordered to move forward and the II./A.R.172 goes into position. But it was not possible to silence the increasing enemy artillery fire. Despite the enemy fire the infantry advances to the area north of height 906 (Werkgrupp Maliagha) . As both Btls. start to attack the height from the Terlit creek valley , the resistance is heavier than expected.
The prepared attack of I./124 is stopped by heavy enemy fire.
During the night it was not possible to bring artillery forward because of heavy enemy harassing fire. Two le.I.G. platoons of 13./I.R.124 are subordinated to II./124.
Inf.Rgt.105: The regiment with subordinated II./Inf.Rgt.266 (+13., 14./266), 3./Pi.Btl.72, 3./Flak 23, one platoon Stg., Art.Rgt.72 without II.Abt. forms Angriffsgruppe Mitte.
II./Inf.Rgt.266 makes good progress because the Greek border troops withdraw without resistance. The verst.Btl. reaches the road on the northern edge of the valley at 08:30 . AT-guns were not able to follow the infantry due to the heavy terrain. As ordered the II./266 makes a turn to the southwest towards Perithorion to take the pass-road leading to Kato Vrontou.
As the forward elements of the Btl. reach the western mountainside and the road there, heavy machine gun fire from Werk Perithori starts. All attempts to get closer to the enemy positions fail under heavy fire.
14:00 . Two enemy bunkers are taken out by the recently arrived 3./Flak 23. Shortly afterwards the guns of the company are taken out by heavy enemy fire.
The Btl. commander decides to attack Werk Perithori in the night but Inf.Rgt.105 does not allow that and orders a prepared attack on 8 April at 05:30 . The companies of the Btl. are reorganized during the night.
II.-III./105 with attached artillery and other units advance on Vormarschstrasse II with order to take the Kalapoti pass via Nevrokopion – Ochyron . Without enemy resistance the Btls. reach Nevrokopion at around 10:00 . Two enemy bunkers on the road were taken out by guns of 3./Flak 23.
The enemy has destroyed roads and bridges. Thus, the artillery is far behind. 3./Pi.72 can repair an important bridge by 15:00. I.-III./Art.Rgt.72 suffer losses during its advance by enemy artillery.
11:00 . II.-III./105 reach the area 1.5km/1m southwest of Nevrokopion. Without waiting for the coming artillery the Btls. attack village and Werk Ochyron . A heavy Flak is brought forward to support the attack which fires on identified enemy positions at Ochyron with good success.
Because of no enemy resistance (except artillery fire), II./105 is turned southwest to attack towards the Kresti mountain and take the pass-road to Mikropolis.
III./105 is considered strong enough to take Werk Ochyron alone.
14:00. II./105 under Hptm.Nietsche passes the Ochyron mountain to the west. Under the eyes of the Greeks the Btl. advances through swamp terrain. Under constant enemy artillery fire the Btl. reaches the shrub area between Werk Partaluska and Dasalvi at around 17:00 . There it was out of enemy direct fire.
III./105 is not able to take Werk Ochyron. The village Ochyron is taken and the heavy weapons are brought into position to fire on the bunkers but the attack has to be stopped because of heavy enemy resistance. At 1:00 in the night 6-7 April the III./105 follows the same way as the II.Btl. did during the day.
Verst. 10./Inf.Rgt.266 reaches Nevrokopion without enemy contact. Greek positions on the southeastern height 972 are taken. By 8 April, the entire mountain (1085m/3560 feet high) north of Werk Pyramidoid is occupied and secured.

XXX.A.K.

Has orders to advance through the Rhodope mountains and open the exit to the coastal area at the cities of Xanthi and Komotini. By turning west it has to cross the Nestos river and advance towards Salonika via Kavala and Amphipolis. Elements should also reach the Aegean coast and secure the islands and coast there.

5:20 . The divisions of the Korps cross the Greek border at all locations, facing light enemy resistance.

164.Inf.Div.:

Has orders to advance on road III via Ehinos and take the bridge across the Nestos. At Stavroupolis has to pass to through the mountains north of Kavala.

With II./Inf.Rgt.382 (with Radf.Schwdr.220) ahead, the division crosses the border under light enemy fire. After crossing seven destroyed bridges and one large stone barrier, the Btl. reaches the area 2km/1.2 miles north of Ehinos at 9:30 .
Here the forward elements receive heavy fire from bunkers on height 785 and have to withdraw.
Around mid-day, two companies of II./382 take positions north of the enemy fortifications while one company takes position on a height on the south, to suppress the enemy. Although the following I./382 had already outflanked the enemy fortification, the Greek defenders fight fiercly.
The commander of the division decides to attack the fortification tomorrow.
- I./Inf.Rgt.382 leaves the advance road at Kotyli to outflank Ehinos and encounters with light enemy resistance at Phani. It reaches Miki southwest of Ehinos. The Btl. continues towards Toxotes via Xanthi to take the Nestos bridge there.
- Inf.Rgt.440: Crosses the border from Camzas and has order to take the Nestos bridge at Stavroupolis. The regiment crosses the border against light enemy resistance and advances through heavy mountain terrain via height 1468 and 1573. Advancing south, the regiment is stopped by enemy fire at height 1608. After 7 hours of fighting, enemy resistance is broken.

50.Inf.Div.:

Has order to take Xanthi by advancing as fast as possible on road IV via Komotini. Take the bridge across the Nestos at Toxotes and breaks through to Kavalla. To capture Alexandroupolis the division has to detach a group which is strong enough.
The division forms three groups advancing on and beside road IV. The advance unit to the Nestos under the command of Kdr. I.R.122 with II./121 (on trucks), Pz.Jg.Abt.150, 1 s. and ½ le.Bttr. of I./Flak 64, 3./Pi.71 (mot), 100mm Bttr. Of II./Art.Rgt.65. Later Stg.Abt.190 is added. Prepared for advancing east is A.A.150. Waiting to advance through the opened mountain passes were II./122 (Div.reserve), I.R.122 (without II.), Art.Rgt.109, II./A.R.63, II./A.R.65 (without 1 Bttr.) as reserve
- II./Inf.Rgt.123 on the left is the fastest unit. Marching through the mountains it passes Werk Nympaea (Hohe 685) via Kato Mitikas. II./123 reaches Komotini in the evening without enemy contact. Obviously the enemy considered the terrain as impassable and did not defend it.
- The main column (I.R.123 without II.Btl., 3./Pi.85, Stg.Abt.190 (18 guns), 1 platoon light and 1 platoon heavy Flak (2x 88mm) of I./Flak 64, Art.Rgt.150 without II.Abt.) has to expect more enemy resistance and advances with I./123 in front, III./123 behind, 1.Kp. east, 2. and 9.Kp. in the west. After passing several road blocks heavy machinegunfire from Werk Nymphaea starts at 8:15. After direct fire of the AA-guns was ineffective, 4 Stg. were ordered to fire at the bunkers. The infantry did not take advantage of the fire support immediately and is pinned down. In the late afternoon a battery Stg. is ordered to fire on the fortifications. Now the enemy blows up the neck between the heights which causes three huge craters and makes it impossible fo the Stg. to advance. Into the night height 510 is taken under harassing fire.

The fighting north of Nymphaea (20km/12.5miles north of Komotini).

- Inf.Rgt.122 is advancing south along road IV from the area Cakal. It marches across the mountains on a small path and encounters enemy positions before height 893. After short heavy fight the I./122 breaks the enemy resistance and reaches Sostis at the southern tip of the mountains in the evening. A Kompanie of the Btl. which should attack Werk Nymphaea via Komotini tomorrow, is not attached any more.

12.Armee

The offensive started according to plan. Heavy enemy reistance especially at the Roupel gorge. Several roads and bridges are blown up in Greece.

5.Pz.Div.: In the ordered area.
4.Geb.Div.: Crossed the Petrohan pass with mass of the division.
60.Inf.Div.(mot): Is moved forward into the area Sofia – Somokov – Ihtiman.
76.Inf.Div.: Forward elements at Bloesnizevo (8km south of Lukovit), end elements east of Pleven. Report from 8.4. 08:00: Forward elements Osikovica (20km/12.5miles east of Botevgrad), rear elements Grn.Doebnik (20km/12.5miles SW of Pleven).
198.Inf.Div.: arrives at Pleven.


April 7

XVIII.A.K.

Because of the mountaineous region the Korps has problems to hold radio contact with the various units. So the Korps establishes a radio station at the highest point of the Belschitza mountains and a relais (Funkwiederholer) station on the Istibey.
2.Pz.Div.: Div.Gef.Std. in Strumica .
The battlegroup which advanced from Strumica towards Stip meets elements of the 73.Inf.Div. before Stip and turns around to follow the rest of the division to the south.
In the afternoon the division starts to advance from Strumica towards Kosturino and the Greek border.
The division decides to take the smaller more difficult route along lake Doiran as it expects heavy resistance on the road through the Vardar valley. With this decision the division hits the most vulnerable location of the enemy defenses for Salonika.
The road is difficult and the long columns are slow on the steep and windy paths. Most bridges are destroyed or too weak for tanks so the engineers have to build a bridge across every small creek. The rain makes the situation worse.
But nevertheless the advance unit makes good progress and reaches Novi Doiran at the eastbank of lake Doiran at 23:00 .
Enemy resistance is weak and most road blocks were undefended. Occasional enemy resistance especially at the pass behind Kosturino is quickly broken.
The Yugoslav units consisted mostly of Slovenian and Croatian soldiers, didn't show a big will to fight.
In the evening the enemy tries to attack the division from the flank. At around 19:00 enemy tanks attack from the area Valandovo. The attack is rejected by the advance unit. About ten enemy Renault tanks are destroyed.
In the night 7./8. April the mass of the division reaches lake Doiran and sets up for the attack towards the Greek border.

6.Geb.Div.:
The situation of the division is dangerous. Without neighbouring units and without the support of heavy weapons the battalions stand in the Kumli valley. The division prepares to attack the last Greek defense line when neighbour units arrive.
During the day all light artillery elements arrive. Also the Reiterschwadron of Geb.A.A.112 arrives crossing the snowy mountains with their horses.
To prepare the attack on the Krussia mountains the I./Geb.Jg.Rgt.141 which secures the Struma valley at Theodoritsi and Livadia is ordered to advance to Rodopolis. Stukas should prepare the attack.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 must secure the mountain exit southeast of lake Doiran, Geb.Jg.Rgt.141 the left of the city of Heraklion. Geb.A.A.112 has to advance through the upper Kumli valley and establish contact with the 2.Pz.Div. at lake Doiran.
Because of communication problems the Stuka attack cannot be synchronized with the attack of the regiments. So 70 Stukas attack at 13:00 and inflict heavy casualties especially at the right wing where the Greek artillery stopped firing.
Because of the good success of the Stuka attack the divisonal commander decides to attack today at 16:00.
16:00 . Five battalions (III./141 in reserve) attack the Krussia mountains through swampy terrain and cross the Kumli creek. Greek defenders did obviously not expect an attack that late on the day and are totally surprised. While the heavy weapons hold down enemy positions the infantry attack makes good progress.
Enemy just resists at some locations. The resistance is broken by heavy machineguns.
17:00 . The I. and II./141 storm the positions of the 3rd Greek motorized regiment and advance fast west of the road to Heraklion breaking occasional light resistance.
Taking advantage of the success the commander of the division orders to pursue the enemy across the Krussia mountains without cover of the flanks. To get the orders to the units Ordonnanz-officers are sent to the battalions.
20:30 . All enemy positions in the Krussia mountains are taken. The battalions advance through the night taking many prisoners after short fire fight.
5.Geb.Div. (+ I.R.125): Div.Gef.Std. north of Istibey.
Geb,Jg,Rgt,100: At around 6:00, III./100 rejects an enemy counter-attack on Kelkaya and discovers an entrance to the fortress on the eastside.
Stosstrupps enter the underground system and force the enemy to surrender with explosives and smoke.
At 7:45 four officers and 150 men come out of the fortress, believing they were gased.
Shortly afterwards the 12./100 and a Stosstrupp of 1./Pi.95 take another outside fortification to the east. At 8:00 40 enemy soldiers surrender there. This is the first fortress of the Metaxas line which has been taken.
The division sees the chance and orders the main effort to take place in the sector of the regiment. The regiment should break through at the fortress Didymi and send a battalion to Neon-Petritsi . If possible the mass of Geb.Jg.Rgt.85, Radf.Schw./Geb.A.A.95, Flak-Btl.609 should follow.
But early in the morning it was obvious that not all enemy positions have been taken out and casualties occurred. The division decided to clear the area carefully before advancing.
9:00 . The regimental commander decides to advance even though Istibey still fires occasionally.
After the artillery guns of fortress Didymi iare taken out by direct hits of a s.I.G. the 7. (right) & the 12.Kp. (left) attack the fortress. The heavy weapons follow and suppress the enemy bunkers.
11:00 . Two bunkers on the western mountaintop are taken out.
11:30 . 7./100 secures the forested southern mountainside while the 12.Kp. reaches the height opposite of Didymi after a failed frontal attack. Here the two companies are pinned down by heavy enemy fire. The heavy weapons follow slowly because of heavily mined paths.
14:45 . The heavy weapons open fire on the enemy fortifications. The artillery fires on fortress Arpaluki and Vasano behind.
At around 16:00 fortress Didymi is taken after short fight. Two officers and 100 men surrender. This is the key position for the attack on Arpaluki.
During the night 7./8. the enemy withdraws from fortress Arpaluki after the armoured-cupola and two gun bunkers were destroyed by direct hits.
-Geb.Jg.Rgt.85: The regiment is still fighting for several enemy bunkers and fortifications in the area. 1.Kp. is still suppressed at the peak of Rupesko.
- I./GJR.85: 3.Kp. tries to blow up several bunkers without success & attacks bunkers at the western mountainside. Several heavy Greek counterattacks from above are rejected in close combat.
The verst. 2.Kp. tries again to make a turn towards the eastern mountaintop. By 15:00 the company takes the northern mountainside Sultanitsa. While an engineer-platoon attacks the top from the back, 2.Kp. continues to attack Sultanitsa.
Sultanitsa is taken and the company sends forward positions towards the Struma-valley. Six enemy artillery guns are captured.
- II./GJR.85:
6:00 . II./85 starts to block the sight of enemy bunkers at the Istibey. But the enemy appears to have taken positions again and again and continues to fight. Two or three machineguns on the northeastern hillside of GJR.100 make it impossible to get in contact with the 11./85. These machineguns are taken out by a platoon of 7./85.
Now the Germans pour 200 litres/53 gallons of fuel into a blown up cupola at the mountaintop and throw explosives into all holes and openings.
9:00. Lt.Klingeisen (Pi.Zugfuhrer) enters with several men the underground system of the Istibei. Deep down he encounters with organized heavy resistance and has to withdraw.
9:30 . Somewhere in the fortress area a white flag appears. But all the time enemy soldiers start firing again and again.
11:15 (16:00 according to Greek sources) . Fortress Istibey surrenders officially. 8 officers, 450 men are taken prisoners. 5 officers and 38 greek soldiers were killed, over 100 wounded.
Immediately the division orders to start to advance through the gap at the sector of GJR.85. But the paths and roads are muddy because of the rain and the vehicles are stuck. Also the mules have problems to move.
All soldiers of Geb.A..A.95 and Flak-Btl.609 under command of the Stab Geb.Pi.Btl.95 are ordered to make the roads passable again.
Major Dr.Treeck decides to take advantage of the success and orders his II./85 to advance. 7./85 advances, followed by the other elements of the Btl. Under rain and fog the Btl. reaches Trapesko at 15:00. The enemy positions are abandoned and some disrupted enemy units are captured. Several guns are captured.
15:45 . III./85 reaches height 668 (Letsitsa). The enemy positions there are also frehsly abandoned.
19:15 . The last elements of the III.Btl. reach Neon-Petritsi which is also free of enemy. Forward positions are established at the railroad. The mass of the Btl. takes position in Neon-Petrisi for the night.
verst. 7.Kp. (with s.M.G.Trupp, Pi.Trupp, Funktrupp) receives order to establish a bridgehead west and east of the Struma-bridges at Loutra. But as they reach the bridges, at around 22:30 the bridges are already destroyed. Vehicles can be heard on the other side. Obviously the enemy witdraws the Roupel-gorge.
- III./GJR.85: Assembles on the Istibey in the afternoon.
Inf.Rgt.125:
The regiment prepares new attacks on the fortifications of Usita from the east and northeast. At around midday, enemy artillery and mortar fires increased and hit especially the attack preparations of the III./125 which had to cancel the attack.
14:00 – 16:00 . 40 – 50 Stukas attack the enemy rear area and artillery positions. One enemy battery is destroyed.
All attacks of I./125 on Usita-west (Werk A) fail also on this day.
II./125: 6.-7./125 reached height 520 in the morning. They observe enemy troops approaching the Struma bridges and take them under heavy M.G.fire. The Greeks destroy the Struma bridges cutting off their supply line but also destroying the German objectives. In the afternoon the commander of II./125 and the 8.Kp. arrive. 200 men of the Btl. set up defensive positions on height 520 and at the Roupel gorge. Finally the Btl. establishes radio contact with the regiment which has lost contact for 36 hours.
In two waves six aircrafts drop ammo, supply and medical equipment.
I./100: An enemy forward position is taken out. The Btl. advances & takes defensive positions 200m/656ft before the wire obstacles. All attacks despite support by aircrafts fail.
72.Inf.Div.: Div.Gef.Std. 5km/3miles north of Kato Vrontou.
1:30 . I.-II./Inf.Rgt.124 advance and take some forward field positions after heavy fighting during the morning. A planned attack of the regiment on Werk A is impossible because of the heavy resistance.
9:00 . II./Art.Rgt.172 which took position in the valley to fire directly on the fortifications comes under heavy enemy fire and suffers high losses. 1 ½ batt is destroyed. Repeated attacks of I./124 fail.
Inf.Rgt.124 reports to the division that Werk A cannot be taken with the present forces in a frontal attack. The division orders that I./124 must outflank the fortress via Dasoton and attack it from the east. II.Btl. shall by-pass Werk A from the west and advance towards Kato Vrontou via Perithorion in the night.
Inf.Rgt.105:
2:00 . I./105 which is ordered to attack the fortress mountain Ochyron from the west and southwest sets up at the village of Ochiron.
5 batteries (other batteries not operatable because of casualties) fire against the enemy positions. The attack of I./105 starts at 5:50. The first attack fails. Another attack at 14:05 fails also with heavy losses. The attack has to be stopped. At least the Btl. can hold the village.
The attack of II./266 starts at 05:30 as planned, after preparation fire by the AA-guns. When the attacking units entered the coverless terrain, enemy resistance got heavier and the attack slowed down again.
6:50 . 5./105 attacks Perithori and takes out several bunkers in heavy fighting. But it was not possible to take out the fortifications completely with the insufficient close combat equipment. 5.Kp. fights until it has no ammo and supply cannot be brought because of the heavy enemy fire. After Greek counterattacks the 5.Kp. withdraws.
19:00 . Another attack on the Greek fortifications fails because of insufficient equipment to destroy heavy fortifications. II./266 is withdrawn from the scene and is subordinated to I.R.266 again.
In the morning II.-III./105 reach the main enemy tank obstacles (concrete) southwest of Dasavli. No enemy is seen inside the bunkers. Obviously the Greeks did not believe that it was possible to pass the swamp area and start to fire very late. The last elements of the German units come under fire. An infantry platoon with attached AT-rifle platoon takes position and covers the advance successfully.
After heavy fighting, II./105 attacks and takes the mount Kresti (878m/2880ft high) which controls the Kalapoti pass. Greek counter-attacks retake parts of the mountain but II:/105 holds the northwstern mountainside.
II./105 which made a wide turn towards Kato Vrontou in the early morning takes the Kalapoti pass at 10:00 after a short fight. While advancing towards Mikropolis the Btl. rejects several enemy attacks from the flanks and pushes back the enemy forces. But soon the situation becomes dangerous because of lack of ammo and supply.
During the day heavy enemy counterattacks on II./105 on mount Kresti. Enemy retakes the mountain with several reinforcements (7th Infantry Div.)

XXX.A.K.

164.Inf.Div.: Div.Gef.Std. in the border post on the road Pasmakli – Xanthi.

- III., II./Inf.Rgt.382:[/v] III.Btl. under [b]Major Fett receives order to attack the enemy fortifications at height 785. The road obstacles are cleared during the morning to bring the artillery forward. As fog shows up the attack is postponed for tomorrow.
While the mass of the division stops, artillery, Pak, Flak and heavy weapons arrive at Ehinos by the evening. I.-II.- IV./A.R.220 take positions beside the road. In the dark 88mm and 50mm guns are brought forward into the village Ehinos.
The divisional commander decides to attack a part of the fortification first. III.Btl. with attached 3./Pi.220 has order to attack Werk M. The Btl. moves from Melivia into Ehinos and crosses the Xeropotamos creek. It takes position at the northern slope of Werk M.

- I./382 advancing through the Gondzaberg valley. Passing several undefended road blocks the Btl. reaches the area north of Xanthi.
- Inf.Rgt.440 continues to advance through the mountains and encounters with enemy resistance at height 1379. After the resistance is broken the regiment reaches Stavroupolis. 11.Kp. which advances towards the bridge comes too late. 200m/656ft in front of it the bridge is blown up. On the other side strong enemy positions are identified.
-50.Inf.Div.:
2:00 . After half an hour of preparation fire the first attack on height 510 fails. In the early morning a second attempt to take the fortification fails. The third attack at 8:30 fails again. The commander decides to start planning a well prepared attack and has to wait for the following artillery.
17:00 . Artillery starts to bombard height 510 (Werk Nymphaea) and scores several hits.
18:00 . While artillery, 88mm and Stg. attack identified fortifications, the infantry starts flanking attacks. 3./123 with Pionierstosstrupps of Pi.Btl.85 attacks from the north, 1.Kp. from the east, 2. and 9.Kp. from the southwest. All three groups break into the Nymphaea fortification at the same time and take out the enemy positions with flame-throwers and grenades. At around 19:00 Werk Nyphaea surrenders. Immediately the division starts to clear the roads to be able to continue the advance.
Mass of the division is fighting for Hohe 510 at the road Kirdjali – Komotini (4.5km/2.8 miles south of the border). 1 Btl. at Sostis (9km/5.6 miles west of Komotini). Div.Gef.Std. at the road Komotini, 2km/1.2 miles north of the border.
- Inf.Rgt.122 . II. and III.Btl. reach Sostis also during the day while I.Btl. takes Iasmos (Datum) after passing a blown up bridge.

April 8

12.Armee Weather: dry, clear, warm.

XVIII.A.K. Stopped before the fiercely defended Struma-bunker-defenses.

2.Pz.Div.:

5:00 . The division attacks the not fully deployed greek border defenses and makes good progress. The obstacles are blown up and the border is crossed. The borderguards are pushed back and machinegun positions which fire on the roads are taken out. Infantry and tanks clear the mountainsides.
6:00 . German artillery breaks increasing enemy resistance. The important height Obeliskos is taken shortly afterwards. Now the enemy withdrws and evades contact.
The breakthrough is expanded to the west and east. Only the motorized subordinated elements of the 6.Geb.Div. encounter resistance at and north of Amarandas at 9:50.
Pz.A.A.2, Schtz.Rgt.2 advance via Megali and reach Polykastron at the Axios at noon. The 400m/1312ft long road bridge is taken quickly and the already working british destruction team is captured. This is the only bridgehead across the Axios which was held until elements of the 6.Geb.Div. arrived.
In the meantime the mass of the division is advancing towards Salonika. The roads got better and the units advanced at high speed. Only the destroyed bridge across the small canal at Elefherochori stops the advance for two hours.
Enemy resistance at station Metallikon is broken quickly with an attack. Withdrawing enemy columns are overtaken. Usually just a few shots were enough to make them surrender.
At Kilkis the last elements of the 19th Greek mot.division are overrun and the city is occupied in the afternoon.
At midnight an armoured advance unit reaches Salonika and builds a hedgehog position outside of the city. A negotiator is sent out to request a surrender.
6.Geb.Div.: Elements of the division are pursuing the withdrawing enemy after the breaking of the enemy positions on the Krussia mountains yes



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Posted: Wed Dec 21, 2005 6:52 pm

6.Geb.Div.: Elements of the division are pursuing the withdrawing enemy after the breaking of the enemy positions on the Krussia mountains yesterday evening.
At around 2:00 elements of I./143 and II./141 encounter heavy enemy resistance at a forested height before Heraklion. The strength of the enemy is unknown. First prisoners say that there are about 2000 men of a fully motorized unit in this area. Bigger enemy resistance nests are attacked by machineguns and mortars. Also light tanks are present. One enemy tank is attacked by anti-tank-rifles. The crew of the tank surrenders.
Another enemy tank is destroyed with handgrenades. Vehicles, tents are going up in flames until the enemy withdraws at 3:00 . Several enemy soldiers are captured on the moment they board on trucks and other vehicles.
As the battle is over and the sun rises the battalions take defensive positions and see the real scale of the nightly engagement. The 19th Greek mot.division which assembled to counterattack the germans was smashed and nearly annihilated. About 1000 men among them a Colonel were captured. Over 200 vehicles were destroyed or captured (mainly destroyed). Seven light tanks have been captured.
I.R.125:
II./125: Still occupies height 520, 12km/7.5 miles behind the enemy lines. In the morning the enemy tries to recapture the height. All enemy attacks are rejected so the enemy takes positions on the heights around to keep the Btl. down with fire. By radio the II./125 requests for air support. The night (8-9 April) is cold with rain sometimes snow and storm. The wounded soldiers are treated inside a small cave.
In the morning the Btl. tries to accomplish its mission to take the southern exit of the Roupel gorge to cut the enemy supply line. The attempt of the 5.Kp. fails. Several soldiers are wounded including the company's CO. The Greeks defend the area with at least one battalion.
III./125: In the morning, III./125 receives orders for the fourth attack on the Usita fortifications. 353 Stosstrupps and one engineer platoon prepare for the attack. All heavy weapons of the Btl., two platoons of the 13.Kp., one platoon 14.Kp. and Stg. shall attack the bunkers. The regiment requests that all enemy positions and batteries on the left flank are taken out before the attack because these were the factors which stopped all attacks before.
12:30 . After air and artillery attacks the Stosstrupps start to attack. Immediately the Greek artillery fires on the assembly area and causes high losses especially at the engineers and assault guns. Obviously these batteries were not taken out. The attack is stopped immediately.
I./100: Paliouriones is under fire until 17:00. But the Btl. is too weak to take the fortifications and receives order to withdraw north to meet the rest of Geb.Jg.Rgt.100 and surround enemy forces.
5.Geb.Div.: This day is a race for the elements of the division to get to the mountain exits.
The division has to expand the bridgehead of II./85, to capture the still fighting fortifications and to bring heavy weapons into the Struma-valley. By the evening, the division takes all enemy fortification except the ones on Rupesko. Four fortresses have been taken after heavy fighting. Strong elements can advance into the Struma valley and make contact with the units on the right flank.
The night (8-9 April) is quiet. Sporadic artillery fires on the bridge south of station Vyronia.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.85:
- I./GJR.85: Enemy forces still set in front of the Btl. 1.Kp. is not able to climb on Rupesko. The company lies here now for 48hours.
During the night several bunkers of fortress Popotlivitsa were knocked out from the rear. The engineer platoon takes out one bunker after another with explosives, fuel and smoke-grenades.
3./85 takes out five bunkers by 15:00. Reports that 13 are still operational.
19:00 . The last enemy fortifications of fortress Popotlivitsa surrender. 3 officers and 120 men surrender. 70 enemy soldiers were killed.
2./85 reaches Vyronia advancing from Sultanitsa south via height 873 at 6:30.
- II./GJR.85: A platoon of 8./85 receives order to take the bridge south of station Vyronia and establishes contact with Geb.A.A.95 which is there since yesterday evening. The bridge is destroyed and the enemy defends the southern riverbank.
8:50 . The battalion has visual contact with the II./125. Spahtrupps are sent to Aetovouni which is free of enemy. 19 greek soldiers are captured on the way.
Later in the morning the situation got worse again. Greek units which didn't make it across the bridge at Loutra try to escape along the Struma to the west. Local heavy fighting especially at the sector of 7./85 which rejects an attack in close combat. 155 enemy soldiers are captured by the afternoon. Several enemy artillery attacks on Neon-Petritsi.
Elements of 6./85 which advance towards Loutra in the afternoon, join an engagement between Greek troops and 13./100.
- III./GJR.85: The Btl. marches from the Istibey to Neon-Petrisi in the afternoon.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.100: The regiment identifies very late that the enemy has witdrawn from the Arpaluki covered in the fog.
II./GJR.100: In the night (7-8 April) the battalion receives order to advance to the Struma west of Loutra. The battalion starts to move at 3:00 and climbs down into the Struma valley at around 6:00. The Btl. continues towards the Yannitsa valley exit east of Neon-Petrisi. There contact with II./85 is established at 16:00. The battalion takes defensive position because of battle sound in the back (engagement of 13./100).
In the evening, II./100 is ordered to move toward northeast, to cut off Werk C of Paliouriones to the south in connection to the III./100.
- III./GJR.100: After the regiment recognized that the Arpaluki is free of enemy the Btl. advances via Arpaluki to the western Struma bank. In Arpaluki, 70 prisoners are taken and 50 killed Greek soldiers are found. 13./100 advances via Vasano (height 788) on the Yannitsa-valley path and overtakes the withdrawing greek Arpaluki garrison without being recognized.
At around 15:00 the 13./100 attacks the withdrawing garrisson surprisingly. The enemy tries to force the way and the battle takes two hours before the Greeks surrender with 5 officers and 210 men. Heavy German casualties occurred. Some enemy soldiers jumped in the Struma river and swim to the eastern bank to escape. 13.Kp. takes positions to the north on the western riverbank. In the evening heavy enemy artillery fire from the area Loutra forces the company to go back.
In the meantime the rest of the battalion is turned east via Vasano towards Paliouriones. There Werk C must be cut off from the north in connection with the II. and I.Btl. After the kelkaya has been taken this fortress (Paliouriones) could be taken from the back also.
Between 18:00 – 18:30 heavy German artillery fire from the sector of Inf.Rgt.125 on Werk C. Under cover of this bombardment the III.Btl. can get closer to Werk C.
As there was no time for a prepared attack left, a Stosstrupp tries to get into the fortress. The first obstacles are passed but then the enemy starts to fire. The main object to cut off the fortress is achieved.
Geb.A.A.95: In the morning the Abteilung receives order to advance on the mountain path via Letsitsa. The Radfahrschwadronen reach Neon-Petritsi before noon and station Vyronia at 15:00. By 17:10 Thrakikon is secured, 29 Greek soldiers captured and contact with the 6.Geb.Div. established.
Flak-Btl.609 had to wait for repaired roads to follow.
Geb.Art.Rgt.95: II.Abt. advances on mules and marches south across the mountains. From the area north of Neon-Petritsi the Abteilung attacks an enemy AA-battery at Loutra and supports the II./125 which is cut off east of the Struma by attacking enemy artillery positions.
72.Inf.Div.:
At the end of the day the division lost 700 KIA plus WIA during the fighting at the fortress complex of Nevrokopion. The Greek defense strength and manpower suffered negligible losses.
Inf.Rgt.124: II.Btl. loses the right direction in the night and makes a turn too early not knowing of Werk Maliagha. This brings the Btl. between Werk B, C and Werk Perithori. Here the Btl. is under heaviest fire for the whole day until it can pull back to Dasoton in the night 8-9 April. Several German soldiers are captured by enemy soldiers breaking out of their fortresses occasionaly.
I./124, 1./Pi.72, 20mm Flak and the Stg. platoon attacks from Dasoton towards the east of height 906. The verst.Btl. encounters heavy fire from Werk B and flanking fire from Werk Ochyron. Under the cover fire by heavy weapons the Btl. pushes into the forward positions of Maliagha. Attempts to take out enemy fortifications fail with serious casualties. The new planned attack with support of light and heavy artillery tomorrow will not take place because of the enemy withdrawal.
Inf.Rgt.105: III./105 which is in a dangerous situation on the hills north of Mikropolis is ordered to move back. It was hard to make contact with the Btl.
XXX.A.K. took Komotini after heavy fighting. Attacks towards Xanthi from the north and east. Several thousand prisoners.
50.Inf.Div.:
[b]- Verst.Inf.Rgt.123 arrives at Nymphaea.
- Inf.Rgt.122 . I.Btl. reaches Xanthi.
- AA.150 with 4./Art.Rgt.65 starts to advance southeast to secure Alexandropulis. The unit will reach the city after passing several roadblocks tomorrow.
164.Inf.Div.:
- Inf.Rgt.382: As the Stosstrupps approach Werk M heavy enemy fire starts despite the heavy counter fire from the German artillery. Werk A and M58 machine-gun nest join in. Werk A and M58 are taken out after several direct hits.
Werk M is taken after heavy fighting. 60 men captured. An enemy counterattack is rejected. German forces do not attack further because of continuing enemy fire and lack of informations about the fortifications.
During the night enemy gives up the fortifications. The withdrawing garrison is captured northwest of Xanthi.
Brigade Nestos withdrew behind the river without much resistance.
- I./382 is marching fast towards Toxotes.
-Inf.Rgt.440 . An early morning attempt in to cross the Nestos river on rafts fails due to the fast flowing river. During the day the regiment tries to find a good location to cross the river. Another attempt at Daphnonas fails.

April 9:

12.Armee

10:30 . The Greek East Macedonian army guarantees an unconditional surrender. The document was signed at 13:00 and should go into effect tomorrow at 13:00.
15:00 . The Korps sends out messages to the divisions that the unconditional surrender has been signed and all fighting activities must be stopped.

2.Pz.Div.:

8:00 . The division enters Salonika. The divisional commander is leading the column into the city and meets a delegation of the city. The mayor hands the city over to the German general.
A small parade in front of the General in the center of Salonika takes place.
6.Geb.Div.: Took Polykastron 70km/43 miles before Saloniki.
During the day the enemy withdraws in front of the divison.
7:15 Geb.A.A.112 establishes contact with the 2.Pz.Div. at Kilkis.
The division continues to pursue the enemy forces.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.143 receives order to advance to the village of Drosaton at the western end of the Krussia mountains.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.141 receives order to advance to Alexia at the southern tip of the Krussia mountains. Reconnaissance elements are sent out to the east and southeast.
A verst.Kp. of I./141 on captured vehicles is sent to Kilkis to block the roads there for withdrawing enemy forces.
12:00 . II./141, I./Geb.A.R.95 breaks the last desperate resistance in Alexia.
15:00 . The small advance unit establishes contact with the 2.Pz.Div. at Kilkis.
5.Geb.Div.: The attack on the Roupel-gorge to support the attack of I.R.125 from the north is cancelled because of the Greek capitulation.
The division continues to bring more elements across the mountains.
9:00 . Btl.Stab I./85 and 3.Kp. reach Vyronia.
After the roads and paths via Letsitsa have been repaired Flak-Btl.609 advances and turns south north of lake Butkovo. At 13:00 the Btl. reaches Kerkini lake which is free of enemy.
Geb.A.A.95 follows and reaches Livadia. Next in the schedule were Pz.Jg.Abt.95, III./Geb.Art.Rgt.95(mot) and at last le.Flak-Abt.73.
These AT- and AA-units are enough to secure the Struma valley.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.100:
Elements of the regiment blow up the light and water works of the still resisting Werk C of Paliouriones. The heavy weapons are brought into position directly in front of the main entrance and all preparations were finished in the afternoon. The attack was cancelled by the division and at 18:00 the commander of Werk C appears for negotiations.
Inf.Rgt.125:
II./125: The Btl. still holds height 520 on the back of the Greek fortifications. In the early morning enemy preparation fire starts and in the morning major infantry attacks. At various locations the enemy can come as close as 15m/49ft but the attack is rejected with heavy casualties for the enemy. Several following attacks are rejected as well. After German aircrafts attack the enemy positions the pressure decreases in the afternoon.
III./125: In the morning III./125 reports that the enemy artillery and M.G. positions control the entire west- and north sides of the mountain and that the Btl. has only limited strength because of casualties.
The fifth attack of the III.Btl. is canceled because of the enemy surrender.
Casualties (KIA/WIA) of the verst.III./125: 5 officers, 21 NCO/s, 138 men.
- I./125 attacks on Werk A but has no further success. The Btl. lost around 80 KIA.
- I./100: The Btl. completes the surrounding with other elements of GJR.100. Fortress Paliouriones surrenders on 10 April.

50.Inf.Div.:
- II./121 . After the elements of the division moved through the mountains without enemy resistance the advance unit of the division reaches Pimni (3km/1.8miles south of Toxotes) at 1:50. Reconnaissance during the night reports that the western bank of the Nestos is defended by strong enemy forces. A soldier who swims across the river is shot at the way back.
The division receives order to force the 500m/1640ft broad Nestos at 17:00.
15:15 . The available artillery II./A.R.63, II./A.R.65 (without 4.Bttr.) opens fire on the enemy positions on the western bank between Dialektron and Paradisos. The bunkers are attacked by eight guns of I./Flak 63 and the Stg.Abt.190 with 18 guns. The Stg. advanced on a dead river arm towing the dinghies to cross the river.
17:00 . As the infantry starts to cross the river the enemy opens fire from well hidden positions which did not fire until now. Just one boat can reach the other side. All others are destroyed.
23:00 . The divisional commander orders a second attempt at 1:30.
A.A.150 reaches Alexandroupolis after passing several road blocks. The Greek brigade Evros in the town evaded partly to turkey or was brought to mainland Greece by the sea.
164.Inf.Div.: I./I.R.382 marched 35km/22 miles via Xanthi reaches Toxotes but finds the bridge destroyed. The Btl. is pinned down by enemy fire and is subordinated to the advance unit of 50.Inf.Div.
- Inf.Rgt.440: More elements of the regiment arrive at Nestos. Because of the Greek surrender the attack across the river is cancelled.

April 10:

12.Armee Weather: Overcast, rainfall, bad road condition.

The Greek "Thracian Army" surrenders unconditionally. Next objectives are Veroia – Katerini.

9.Pz.Div., SS ”Adolf Hitler”, 73.Inf.Div. moving into the area around Prilep. Forward elements reach Phlorina. First contact with British troops.

XXX.A.K.

164.Inf.Div.: Forward elements reach Stavroupolis.

50.Inf.Div.:
00:20 . The artillery starts preparation fire.
1:00 . AT-guns of Pz.Jg.Abt.150 join the bombardment of enemy positions.
1:30 . The infantry starts to cross the river against light enemy resistance most probably because the Greek Thracian Army surrendered already.
2:00 . With minimum casualties the western bank of Nestos is secured.

XVIII.A.K.

2.Pz.Div.:
07:00 . The division marches into Salonika.
6.Geb.Div.:
After the capitulation of the Greek forces the division sends elements towards the Axios at high speed. The improvised motorized advance group advances via Kilkis to the river at Polykastron and replaces elements of the 2.Pz.Div. which built a bridgehead there.
5.Geb.Div.: Forward elements reach Kerkini lake.
After three days of heavy fighting the division broke up the Metaxas-line. The division took 2100 prisoners and captured 14 guns and 114 M.G..
The division lost: 7 Officers 153 men KIA, 15 Officers 442 men WIA.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.100:
8:00 The entire fortress Paliouriones surrenders with 10 officers and 400 men.
Geb.Jg.Rgt.85: 1.Kp. which held Rupesko for days occupies the mountain around noon without enemy resistance. The enemy has witdrawn during the night.
Inf.Rgt.125:
At 6:00 the Greek forces in the area surrender. Fortress Karatas on the eastbank of the Struma which provided fire support to the attacked fortress Usita-east (Werk E) was not attacked by the regiment just by artillery and Stukas. Fortress Kali further east was not attacked at all but supported the battle with its 120mm guns.
After the surrender the regiment discovers the defense power of fortress Usita. They find: 5x 105mm, 18x 75mm, 6x 47mm AT-guns, 10x 37mm AT-guns, 10x 20mm AA-guns, 20 mortars, and 210 machineguns.
Fortress Paliouriones surrenders.
- II./125 which still holds height 520 in the back of the Greek fortifications is informed by a motorcycle messenger about the enemy capitulation. The Btl. was cut off for three days.
The defensive strength of the entire Roupel fortification was not decimated. The Greek soldiers put up stiff resistance and the moral was still high.
I./100 lost 27 KIA, 75 WIA during the battle.
72.Inf.Div.: Holds the line Maliagha – Perithori – Kato Vrontou – Ochyron.

German & Bulgarian troops inspect a captured fortress


Roupel after the battle


Withdrawing Greek troops, passing by a mechanized column of the Leibstandarde SS-Adolf Hitler. Field Marshal List issued this order on April 10: " Greeks defended their Fatherland gallantly until the end...German troops must treat Greeks with respect...Greek troops will not be held as prisoners"

Lufwaffe units in Greece:


Luftwaffe aces who fought in Greece:


Major Theodor Nordmann


Major Dr.Ernst Kupfer


Major Helmut Bruck


Oberstleutnant Hubertus Hitschold


Oberleutnant Helmut Naumann


Oberleutnant Hendrick Stahl


Hauptmann Thiede Armin



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Posted: Tue Dec 27, 2005 7:34 am

Wow! I've never heard that Germans used captured French tanks during Greek campaign.



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Posted: Fri Feb 10, 2006 2:38 pm

The Greeks in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)



"Comrades of the International Brigades! Political reasons, reasons of state, the good of that same cause for which you offered your blood with limitless generosity, send some of you back to your countries and some to forced exile. You can go with pride. You are history. You are legend. You are the heroic example of the solidarity and the universality of democracy… We will not forget you; and, when the olive tree of peace puts forth its leaves, entwined with the laurels of the Spanish Republic’s victory, come back!"

[The fairwell speech given to the International Brigades by Dolores Ibarruri, in 1939]


Dolores Ibarruri, la Pasionaria

When the Spanish Civil War broke up in 1936, many members of the Greek Communist Party/Kommounistiko Komma Elladas or KKE, organized almost immediately a solidarity movement, despite the fact that KKE was an illegal political party, working underground. "Rizospastis/The Radical", KKE's official newspaper, sent a reporter to Spain on 7/25/1936 (one of the first reporters worldwide who were sent to Spain)


500 Greeks & Greek-Cypriot "Brigadistas" (fighters of the International Brigades), workers, fishing & freighter Deckhands, farmers, took part in the Spanish Civil War, fighting for the Republicans, arriving to Spain from the Greek mainland, the Dodekannese, Cyprus, Africa, the UK, the US, France, the USSR. 125 of them, were either killed, captured or seriously wounded. Among the well known Brigadistas were Nikos Vavoudis (secretary of the Piraeus Workers Union), Nikos Karayannis (secretary of the deckhands union), Anagnostis Deliyannis (secretary of the tobacco workers union), Kostas Vidalis (a well known leftist journalist)



The Greeks in Spain, formed the "Nikos Zakhariadis" Company, named after the imprisoned KKE's General Secretary, Nikos Zakhariadis. CO of this company was Cpt. Yannis Siganos . They fought the Franco's forces in a series of battles at Belchite (in which Dimitris Perros was killed) & Aragon .

The "Manchester Guardian" (12th March 1938) describes:
"Belchite has fallen to the rebels. It was taken from them in a successful Government offensive in the autumn, but the
rebels claim that in their present offensive nearly all the ground then lost has been regained.
According to a Salamanca communiqué the rebel advance, which covers a front some 50 miles long, has been 'carried
to a great depth'. Troops on the left front are reported to have followed the capture of Belchite with the taking of several villages. Gains are also claimed for rebel forces in the centre and on the right front.
The communiqué states that 'terrific' casualties have been inflicted on the Republicans and that over 3,500 prisoners and 'enormous' quantities of war material have been taken.
It is reported that Belchite was defended mainly by soldiers of the International Brigade, the majority of whom were Canadians. About 100 foreign prisoners have been taken. The centre of three columns used for the offensive was at first delayed through having to encircle a hill held by the Republicans, but caught up with the other columns on Thursday, partly through a spectacular cavalry charge which General Franco personally watched.
Extending the front of their offensive, rebel troops yesterday started a push down from the Ebro River valley from the village of Fuentes de Ebro" .

In the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), one of several direct references to the Spanish Civil War, was the speculation that an International Brigade would fight alongside the Greek communists. By the summer of 1947 the British, Greek, and American governments were examining the possibility that an International Brigade, consisting of veterans of the Spanish Civil War, was being organized in France and Italy. Although it cannot be entirely discounted that some European left-wingers and veterans of the Spanish Civil War might have entertained such an idea, the most likely explanation of the entire episode lies in a combination of still vivid memories of the Spanish conflict and the emerging realities of the Cold War, which impelled the opponents of the Greek communists to believe that, apart from using its local "puppets," international communism might decide to get itself actively involved in the fighting in Greece



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Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2006 3:33 pm

The Battle of Phardykampos (4-6 March 1943)


The Phardycampos Monument. The people of Siatista* and the surrounding region, with the guidance of the local Resistance chapter, attacked and took prisoner first an Italian company and then a fully armed Italian battalion in the battle of Phardykampos (4-6 March 1943)


In February 1943 , the Italian High Command decided to replenish the supplies of the Italian Battalion that was stationed in Grevena. 10 heavy loaded trucks with supplies & munitions, accompanied with 180 soldiers, made tracks for Grevena from Larissa.

THE AMBUSH AT VIGLA (3-4-1943)

On March 3rd, the Italian column, entered Kozani. A member of the local resistance group, immediately informed the professor of the Siatista high school Alexandros Rossios (who served in Albania as 2nd Lt & was an active member of the ELAS resistance group) about the Italian plan. The Siatistan Greek guerillas, unaware of the exact destionation of the Italian force, decided to ambush the enemy at the defile near Vigla, between the Askios & Vourinos mountains. Thus, two rebel groups were ordered to lie in ambush:
-The Siatistan Guerillas under 2nd Lt (reservist) Demetrios Kharisiades , and
-A force of former Gendarmes (in April 1941, when the Germans occupied Siatista, the whole local Gendarmerie force, "defected" to the local resistance), under the former Gendarmerie Lt/Ypomoirarchos Thomas Venetsanopoulos . In total, 250 men strong.

The guerillas, slipped into the middle of the road (Kozani-Siatista) an empty fuel truck as a road block & waited for the Italians to appear. In the morning of March 4th, the guerillas were informed that a truck column with a motorcycle ahead, was approaching their positions. When the motorcycle & the first trucks reached the road block, the column was forced to stop & a few Italians were ordered to push aside the fuel truck. Almost immediately, the guerillas began to fire against the Italians. The Italian troops, jumped off the trucks & started to reply to the Greek fire. After a heavy fighting, the Italians were forced to surrender to the guerillas, due to heavy casualties (15 dead, 34 wounded). 133 Italians were captured. Only 3 casualties were reported in the fighting by the Greeks. 4 heavy machine-guns, 12 machine-guns, 4 mortar tubes, 120 rifles & huge quantities of munitions were also captured by the guerillas. The wounded Italians were sent, with the aid of the red cross, back to Kozani. The captured Italians were escorted & held as POWs to a nearby village (Tsotyli)


Greek guerillas lie in ambush

When the news reached Grevena, the Italian CO of the Grevena garrison Major/Maggiore Perone Pasconeli formed urgently a company & sent it on trucks to Vigla to assist the ambushed Italians. Reaching the Aliacmon bridge though, heavy fire from the Greeks positioned in the surrounding hills, pinned the Italian company down. Pasconeli then, judging that the situation is critical, decided to step in immediately with his entire battalion (plus three 75mm artillery guns). When the battalion approached the Aliacmon bridge, more Greek fire harassed the advancing Italians. At Siatista, the news that the Italians are approaching, galvanized the population to action. Almost every local guerilla group rushed in Siatista to defend the town. At the same time, the local guerilla command made an appeal to every former military serviceman to come to aid of the guerillas. Among those who answered to the rebel appeal, was Major Demetrios Hatzis, Maj. Ioannis Kontonassios, Cpt. Daphnis, 2nd lt. Papayannopoulos, 2nd lt Kalogeropoulos, 2nd lt Sideropoulos and others
600 guerillas gathered in Siatista to defend the town


Siatistan guerillas

THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF PHARDYKAMPOS (3-5-1943)



In the morning of March 5th, the Italian battalion started its advance on Siatista. Artillery & mortar fire supported the advance of infantry. A few hundred yards away from the first Siatistan houses, the Greeks started to fire against the Italian troops. At 17:00 in the evening, the first Italian troops entered Siatista. Every Siatistan fit to bare arm, reinforced the Siatista garrison. At the same time, a group of 60 ELAS guerillas attacked the Italian troops from the rear. 25 more men (under 2nd lt Michael Papayannopoulos) attacked the Italian Btn HQ. 2nd lt Demetrios Zygouris


2nd Lt Demetrios Zygouris. The photo shows him holding the Candidate Officer's rank

with his 200 men, having just arrived from Grevena & not knowing that Siatista is falling to the Italians, decided to attack immediately the Italians from the rear. The thrilling cry "Aera" (meaning "free air") once again was heard in the battlefield, almost 3 years after the Greek-Italian confrontation in the Albanian mountains (his men were veteran fighters of the IX Infantry Division). Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed by the Greeks.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE (3-6-1943)

In the morning of March 6th, the CO of the guerillas Major Ioannis Kontonassios issued an order for a generalized attack on the Italians. The first Greek attack (08:30) was repulsed by the Italians (due to the artillery fire & the straffing of Greek positions by 3 Italian planes from Larissa). The second Greek attack launched in the evening, met the same fate. The Italians fought obstinate. The situation on the Italian side though, was deteriorating rapidly. Hunger & thirst underminded the morale of the fighting Italians. In the night (6-7 March), Major Pasconeli with a delegation, met with 2nd lt Zygouris & asked for a cease fire. 2nd lt Zygouris refused & offered a cessation of arms only if the Italians would surrender unconditionally. Major Pasconeli, having no alternative option, accepted. Thus, the battle of Phardykampos ended in the morning of March 7th 1943.

THE OUTCOME

-The Italian casualties accounted for 95 men dead, 79 wounded, 661 were captured.
-The Greeks had 6 dead, 20 wounded. Three 75mm guns with 300 rounds, 40 heavy machine-guns, 15 machine-guns, 4 mortar tubes, 700 rifles, 30 pistols, huge ammounts of munitions were also captured.
2 weeks later, the Italians withdrew from Grevena. Within the next month, the Italians withdrew from Karditsa also. Thus, in the summer of 1943, a large area in central Greece (West Macedonia & parts of Thessaly), was completely liberated of the enemy troops

*Siatista (pop. around 6,000). Believe it or not, the name of the town is the Greek rendering of the German Schatzstadt (Rich or Treasure city) . Siatistan emigrants to Germany, in the early 18th century, were using this name for their hometown instead of the Greek one Phloropolis which means exactly Rich City. After a while, the German name dominated & the Greek Phloropolis, in time, was forgotten. This town lies in a unique setting with a strange sense of solitude and wildness which is like nowhere else. This feeling of isolation, of exclusion from the rest of the world is incomparable and cannot be found in other mountain towns in Greece. The circumscribed, steep mountain slopes on which it perches, the narrow, difficult-to-negotiate lanes fashion the impression in the mind of the visitor that he has been caught in a world tranquil and forgotten, hemmed in by barren, savage mountain peaks.
In its historical past, trade with Europe was flourishing there, thus opening a door and welcoming in all the artistic and cultural currents from the free world

Early 20th century black-and-white photograph with a view of Siatista

Energetic leaders, the Siatistan merchants left temporarily, forced out by the morass the Greek market had become and returned with material and intellectual wealth, having spent their time abroad well, and introduced a creative spirit into their homeland. The famous mansions with their very strong walls, the imposing doors, the lavishly decorated and elegant on-dades, the gorgeous stained glass, the lively colors of the folk paintings on the walls, embody, for that difficult period, a high living standard and express a spirited social life.
Siatista lies 28 km/17 miles west of Kozani, rooted on Mt. Velia's slope at an altitude of over 900 feet/274 metres. It consists of two continuing close together very large neighbourhoods "Gherania and Khora". In each separate place dominates a belfry, which signifies and determines morphological elements, which compose the towns (Siatista’s) two traditional masts. The narrow paths give you the impression that you have been trapped in an isolated place enclosed around bare mountains



Siatista today

Searching for independence from the Ottomans, the first inhabitants came to this difficult of passage area in the early 17th century. The sterile grounds drew them to cultivate vineyards and leather and fur processing as well as external and internal trade.


The Greek flag raised at the house of Nicholaos & Agnes Patsias on 11-5-1912. On 11-4-1912, elements of the advancing Greek Army under Colonel Epites (5,000 men, 3 field artillery guns), aided by Siatistan scouts & Cretan volunteers, under Georgios Papadopetros, Panayotis Phiotakis & Michael Tsiontos attacked & defeated the Ottoman Army in the battle of Siatista and liberated the town. 70 Greeks were killed. The Ottoman casualties accounted for 400 men, killed or wounded. The dummy on the left is dressed in traditional Siatistan clothing, worn by the Siatistan rebels in 1912

Last edited by valtrex on Mon Feb 20, 2006 2:08 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Posted: Thu Feb 16, 2006 9:38 pm

THE NAVAL BATTLES OF SPETSES (1822) & GHERONTAS (1824)

The most decisive naval battles in the Greek revolution

From the beginning of the Revolution it was clear that the small and inadequately equipped Greek ships were not capable of confronting successfully the Ottoman ships in an open conflict. Thus, other forms of action which resulted in the wear and obstruction of the movement of the Ottoman fleet were adopted. The main targets were the convoys which transported troops and provisions to the besieged forts of the Peloponnese and the mainland. Moreover, the attempts of the Greek fleet to raise the siege of the forts and reinforce the besieged Greeks with provisions and armed men were frequent. Finally, the Aegean islands had to be defended against the action of the Ottoman fleet.
In these operations the damage of the Ottoman fleet was achieved by a war tactic that balanced the supremacy in weaponry of the Ottoman fleet. This tactic was the attacks at night with fireships (pyrpoliko/pyrpolika in plural)-small ships loaded with inflammable and explosive materials-which were attached to the Ottoman ships and blown up with them. The most famous in the use of this tactic was Demetrios Papanikolis (Papanikolis survived the war & in 1843 became the first Psarian-from the island of Psara-representative in the Greek parliament. In 1927, Greece named one of the newly acquired French made S/M, after him. In 2004, another S/M, class 214, built from HDW in Kiel, Germany, was the second Greek S/M named after him)

Type 214 Class Diesel Powered Attack Submarine "Papanikolis"

These hazardous attacks, which demanded agile manipulation so that the fireship could be attached to the Ottoman ship and luck so that the operation would not perceived by the Ottomans, resulted in certain impressive actions. The most characteristic blowing up was that of the flagship of the Ottoman fleet off Cesme in July 1822 by Kanaris. Such actions provoked fear to the crew of the Ottoman ships and frequently the movements of the Ottoman fleet were hesitant from fear of the fire-raisers.

The blowing-up of the Turkish flagship by Constantine Kanaris

Naval battles were also carried out, some of which were successful for the Greek side as the one off Hydra and Spetses in October 1822, in the gulf of Gherontas in August 1824 and in Cavo-Doro in May 1825. In those battles, Admirals Andreas Pipinos, Andreas Miaoulis and Georgios Sachtouris were distinguished respectively.

PART 1.
The Naval battle of Spetses (September 8, 1822)

In september 1822, the Ottoman fleet, was en route to Naphplion in the Peloponnese. Naphplion was under siege for quite some time now, by the land forces of Alexandros Ypsilantis & by the Laskarina Bouboulina's fleet

Alexandros Ypsilantis & Laskarina Bouboulina

While sailing the straights between the islands of Trikeri & Spetsopoula, the Ottomans were suddenly attacked by three squadrons of the Greek fleet (the Hydrean squadron, the Psarian squadron & the squadron from Spetses)

The Naval Ensign of Spetses


The Hydrean Naval Ensign


The Psarian Naval Ensign


The island of Hydra, off the coast of Argolis, Peloponnese


The island of Spetses, near Hydra


The island of Psara

Miaoulis, ordered the Greek squadrons back into the gulf of Argolis in order to close off the entry of the Ottomans into the gulf. The Spetseans Ioannis Tsourpas, Demetrios Lambrou & Ioannis Koutsis, with the Spetsean squadron though, together with the Hydrean Anthonios Kriezis, ignored Miaoulis' signals & attacked the center of the Ottoman line. The battle was so fierce that the inhabitants of Hydra thought that an earthquake had hit the island & the Spetseans thought that Hydra was on fire! The Spetsean Kosmas Barbatsis, crying "with the help of the Holy Cross, attack!", onboard his fireship, runned to the Ottoman flagship. He managed to attach the fireship to her & blew her up. Barbatsis' action was decisive. The Ottoman fleet set sail back to the Aegean. Naphplion fell to the Greeks, 2 months later.
Every year, on September 8th, a re-enactment of this historic battle, takes place at Spetses

The Ottoman flagship burns


The monument on Spetses


Navy Band


Dropping wreaths

Last edited by valtrex on Fri Feb 17, 2006 2:45 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Posted: Fri Feb 17, 2006 1:53 pm

PART 2
The naval battle of Gherontas (August 29, 1824)



In 1824, Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II


unable to supress the revolted Greeks, asked for help from Mehmet Ali Pasha the Vali of Egypt, Syria & Arabia (Egypt, Syria & Arabia were subject to the Ottomans back then)


Mehmet Ali, assigned his son Ibrahim

Ibrahim Pasha in 1848

to handle the Greek question according to his wills. Ibrahim brewed a bold plot with determination:
Ibrahim's plan envisaged an annihilating victory of the Turkish-Egyptian fleet over the revolted Greeks in the Aegean, as requirement for a succesful landing operation on Greece (on Peloponnese). Thus, on June 6 , the Ottoman fleet destroyed completely the island of Kassos & on the 21st, under Hosref-Pasha the island of Psara. According to Ibrahim's plan, the next "victim" would be Samos


Hosref-Pasha, with 40 frigates & corvettes, set sail for Samos & on July 17 the Ottoman fleet was sighted off Samos. The Greek fleet, with only 21 warships & 4 fireships, did its best to avoid the Ottomans draw close to Samos, engaging them in a series of harassing battles for a week. Hosref withdrew his fleet & returned to Bodrum, in Minor Asia. There he waited for the Egyptian fleet to arrive


And indeed, on August 19 , the Egyptians arrived as planned. Ibrahim divided his fleet into two groups. One group (under the Egyptian Ismael-Gibraltar) would attack sections of the main Greek line and destroy them before other ships could come to their aid. The other group (under Hosref-Pasha) would attack the enemy, break through their lines and then cut off the retreat of the enemy fleet. The Ottoman-Egyptian fleet had 25 frigates, 25 corvettes, 50 brigs & 300 freighters with 2,500 guns, assembled along the Bodrum coast.
The Greek fleet assembled around the islands of Patmos, Leros & Lipsi with 70 warships (800 guns). The ships came from Hydra, Spetses & Psara. On August 22, Admiral Andreas Miaoulis arrived from Hydra onboard his flagship "Kimon"

Andreas Miaoulis & his "Polaka" type threemast sailship, "Kimon"

The first shots were fired at the Greek ships in the morning of August 24. The Greeks were sailing the straights between the island of Kos & the Bodrum coast. The Greeks immediately fled for refuge to the gulf of Gherontas on the coast of Minor Asia


Seamen from Hydra

On August 28, early in the morning, 22 Greek warships left the Gherontas bay, moving on silent, searching for the Ottoman flagship. Guessing that the rest of the Greek fleet must be nearby, Ismael-Gibraltar with his fleet, set out from Bodrum to engage the Greeks (his plan was to break through the Greek line & with his massive force-compared to the force that confronted them-to crush the Greeks). As he did so, Miaoulis with the rest of the Greek fleet appeared out of the blue. Ismael-Gibraltar, immediately made the signal to change routes & ordered his ships to attack on the Greek flagship. Papanikolis, with his fireships, runned to the enemy frigates to defend the flagship. The Ottomans broke the line, trying to avoid the visible danger. Papanikolis' effort to burn the enemy frigates, failed though (due to the wind). The Spetsean Lekkas Matrozos on a fireship, tried to attach his vessel on a Turkish brig but he failed too. In a similar effort, Andreas Pipinos was seriously wounded.


"The Hydrean", a Louis Dupré painting

Hosref-Pasha, with his fleet, entered the battle, trying to block the Greeks combine their forces. The two Greek forces united though & the battle started



Ibrahim ordered his ships to steer and take advantage of the gap created between enemy vessels. Hosref-Pasha, watching this, and to show that the Turks are no less courageous than the Egyptians, ordered his ships to do the same. Thus, the Ottoman & Egyptian ships, engaged with the Greeks in a general melee. The Ottomans though, were unaware that they were about to put themselves against the most skilful sea captain of the Aegean-Andreas Miaoulis.
Miaoulis, knowing that the Greek vessels are smaller & more agile than the large ships of the Turks, signaled his ships to divide into two squadrons. The first squadron would engage with the Egyptians, the second with the Turks. He also ordered the 17 fireships to enter the battle. The Spetsean fireships under Lazaros Moussous, attacked the Egyptians. The Hydrean fireships, under Georgakis Theokharis, attacked the Turks. The Hydrean Georgios Vatikiotis on a small fireship, blew up a large Turkish frigate with 1,100 crew. No one survived. Panic spread among the Ottoman fleet. In the evening, Hosref-Pasha accepted his defeat & sailed back to Bodrum. Ismael-Gibraltar, withdrew to Crete. Thus, Samos was saved. The combat was so unequal (The Ottomans had bigger vessels & a massive force compared to the Greek fleet), that the French Admiral & writer Julien de la Graviere , comments on the battle of Gherontas:
"Perhaps, seamanship has nothing more interesting to display other than the events that took place in the Gherontas battle"

THE GREEK FLEET IN 1824
C-i-C Admiral Andreas Miaoulis*


Squadron of Hydra


1. Agamemnon (Demetrios Tsamados)

2. Athena (Frantzeskos Voulgaris)

3. Athena (Georgios Kountouriotis**)

4. Athena (Leonidas Kountouriotis)

5. Aenian (Demetrios Mastro-Antoniou)

6. Aeolos (Ioannis Orlandos)

7. Alexandros (Stephanos Voudouris)

8. Alexandros (Demetrios Tsamados)

9. Amphitrite (Lazaros Brouskos)

10. Aris (Andreas Miaoulis)

11. Aris (? Tsamados)

12. Aristides (Georgios Gionis)

13. Aristides (Anagnostis Theodorou)

14. Achilles (Demetrios Voulgaris)

15. Achilles (???)

16. Waterloo (?? Voulgaris)

17. Diomedes (Nicholaos Oeconomeas)

18. Epamenondas (Theodoros Gikas)

19. Epamenondas (Anthonios Kriezis)

20. Heracles (Nicholaos Vokos)

21. Heracles (Anagnostis Papamanolis)

22. Heracles (Andreas Miaoulis)

23. Heracles (Anastassios Tsamados)

24. Themistocles (Demetrios Voulgaris)

25. Themistocles (Theodoros Gikas)

26. Themistocles (Georgios Kountouriotis)

27. Themistocles (Emmanuel Tombazis)

28. Thetis (Ioannis Maroukas)

29. Thrasyvoulos (Ioannis Orlandos)

30. Jason (Vassilios Voudouris)

31. Kekrops (Leonidas Kountouriotis)

32. Kimon (Anstassios Theodorakis)

33. Kimon (Anagnostis Kriemadis)

34. Kimon (Andreas Miaoulis)

35. Kimon (Iakovos Tombazis)

36. Leonidas (Emmanuel Tombazis)

37. Lycomedes (??? Voudouris)

38. Mentor (Constantine Methenitis)

39. Miltiades (Anastassios Theodorakis)

40. Nero (L & G Kountouriotis)

41. Odysseus (L & G Kountouriotis)

42. Odysseus (Nicholaos Oeconomeas)

43. Paralos (Theocharis Papantoniou)

44. Scipio (Lazaros Brouskos)

45. Scipio (Michael Nengas)

46. Melpomene (Frantzeskos Papamanolis)

47. Terpsichore (Emmanuel Tombazis)

48. Telemachus (Stephanos Voudouris)

49. Telemachus (???)

50. Timoleon (Lazaros Pinotsis)


Squadron of Spetses


1. Agamemnon (Laskarina Bouboulina)

2. Athena (Dmitry Orlov)

3. Alexandros (Georgios Hatziandreou)

4. Alexandros I (Andreas Sklias)

5. Archangel (Michael Adrianos)

6. Aphrodite (Georgios Lambrou)

7. Achilles (Elias Thermitsiotis)

8. Achilles (Anastassios Kyriakou)

9. Achilles (Theodoros Lazarou)

10. Achilles (Anastassios Matthaeou)

11. Achilles (Gikas Botsaris)

12. Diomedes (Anthonios Dritsas)

13. Diomedes (Gikas Botsaris)

14. Diomedes (Kalaphatis Stemnitzotis)

15. Epamenondas (Constantine Bambas)

16. Epamenondas (Hatziyannis Mexis)

17. Heracles (Christodoulos Koutsis)

18. Sea Horse (Ioannis Boukouris)

19. Themistocles (Georgios Koutsis)

20. Themistocles (Hatziyannis Mexis)

21. Holy Alliance (Nicholaos Lazarou)

22. Kimon (Anagnostis Lembesis)

23. Conte Benix (Gikas Tsoupas)

24. Leonidas (Hatziyannis Mexis)

25. Lycourgos (Theodoros Santos)

26. Lycourgos (Vassili Orlov)

27. Bella Puglie (Elias Bambas)

28. Nemesis (Michael Oeconomou)

29. Xenophon (Demetrios Sklias)

30. Pancration (Georgios Androutsos)

31. Pelican (Nicholaos Kyriakou)

32. Pericles (Constantine Boukouvalas)

33. Pericles (?? Hatzianargyrou)

34. Pericles (Andreas Hatzianargyrou)

35. Pericles (Hatziyannis Mexis)

36. Persephone (Christodoulos Matthaeou)

37. Poseidon (Athanassios Goudis)

38. Poseidon (Pavlos Hatzianargyrou)

39. Solomon (Georgios Koutsis)

40. Scardamoula (Georgios Klessias)

41. Solo (Georgios Panos)

42. Timoleon (??? Kyriakou)

43. Philoctetes (Emmanuel Lazarou)

44. Phocion (Nicholaos Syrmas)


Psara Squadron


1. Love (Anagnostis Domestines)

2. St. Nicholas (??? Hatzikyriakou)

3. St. Nicholas (Nicholaos Mavrogenis)

4. Alexandros (??? Hatzialexandris)

5. Americana (??? Hatziangelis)

6. Apollo (Demetrios Maroukis)

7. Aristides (Nicholas Kotzias)

8. Aspasia (Andreas Mytaras)

9. Achilles (Anagnostis Vourekas)

10. Achilles (??? Papamikes)

11. Achilles (??? Sarris)

12. Epamenondas (Anagnostis Domestines)

13. Epamenondas (Demetrios Papanikolis)

14. Heracles (Andreas Yannitsis)

15. Heracles (Ioannis Markis)

16. Themistocles (Anagnostis Kalimeris)

17. Themistocles (Nicholas Kotzias)

18. Themistocles (???)

19. Themistocles (Emmanuel Balabanos)

20. Themistocles (??? Hatzikotzias)

21. Jason (Velissarios Bros)

22. Calliope (Theodoros Kallaris)

23. Camilostrov (Anthonios Sarris)

24. Leonidas (??? Apostolis)

25. Leonidas (??? Argyris)

26. Leonidas (??? Yannaros)

27. Leonidas (Ioannis Kalaris)

28. Leonidas (??? Hatzimikes)

29. Leonidas (Anagnostis Tzotzis)

30. Leonidas (Hatziconstantis Kambouris)

31. Miltiades (??? Apostolis)

32. Minerva (Demetrios Kotzias)

33. New Carthage (Georgios Kalaphatis)

34. Xenophon (Nicholas Constantis)

35. Penelope (Anagnostis Kontos)

36. Penelope (Georgios Kotzias)

37. Poseidon (Demetrios Linos)

38. Semiramis (Nicholas Mamounis)

39. Socrates (??? Apostolis)

40. Philoctetes (Georgios Skandalis)

* In 1805, the British blockade of the French and Spanish harbours was broken by Miaoulis' ships, providing with wheat the French. In one such attempt the British arrested Miaoulis & brought him before the British Admiral, the famous Horatio Viscount Nelson . The British questioned the 36-year old Miaoulis (in Maltese, the lingua franca of the Mediterranean Seamen):
-"Are you a Turk?"
-No, said Miaoulis
-Are you a Barbarine Pirate?
-No
-Are you Maltese?
-No, I'm Greek
-What would you do then, you dog, if your country was at war & someone dared to help your enemies?
-Well, if I had a country & someone would dare to help the enemies of my country, do you see that big mast? I would hang him from there!
Nelson was touched by his answer & delivered him from captivity

** In 1912, the grand-son of Kountouriotis, Vice-Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis, c-i-c of the Greek navy in the Balkan wars, when asked why did he face the Ottoman fleet alone, onboard his flagship Averoff, without waiting for the rest of the Greek fleet to arrive, he answered:
"I was watching my grandfather standing on the bow & Miaoulis standing on the stern, telling me: Pavlos, you must die for your country!



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Post subject:

Posted: Sun Feb 19, 2006 6:38 pm

THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN (July-November 1942)



There were two battles of El Alamein, both during 1942 (First Battle of El-Alamein, 1–July 27, 1942. Second Battle of El-Alamein, October 23 to November 3, 1942). In Egypt, Allied forces under a British General finally stopped the Germans. It was a turning point for World War II.

THE OPPONENTS:

AXIS FORCES


Panzer Group Afrika


Feldmarshal Erwin Rommel


15. Panzer-Division


21. Panzer-Division


7. Panzer-Regiment


8. Panzer-Regiment


17 Divisione Pavia


Brigata Paracadutisti Folgore


27 Divisione Brescia


133 Divisione Ariete


101 Divisione Trieste


25 Divisione Bologna


102 Divisione Trento


ALLIED FORCES


8TH ARMY


Field Marshal Sir John Auckinleck

In August 1942, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery , took command of the British Eighth Army from Claude Auchinleck



78th "Battleaxe" Division


3 Dywizja Strzelców Karpackich-3rd Carpathian (Polish) Rifle Division


4th British Infantry Division


51st Highland Division


9th Australian Infantry Division


1st Canadian Infantry Division


50th Division


5th Canadian Armoured Division


44th Home Counties Division


48th Midland Division


56th London Division


2nd New Zealand Division


5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty-5th Polish Infantry Division


6th South African Armoured Division


Français Libres-Free French


Chativah Yehudith Lochemeth-The Jewish Brigade


1st British Infantry Division


1st Armoured Division


4th Indian Division


7th Armoured Division (Desert Rats)


5th Infantry Division


5th Indian Division


2nd South African Infantry Division


6th Armoured Division


1st South African Division


Elliniki Taxiarchia-The Greek Brigade (I Elliniki Taxiarchia-1st Greek Brigade)

The Greek Brigade in the battle of El-Alamein

Following the defeat at the Battle of Gazala in June 1942 , the 8th Army had retreated from Mersa Matruh to the Alamein Line in Egypt, a 40 mile (60 km) gap between the town of El Alamein on the Mediterranean coast to the north and the Qattara Depression in the desert to the south.
On July 1 , the Afrikakorps attacked. On July 2 Rommel concentrated his forces in the north, intending to break through El Alamein.
Auchinleck counter-attacked on July 10 at Tel el Eisa

The British Attack

On October 23 , following the First Battle of El Alamein, which had stalled the Axis advance, the allied forces commenced a feint attack to the south, engaging the German 21st Panzer and Italian Ariete Divisions which were both tank divisions & to the north, attempted to make the narrow pathway through the German minefield for the armoured divisions. The Greek Brigade was stationed at Alam Naghil , spread out in a long line of defensive posts (5.5 km-3.4 miles), opposite to the 20th Italian Regiment (Brescia Division) & two battalions of the German Fallschirmjäger (Oberleutnant Schweiger's II Battalion, Hauptmann Burckhardt's III Battalion). From October 12, Greek Brigade was put under the command of the 50th British Division

October 20

Elements of the Greek Brigade, penetrated deep into enemy ground & identified enemy positions. A group of five men, attacked in the night a German advanced post & after a short exchange of fire, captured a German Officer

October 21

Elements of the Greek Brigade (one company), penetrated deep into enemy ground & encountered with enemy force of at least two companies. In the night took defensive positions & identified enemy formations & defensive positions.

October 22

In the morning, Colonel/Syntagmarchis Pausanias Katsotas , CO of the Greek Brigade, met with General Nichols , CO of the 50th Division. He received orders to:
1-Attack enemy forces on D-Day (the day of the Allied general attack), somewhere between 22:00-24:00, in order to cause confusion & confound enemy forces
2-Conduct a special reconnaissance operation (SE of area 104, at 24:00)
3-Launch a feint attack in order to help friendly artillery to detect enemy artillery positions
4-Be in maximum readiness to reject enemy attacks

October 23/24, 24:00

Elements of the Brigade attacked (supported by the Brigade artillery), identified enemy positions. The operation was successful. 18 Italians captured


Greek Artillery fires against enemy positions

October 25/26, 24:00

4 Greek companies, attacked area 104. The operation was successful. Despite fierce resistance, the Greeks captured the area & took defensive positions on it. Enemy units withdrew 104

November 1/2, 24:00

The Brigade launched a full scale attack on enemy positions. Its advance guard crossed two lines of barbwire & a minefield & captured enemy positions as planned. Due to casualties though (6 dead, 33 wounded) withdrew to its previous positions

The Greek Brigade attacks

November 3

In the evening, the Brigade launched an attack (2 companies) on identified German positions. At 21:00, reports affirmed the capturing of all enemy positions (Qattara Box). In the night, the Brigade received orders to clear the surrounding enemy minefields

November 4

The Greek Brigade in co-ordination with the French Brigade & the British 69th Brigade, attacked on area 103

November 5

In the morning, elements of the Greek Brigade, reached area 103. 314 Italians captured. The Brigade received orders to take defensive positions & spend the night there

November 6

The Brigade received order for further advance. By the evening, had advanced further 30 km/19 miles deep into enemy lines, hunting down the enemy

November 6-13

The Brigade received orders and returned to Egypt

Col Katsotas, received a personal letter from Montgomery on December 21:
"...your chosen troops met with gallantry our expectations. With their meritorious conduct earned the respect of the forces of the British Commonwealth..."

Gen Nichols (CO of the 50th Division) in his report, describes the achievements of the Greek Brigade:
"...I trusted the Greeks implicitly. I was convinced that any operation or mission entrusted with the Greeks, would be achieved no matter the losses..."

The Greeks in the battle of El Alamein had 6 Officers 83 NCOs & men KIA, 26 Officers, 202 NCOs & men WIA


The Greek Memorial at El-Alamein



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Post subject:

Posted: Mon Feb 20, 2006 1:14 pm

THE BATTLE OF GOTHIC LINE (Die Gotische Linie-Linea Gotica)

"The battle of Rimini was one of the hardest battles of Eighth Army. The fighting was comparable to El Alamein, Mareth and the Gustav Line (Monte-Cassino)". (Sir Oliver Leese, CO of the British 8th Army)



The Gothic Line , was a fortified line, running 320 km (199 miles) from Pesaro on the Adriatic to Massa Carrara on the Tyrrhenian sea[/b], thick with Panzers, steel shelters, rock tunnellings of defence positions, deep minefields, etc. From the left bank of the river Foglia it had 2,376 machine-gun posts, 479 antitank guns, mortar and assault guns positions, 120 km (miles) of wire and many miles of antitank ditches

The Opponents:

The eastern side of the Adriatic Sector of the Gothic Line, going from Pesaro to San Sisto , was guarded by the LXXVI Panzerkorps (General Traugott Herr) :


LXXVI (76th) Panzerkorps


General der Panzertruppe Traugott Herr

LXXVI Corps, comprised:


1. Fallschirmjäger-Division/1st Paratrooper Hunter Division (Gen. Heydrich)


71. Infanterie-Division (Gen. Raapke)


5. Gebirgsjäger-Division/5th Mountain Hunter Division (Gen. Schrank)


278. Infanterie-Division (Gen. Hoppe)


29. Panzergrenadieren-Division (Gen. Polack)


98. Infanterie-Division (Gen. Reinhardt)


26. Panzer-Division (Gen. Crasemann)

The 8th Army (General Leese) moved against the Germans with three Army Corps:


8th Army


General Sir Oliver Leese

II Polish (General Anders):

Drugi Korpus Wojska Polskiego-II Polish Corps

2nd Polish Corps, Comprised:

-
3 Dywizja Strzelców Karpackich-3rd Carpathian (Polish) Rifle Division (Gen. Duch)
-
2 Warszawska Dywizja Pancerna-2nd "Warsaw" Polish Armoured Brigade (Gen Rakowski)

5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty-5th Polish Infantry Division (Gen. Sulik)

I Canadian (General Burns):

1st Canadian Corps

1st Canadian Corps, Comprised:

-
2nd New Zealand Division (Freyberg)
-
5th Canadian Armoured Division (Gen. Hoffmeister)
-
1st Canadian Infantry Division (Gen. Vokes)
-
III Elliniki Orini Taxiarchia-3rd Greek Mountain Brigade (Col. Tsakalotos)


V British* (General Keightley)

Comprised of:
-
56th London Division (Gen. Whitfield)
-
1st Armoured Division (Gen. Hull)
-
4th Infantry Division (Gen. Wall)
-
4th Indian Division (Gen. Holworty)
-
48th Midland Division (Gen. Hawkesworth)
-
7th Armoured Division (Gen. Erskine)
-
Gruppo di Combattimento Cremona (the Cremona Combat Group), with 21 & 22 Italian Infantry Rgts (Gen. Primieri)

III Greek Mountain Brigade in the Battle of Rimini (September 14-21, 1944)


First let us pay homage to all the Fallen of the Rimini battle, whose 4,620 Allied ones lay in the 5 war Cemeteries of Montecchio (Pesaro), Gradara, Coriano (Anglo-Canadians), Riccione (Greeks), Highway Rimini-San Marino (Gurkhas) whilst the Germans lay in the war Cemetery at the Futa Pass.
At the request of the Greek Government and with the approval of the New Zealand Government, 3 Greek Mountain Brigade was placed under the aegis of the New Zealand Division. The brigade was composed of 3,000 or more officers and men. Some had seen action in Albania and others at El Alamein



3 Greek Mountain Brigade and the New Zealand troops, made closer contact with the enemy on September 12th. The Greeks, with the support of Canadian mortars, machine guns and anti-tank guns, were sent into action to gain battle experience. By a perversity of fortune, these mountain troops were committed on the coastal flats, where they relieved a brigade of 1 Canadian Division (Major-General C. Vokes) on a front of about 2 km (1.2 miles)
inland from Riccione Marina. In this country of vineyards and closely tilled fields, the Greeks were pitted against the men of 1 Parachute Division (1. Fallschirmjäger-Division); but, though suffering many casualties, they gave a good account of themselves in the sharp patrol clashes.
As a preliminary to the crossing of the Marano, the Greek brigade was ordered to clear the approaches to the river on its front. An attempt in the early hours of 14 September to capture two clusters of houses known as Monaldini and Monticelli on a lateral road south of the river met with a costly repulse, the Greeks losing more than a third of the troops engaged since the action began. The 22nd NZ (Motor) Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Donald), supported by the 17-pounders of a troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery, already had been sent forward to a reserve position behind the Greeks. Although it was not intended originally for an active role, General Vokes now instructed the battalion to detach a task force of at least one company to go with all speed to the "moral and physical support" of the Greeks. Donald sent 1 Company (Major O'Reilly). At the same time Major E. W. Aked (of 24 Battalion), now commanding 210 British Liaison Unit, was tactical adviser to the Greeks; he appreciated at once their need for armoured backing, and within a few hours B Squadron of 20 Armoured Regiment (Major Clapham)joined the task force.
Thus strengthened, the Greeks returned to the assault on the evening of the 14th. In what a New Zealand officer described as "a copy-book attack with close support fire from tanks", Greek infantry occupied Monaldini and New Zealand infantry the neighbouring settlement of Monticelli.
Beyond the Marano, which they crossed on 15 September, the Greeks began to broach the problem of Rimini airfield, a rectangle a mile long and 1200 yards wide, copiously sown with mines and easily swept by fire from damaged hangars and other buildings around its perimeter. They could still rely on New Zealand help, though now C Squadron, 18 Regiment, replaced the squadron from the 20th, and it was decided to allot to each of the three Greek battalions one tank troop accompanied by a platoon from 22 Battalion. The Greeks maintained the pace set by the Canadians on either side of them. By the 16th, after capturing 20 German paratroops and killing perhaps twice as many on the way, they had disposed of nuisances at the south-eastern end of the airfield and were lining the edge of it



On 18 September, during the fight for the Ausa crossing, the Greeks completed their encirclement of the airfield and extended their right wing to the sea to relieve the Canadian armoured car regiment which had fought its way through the ribbon of seaside villas and hotels along the coastal road. The 19th, a day of decisive battle on the San Fortunato ridge, was for the Greeks, assisted by C Squadron of 19 Regiment, a day of easy progress towards the outskirts of Rimini.
The Greeks had more fighting on 20 September against elements of both 1 Parachute Division and the much less warlike 162 Turkoman-Division but at the end of the day the battered old town lay only a mile ahead.
On the 21st, the 3rd Greek Mountain Brigade entered the town.
1st Lieutenant/Ypolochagos Constantine Gerakinis (CO of 1 Company) & 1st Lt/Ypolochagos Georgios Beliyannis (CO of 3 Company), were the first allied Officers entered Rimini. The Greek flags that were soon flying from the Town Hall and other prominent mastheads signalled a success won by 13 days of rugged fighting and at a cost of 314 casualties (128 Greeks). Although inexperience and the language barrier had prevented it from making full use of the supporting New Zealand tanks, the Greek brigade had secured the coastal flank and conformed to the main advance inland, and its first battle honour was well deserved.
Today, III Brigade, is a fully mechanized Infantry Brigade (III Mechanokiniti Taxiarchia Pezikou/3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade). Its crest consists of a red shield (Infantry's branch colour) with Goddess Athena & an Armoured Personnel Carrier. The scroll is bearing the word "RIMINI" (III Mechanized Brigade is also known as the Rimini Brigade).
Brigade's motto: "Anaphaereton Hoplon Arete" (Merit is an inalienable Weapon)




Uniforms of the men of the III GMB. Officer's M1939 Winter & Other ranks' M1939 Summer Uniform

*I'm sorry I could not find the badge or the seal of the British V Corps. I'd appreciate if someone could help me on this



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Post subject:

Posted: Mon Feb 20, 2006 5:26 pm

The surrender of the Italian Fleet at Malta on 10 September 1943

The invasion of Sicily was the preliminary step in the invasion of the Italian mainland. The Allies hoped to knock Italy out of the war.
The Italian government was fed up with the war and the invasion of Sicily threw it into crisis. Churchill and Roosevelt addressed Italy on July 16 , calling on her people not to die for Hitler but to “Live for civilization.” That day, the Italian Fascist leaders opposed to Mussolini began to agitate for his removal. While Mussolini and Hitler met on July 19 in Northern Italy, US warplanes bombed Rome and killed 2,000. On July 25, King Victor Emmanuel had Il Duce arrested and replaced him with Marshal Pietro Badoglio , the Army Chief of Staff.
Badoglio immediately started secret negotiations with the Allies to take Italy out of the war. The deal was announced September 8 , while the British 8th Army landed in Southern Italy. The Italian Fleet limped into Malta & surrendered on 10 September 1943 .


Ensigh of Regia Marina

Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force (ANCEF) Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham


ordered a small allied squadron to sail out & meet the surrendering Italian fleet off the coast of Malta & escort its warships back into Malta, in the morning of 10 September . The Allied Forces assembled to meet the Italian Fleet were:
The British
-HMS Warspite
-HMS Valliant
-HMS Faulknor
-HMS Fury
-HMS Echo
-HMS Intrepid
-HMS Raider
the Greek
-RHNS Vassilisa Olga/Queen Olga
& the French
-FNFL Le Terrible

For the Greeks this was a sign of recognition of the Greek Navy's contribution to the allied cause in WWII.
For the British this was a symbolic gesture: Warspite & Valliant were the same vessels present to the surrender of the German Imperial Fleet in 1918.
At noon of the same day, Admiral Cunningham & General Eisenhower, onboard HMS Hambledon & followed by 21 other British ships, set out from Biserta, Tunisia. At about 1,000 yards off the coast of Biserta, the main forces of the surrendering Italian Fleet appeared, sailing in two parallel lines (Battleship Eugenio di Savoia was leading the Italian ships). At almost the same time, two Italian Battleships (Caio Duilio, Andrea Doria), set out from Salerno, Italy to Malta. Among the allied ships escorting these vessels to Malta, was RHNS Adrias. Her captain, Commander Ioannis Toumbas RHN , sent this signal to Vice-Admiral Constantine Alexandris, C-i-C of the Royal Hellenic Navy:
"With profound summit of happiness and national pride, I inform you that I escort to Malta the surrendering Battleships of the Italian Fleet. Everyone on board the Adrias, offers thanks to God for this astounding moment"


Men of the Adrias crew witness the surrendering of the Italians

On 13 September , all the Italian ships set sail to Alexandria to disarm. Early in the morning of 16 September , the ships arrived to Alexandria. There, admiral Cunningham escorted by vice-admiral Alexandris, accepted the surrender of the Italians. Admiral Alexandris writes in his memoirs:
"...admiral Cunningham informed me on the 15th, that he intend to wear his own rank flag on the small minelayer "Durby" in order to set out & meet the Italians. He also invited me to do the same & I boarded on the minelayer "Carteria"/Endurance. I chose Carteria as a symbol of our nation's power of endurance and because Carteria was the first ever steamer worldwide that took part in a naval engagement, in 1826. Admiral Cunningham with this eloquent gesture, wanted on one hand to abase the Italian Fleet for its unconditional surrender & on the other hand to express his feelings of gratitude towards the Greek Navy. It was an overwhelming experience to be boarded on a small minelayer & accept the surrender of a big Fleet. The Italian ships were sailing before us with black pennants, as signs of defeat. After the ceremony, I said to admiral Cunningham:
-It was a big & memorable day for me, I thank you.
Admiral Cunningham replied:
-Yes it was. I hope you'll join me for the surrender of the German Fleet too"


Vice-Admiral Alexandris



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Post subject:

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2006 4:30 pm

What news did the HM King Constantine's report about december 13 ,1967 events?
SEE http://www.greekroyalfamily.gr/el/index.cfm?get=news

SEE ALSO
Επίσημα ιστορικά στοιχεία για το βασιλικό αντιπραξικόπημα της 13ης Δεκεμβρίου 1967








//www.xronos.gr/view.cgi?newsid1134450000,27869,

SORRY to say I,m not good in Greek
Vitos



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Post subject:

Posted: Tue Feb 28, 2006 10:49 am

The epic battle of the Makriyannis Camp, 6-10 December, 1944


The Gendarmerie HQ (Makriyannis Camp), in the '60s

In December 1944 , Athens was under complete Communist control. The only areas controlled by the government forces were the Gendarmerie HQ (Makriyannis Camp) & the Omonia Square (down-town Athens), controlled by the Greek III RIMINI Brigade. The Communists tried to take by assault the Gendarmerie HQ, to force the government leave the city in order to establish a new Communist regime & drive the British off. Albania, Bulgaria & the USSR, were eager to recognize & legitimize the new regime.
The building complex that sheltered the Gendarmerie HQ, stood at the Makriyannis district, below the Acropolis rock.
The HQ was guarded by the men of the 1st Gendarmerie Rgt (1,100 men in 1944). 700 of those, had been ordered to spread inside the city, to guard government & other public buildings.
On December 5 , the Gendarmerie contingent, consisted of 88 Officers & 429 Gendarmes, armed with the Mannlicher-Schonauer 6.5mm twin-bolt rifle & the Sten MKII Sub Machine Gun. This force was supported by a heavy Breda 8mm Machine Gun, two 37mm guns & a light armoured vehicle (with two Breda machine guns). CO of the Gendarmerie Rgt was Col/Syntagmatarches Georgios Samuel

Army & Gendarmerie Officers a few days before the Makriyannis battle. Colonel Samuel is the fourth officer from the left (front row). Note that the Gendarmerie Officers are distinguished by the white shoulder cords worn from the left shoulder (two shoulder cords for officers, one shoulder cord for other ranks)


Major-General/Ypostrategos Georgios Samuel in 1950 (Chief of RHG). Note the double-cord aigullettes worn from the left shoulder (official uniform)

The basic problem the Gendarmes were facing was that the area surrounding the camp was densely populated, full of big apartment blocks. Thus, if the Communists could ascend the blocks which overhang the camp, the throwning of grenades or dynamites at the gendarmes could cause serious casualties. Consequently, the essential component of the defence plan, involved the control of the surrounding buildings & the establishment of advanced posts ontop of the blocks. These advance posts composed the first line of defence. The first advanced post was set in the flat roof of a nearby block, at the northern part of the camp. The second advanced post was set in the flat roof of a block exactly opposite to the first post. AP1 & AP2 were manned by 22 gendarmes each, supported by a small mortar (AP1) & a Breda MG (AP2)

A gendarme handling a Breda heavy MG

AP3 (18 gendarmes), AP4-5-6-7 (16 gendarmes each), were covering a huge area. The gendarmes called these AP "death posts" because they were set in a long distance from the camp. The men guarding these posts were so convinced they would die, that at noon of December 4, the wife of the CO of AP7 (Captain/Moirarchos Papakostas) payed him a fairwell visit!

The second line of defence consisted of the buildings abuted on the camp wall.
The third (or ultimate) line of defence consisted of the three-floor HQ building guarded by the Gendarmerie reserve force (100 men).

December 6: The first clashes

In the morning of December 5, the battle of Athens began. Communist forces attacked a series of Police precincts. In the area controlled by the Gendarmerie, an unnatural stillness caused the gendarmes to have the fidgets. At 05:45 in the morning of December 6, six shots were heard from a house-block near the southern gate. Almost immediately, bugle calls & battle-cries were heard. Seconds later, the first fusillade hit the gendarmes. Mortar & artillery shells (two guns were set in the nearby hills of Ardettos & Philopappos, manned by experienced communist Italian & German deserters ), hit the camp causing a number of casualties. At 07:00, 400 ELAS (ELAS: National People’s Army of Liberation) guerillas launched an attack on AP7 (AP7 was guarding the main road leading to the Gendarmerie camp). The 22 gendarmes fought obstinate. At 12:00, a small guerilla band, managed to reach the building wall & blew it up. Hundreds of communists, entered the building through the break in the wall & a close combat began. Only 3 gendarmes escaped. The rest were either killed or captured alive. The captured gendarmes were tried & putbefore the communist firing squad in the morning of December 7.
AP5 & AP6 , were attacked simoultaneously. A hail of missiles hit both posts. Soon, only 5 gendarmes were still alive. Cpt Kontakos, carried the wounded WO Papadakis on his back & escaped. The 3 remaining gendarmes attempted a desperate exodus & reached safe the Gendarmerie camp.
AP4 , fell to the communist hands after a fierce fight. WO Hantzakis was the only gendarme left alive. He also attempted a desperate exodus & reached safe the Gendarmerie camp.
AP3 (under Sergeant/Enomotarches Naskos), fell to the communist hands after a fierce fight. No-one survived.
AP2 gave extremely strong resistance. WO Sakellaris, a sharp-shooter, was firing against the communists with the Breda MG, leaving dozens of rebels killed. But the shortage of ammunition, which allowed the rebels to move closer to the post, caused serious casualties among the gendarmes. Under rolling barrage, the barber of the regiment, Leonidas Kousouris, arrived carrying new magazines. Only two rebels survived the attack.
At about the same time, 50 rebels, from the roof top of captured AP5, carrying molotov bombs & dynamites, attempted to destroy the nearby building in which AP2 was set. Immediately, Sergeant Retsinas & Corporals Lambropoulos & Stratidakes, manned one 37mm gun & under constant enemy fire, turned the gun to the north & fired against the communists. One shell hit the roof top of AP5. A huge explosion was heard. The sight was gruesome: Rebels, burning alive, were jumping off the roof top to the ground.
The gendarmerie casualties, on the first day of the battle accounted for 5 Officers 49 gendarmes dead, 8 Officers 28 gendarmes wounded. The Communists attacked with two regiments (6,000 men). 500 dead rebels were lying in the steets around the Gendarmerie camp

The eastern wall of the Gendarmerie HQ. Note the bullet holes. The building looks untouched but this is not the case: The roof collapsed on the gendarmes' heads, after a mortar hit, killing 4

December 7: The Gendarmes counter attack

At noon of December 7, Col. Samuel ordered for an attack on the captured by the rebels AP3 & AP4 (intelligence had evidence that the communists were about to plant huge quantities of gasoline & explosives in those buildings). By 16:00, the attack was over. 50 rebels were caught, 70 rifles, 10 MGs & huge ammount of dynamite captured.

December 9-10: Communist main assault

On 9 December, 500 black-berets (communist elite force)


Black-berets somewhere in Greece

under the legendary Kapetan-Gavrias , arrived to Athens. In the afternoon, 15 British sappers of the Royal Engineers ( Lt.Becker ), managed to lay mines & wire around the camp, under heavy enemy fire (one sapper was killed).
At 09:00 in the morning of December 10, the main Communist assault commences. The entire 6th ELAS Regiment (Kapetan-Gavrias) leads the attack. For two hours, the communists launch consecutive attacks. Elements of the 6th Rgt., achieve the imposssible: They penetrate the wire & through the breakes in the walls, throw grenades & molotov bombs inside. The gendarmes respond with rolling fire. The communist momentum is stopped. At 15:30, a new & massive communist attack begins on the main gate. Lt.Col/Antisyntagmatarches Costopoulos, an Army Officer who volunteered for the gendarmerie defence, orders the gendarmes to carry the 37mm gun before the main gate. Four volunteers (Lt/Ypomoirarchos Svarnias, Sergeant/Enomotarches Koletsis & the gendarmes Sverkos & Kanellopoulos), under heavy enemy fire, defy danger, reach the gun & carry it in front of the main gate. After a 30-minute salvo, the communist assault ends (18:00)

The battle at the Southern wall

At 20:00, about 100 black-berets, reach the southern wall. They notice a large gap on the wall & attempt to enter the camp through it. The file leader steps on a mine though & is killed. The explosion, alarms the knackered gendarmes, who respond with a deadly counter attack. 50 black-berets were killed. After a failed night assault, the communists are forced to cease the attack.
By December 18, the communist assault on Makriyannis camp, was over. By January 1945, Athens was safe.
Casualties: 12 Officers, 3 WO, 53 NCOs, 84 gendarmes KIA. Army Major Apostolos Dounis & Army 2nd Lt Stylianos Lekkas (both volunteers) were also killed. The exact communist figures are unknown.


Col.Schinas (CO of the Gendarmerie Rgt in 1950), proudly displays the Rgt colours at a ceremony



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Posted: Thu Mar 23, 2006 6:24 pm

The Greek Navy in the Middle East- The mutiny, April 1944

After being driven from Greece by the German military in 1941 , the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) operated alongside Britain's Royal Navy (RN) from bases in Egypt, Lebanon, and Malta. In April 1944 the RHN experienced a widespread mutiny, which began in Alexandria, Egypt, over the political composition of the Greek government. On March 31, 1944 a group of officers visited the Prime Minister of the Greek government-in-exile, Emmanuel Tsouderos . Calling themselves the Committee of National Unity of the Greek Armed Forces , "they demanded the establishment of a new government based on the Political Committee of National Liberation". While Tsouderos was considering his options and communicating with the King, who was visiting in England, the mutiny spread to various units of the Greek ground and naval forces in the Middle East

King George II, during his visit in Britain

Committees of soldiers and sailors took over effective command. The Minister of the Merchant Marine of Tsouderos' own cabinet, Sophokles Venizelos , talked of reaching some sort of political agreement with "the Communists". The crisis in the government-in-exile and the armed forces threatened to accomplish the KKE's (Communist Party of Greece) goals without any overt action on the communist's part. The King arrived in Cairo on the 10th and made Venizelos the Prime Minister on April 13, 1944

PM Venizelos (left) with the legendary "black Rider" Nicholaos Plastiras, CO of the 5/42 Euzone Rgt in the Balkan Wars & in Minor Asia (right)

Venizelos' first task was to regain control of the armed forces; he was unsuccessful and the British had to threat him of a step in and use their forces to disarm the mutineers. This was accomplished by April 23 . The mutinous units were broken up and smaller units were reorganized from troops that had remained loyal to the government.

The Mutiny. (Source: Vice Admiral G. Mezeviris,"Four Decades in
the Service of the Royal Hellenic Navy", Athens 1971)
Gregory Mezeviris narrates:

Cpt. Mazeviris in Egypt

“In the evening of April 4, 1944 , I learned that serious events were taking place in the military facilities in Cairo, in the Brigades and in the Fleet. I rushed to the Ministry where I was informed of the unprecedented events happening in our Navy. In the ships and the naval shore establishments, sailors Revolutionary Commissions had been formed and were circulating for signing among the staffs and crews, protocols asking for a reshuffling of the Greek Government-in-exile in Cairo to include the Revolutionary Committee of EAM (the National Resistance Organization controlled by communists) from Greece. The Navy Command had not reacted to this mutiny. Under the pressure of the sailors Revolutionary
Commissions, all crews signed the protocols. Some of the officers signed also; those who didn’t were arrested by members of their crews

The crew of Destroyer "PINDOS" celebrate the capturing of the ship

After the eruption of these cases, the Chief of the Fleet invited the ship
commanders to a meeting to assess the situation. The commanders declared that the situation was not under their control any more. The Chief then decided to appear as heading the movement so as to avoid the interruption of the ship missions. The following order was issued by the Chief of the Fleet Rear-Admiral Alexandris:
“Following the announcement of the creation in Greece of a commission representing resistance organizations fighting against the conqueror, I was pleased to realize the unanimous wish of everyone in our Navy, from the Commander and the ship commanders to the last sailor, that our Government here cooperate effectively with the above-mentioned commission with the objective of joining forces for the continuation of our fight to free our Home Land. I have officially transmitted today this unanimous wish to the Government. I was re-assured that all the necessary measures will be taken immediately for the formation of a Government with pan-Hellenic characteristics. I therefore believe that this effort will soon end to the unanimous satisfaction of the Navy, which is also the wish of the entire Nation. I now invite you all to continue united and concentrated the beautiful task that our Navy is performing for more than three years, in order to achieve soon the supreme satisfaction of bringing with our ships the liberation to our
Home Land.”

Next, a general signal announced that four senior officers were sent to Cairo to present officially to the Government the position of the Fleet and to cooperate for its implementation.

On the above, I can observe that it is not true that it was a unanimous wish of the whole Navy. Most officers strongly disagreed and they proved it when they used their hand weapons to repress the mutiny. It is characteristic that all the officers of the destroyer “PINDOS”, with the exception of an Ensign, refused to sign the protocol. The crew arrested the commander, the brilliant Lieutenant Commander Phiphas , disembarked him and put him under shore arrest. Then, they threw all the officers in the harbor! They reserved the same treatment to the executive officer Lieutenant Kogevinas , an officer very dear to the crew since he had thrown himself in rough seas to save a sailor that was wiped over-board by a wave! What was more astonishing, was that “PINDOS” was ordered to execute a new mission with a new commander and Staff, but with the same crew and their Revolutionary Committee. The consequence was that the ship was assumingly obliged to pass from Malta to disembark an officer who claimed that he was in need of a surgical operation. The “PINDOS” crew came into contact
with the crews of the Greek ships mooring in Malta and contributed thus to their revolt. Next, the “PINDOS” reached an Italian port where the crew contacted the Italian communist party, declared that the War was over and refused to continue the war effort.
Very few of the officers, especially some junior and non-commissioned officers, shared the revolutionary beliefs of the crews. What was strange was the attitude of some senior officers, even of some Captains, that hadn’t realized the seriousness of the situation and believed that the re-establishment of the order could only be done by soft measures. They considered that the first measures taken by the British against the mutineers –cut-off of food and water - should be relaxed. In my opinion, these officers were very much influenced by the enthusiastic radio emissions of the B.B.C. that praised EAM, as the only real resistance movement fighting in occupied Greece.
When, after the outbreak of the mutiny, the Minister of the Navy came to
Alexandria, I met him and placed myself at his disposal for the repression of the mutiny. I considered that that was only possible by using force. He must have remembered then, what I have been telling him for several months, gave me a warm handshake and thanked me for my contribution. A new Chief of the Fleet was named on April 21, 1944 ; a reservist once more, Rear-Admiral Voulgaris, was
appointed with the mission to crush the mutiny.

Rear Admiral Petros Voulgaris

The new Chief was trusted by the King and the Greek Government and was followed by the 1935 re-established officers, with the exception of a few that were sympathetic to the demands of the mutineers. However, without the help of the officers of the opposite political movement, who were more numerous, he wouldn’t have succeeded in his mission. When the new Chief asked me if I was disposed to help him, I replied that, in my opinion, violent measures should be used and that I would be supporting his actions

The repression of the mutiny in Alexandria and Port Said

The first operation for the seizing of the mutinous ships was set for the night of April 22, 1944 . Some senior officers, who, from their general attitude, did not inspire trust to the officers participating in the operation, were moved away from Alexandria. In the operation participated mixed armed teams of officers of all ranks, cadets, non-commissioned officers and even some Army officers who volunteered. The operation targeted initially 3 rebellious ships: the destroyers “IERAX”, “SACHTOURIS” that were coasted to the same side of the British cruiser “H.M.S. PHOEBE”, the other side of which was coasted to the dock and the corvette “APOSTOLIS”, laying in anchor far from the other two. We boarded the British cruiser just before 2:00 in the morning of April 23 . On the deck we were given the side towards the Greek ships. On the other side armed British detachments were ready to intervene. On the docks, stretcher bearers and ambulances were waiting. The attack set for 2:30 , started simultaneously against “APOSTOLIS” and the sea-side of “IERAX” and “SACHTOURIS”. The attack from the cruiser was delayed somewhat. The mutineers were not surprised and responded immediately using heavy fire. The attacking detachments successfully and with self-sacrifice executed the orders. The mutineers on “APOSTOLIS” reacted very strongly in the beginning, then their defense was weakened and in half an hour they gave in. On the other two ships resistance was stronger and it took almost an hour to force them to surrender. Some 250 volunteers participated in the operation. Seven were killed in action: three
officers, Cdr Nicholaos Roussen


Junior Lieutenant Demetrios Repas


and Second Lieutenant (Army) Kavvadias , one non-commissioned officer and three sailors. About twenty were injured, among which Captain Kyris and Lieutenant Commander Theophanides . There was about the same number of injured on the side of the mutineers. This successful operation was followed in the next 24 hours by the bloodless surrender of all the other mutinous ships in Alexandria, the floating repair shop “HEPHAESTOS”, the destroyer “CRETE”, minesweepers and auxiliary
ships. Bloodlessly also surrendered in Port Said the battleship “AVEROFF”, six destroyers in reserve and the submarine “PAPANICOLIS” who was seized with great difficulty on April 29, 1944 . Finally the rebels that had seized the Central Recruit Center located in a central district of Alexandria surrendered, thus ending the very unfavorable comments on our behalf

The repression of the mutiny in Malta

Serious disturbances had taken place on our ships based in Malta, three submarines, the submarine escort ship “CORINTHIA”, the reserve destroyer “SPETSES” and two auxiliary ships. All these ships were under the command of a Captain, the Superior Submarine Commander (S.S.C.). The Chief of the Fleet ordered me to go to Malta, provisionally assume the duties of Supreme Naval Commander, re-establish order and install the new S.S.C., Captain Antonopoulos .
The previous S.S.C., having refused to serve under the orders of the new Chief of the Navy, was arrested by the British Admiral and sent under escort to Alexandria. I flew to Malta on April 26, 1944 . At the airport I was expected by the British Vice-Admiral and Supreme commander of Malta who, very upset by what had happened, drove me directly to his office to brief me. The previous day, as soon as the S.S.C.’s arrest was learned, most of the crews went ashore and refused to return to their ships. They were arrested by the British and confined in a camp. From a total of 456 men, only 172 remained on their ships either from their own initiative or ordered by their revolutionary committee. The destroyer “NAVARINON” had previously sailed from Malta to Bizerta for repairs. About 100 of her crew had refused to sail and remained on Malta. The ship had sailed without them and the British Admiral asked me to convey his congratulations to her commander, Commander Neophytos .
Soon after my briefing, I organized a meeting with Commander Iatridis (the First Secretary of the S.S.C.), the ship commanders and Commander Baker of the British Naval Mission in Greece, now serving in the S.S.C. I declared to them that I wished to be informed of the situation, before issuing my orders. I realized that I was dealing with loyal men in a state of complete confusion. Being far from Central Command, they were seeing the situation under the prism presented to
them by their ex-commander. They were under the impression that the order of the ex-Chief of the Fleet was adopted by the whole Fleet. They had signed the protocols presented by the sailors’ revolutionary committees, but were not able to explain the reason. Commander Iatridis, an officer of right wing political affiliation that had distinguished himself as commander of the submarine “PAPANICOLIS”, after the arrest of the S.S.C. had issued a day order that showed complete confusion. For that reason I had to order his replacement by Commander Zepos , who came with me from Alexandria, and send him to Alexandria. I made it clear to the commanders that their ships should return to legality and that the period of the revolutionary committees was over. They should be aware that in the future the officers will have to protect their honor
with their guns. Whoever disagreed with the above had to tell me right then. Next morning, I decided to officially review the officers and remaining crews on board of the “CORINTHIA”, in spite of the scruples of the British Admiral who took exceptional safety measures on shore during the review. No anomalies were noticed during my review and I received the honors according to the regulations. After reviewing the men, my strict order of the day was read and another one concerning the installation of the new S.S.C. I then met separately with all the officers and repeated the instructions given to their commanders. I asked if there was any objection; there was none and I announced that I considered that their silence was an unconditional acceptance of my orders.
Next, we tried to bring back to their duties those that were arrested and
imprisoned in the camp. Commander Baker split them in three groups; one consisting of the men of the destroyer “NAVARINON”, one of the assumingly “good” and one of all the others. We then tried to read to the “good” group through the loudspeakers my order of the day and another one of the new Prime Minister Georges Papandreou


They refused to listen and were shouting that they didn’t recognize the new Government. Our effort to distribute these orders by pamphlets, also failed. In my report to the British Admiral I stated that these men should be considered mutineers and be moved to Egypt, as the Admiral
didn’t wish these men to remain in Malta. Commander Baker undertook a last effort to persuade some men, he knew personally and considered good elements, to return to their duties. Thanks to his efforts and eventually because in the mean time they were informed of the pitiful end of the mutiny in Egypt, many of them accepted to return to their ships.
Following a request of the British Admiral, I flew to Bizerta on April 29,1944 to examine the situation that had developed on the destroyer “NAVARINON”. Her commander, Commander Neophytos (my First Secretary aboard the destroyer “HYDRA” at the time of her sinking) explained to me with tears in the eyes that he was forced to order his officers to sign the protocol after receiving the general signal of the ex- Chief of the Fleet. He declared ready to follow the new orders and continue the war missions as soon as his crew was completed. My
same order of the day was read and all the officers agreed with all I said. I returned to Malta, after turning in to the British authorities a small number of men that I considered suspicious.
The British Fleet Commander, Mediterranean, had the intention to send to Malta the RHN destroyers “PINDOS”, “THEMISTOCLIS” and “MIAOULIS” to be cleaned-up from mutinous elements. The British Admiral of Malta asked me whether the men that had remained in the Supreme Submarine Command were to be trusted for undertaking such operation. I studied the situation and reported that I didn’t consider these crews good for repeating a similar operation to the one in Alexandria. He then asked me to fly to Algiers report the Malta situation to Admiral John Cunningham, Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean and then transmit his instructions to the RHN Chief of the Fleet in Alexandria. Admiral John Cunningham was quite enraged and I sensed that he was determined to
sink any of our ships that would revolt in the future. He ordered that the
mutineers in Malta should remain provisionally in the camp, hoping that several will change their minds while the rest would later be moved to a prisoner camp in Africa. He also decided that the three destroyers do not approach Malta, unless they refused to execute their missions. In such a case they would go in reserve and their concession to the RHN would end.
The three destroyers and three tank landing ships continued their war missions in spite the fact that, in most of them, remained mutinous cores. With great difficulty we finally succeeded in cleaning-up their crews”


Ensign Zacharias Kotsianas. He was tried for mutiny & putbefore the firing squad in Goudi, Athens, in 1948


Lieutenant Junior Grade Alexandros Phountoukles. He was tried for mutiny & putbefore the firing squad in Goudi, Athens, in 1948



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Posted: Tue Apr 04, 2006 11:28 am

For those of you who are interested in Hellenic Air Force aircrafts, I've found a collection of aircraft artistic illustrations, presenting historical & present day aircrafts in the service of HAF
(photos are from here: http://hafcphotos.cs.net/)
















....to be continued

Last edited by valtrex on Sat Jun 24, 2006 1:28 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Posted: Tue Apr 04, 2006 11:54 am




















Abbreviations:
PM: Battle Wing
MB: Bomber Sq
MASEPE: Airborne Early Warning Sq
STM: Tactical Transport Flight
MTM: Tactical Transport Sq
M: Sq
MPE: Advance Training Sq
MBE: Basic Training Sq
MPK: All Weather Sq

Last edited by valtrex on Sat Jun 24, 2006 1:45 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Posted: Tue Apr 04, 2006 2:21 pm

The Battle of the Nicosia International Airport, July 23-24, 1974

On July 15, 1974 a coup by the Greek military regime toppled the government of Archbishop Makarios and, in response to the coup, the Turkish army invaded the island ( July 20 ). Greece, devastaded by the 7-year military regime, was unable to offer any kind of military help to Cyprus & respond to the Turkish offensive. Greece's only contribution was the sending off to Cyprus a token military force by air in the form of one commando battalion (A' Moira Katadromon-1st Commando Squadron). This mission took place in secrecy, from Souda air base in Crete, with the purpose of carrying the 1st Commando Battalion and its equipment to Nicosia airport in Cyprus. It was given the codename NIKI (Victory).
Following their arrival in the island, A' MK in the morning of Monday July 22 , was ordered to move in secrecy, north. The initial plan for secrecy was well carried out & the Commandos deployed in the Theological Seminary area.
During the night ( July 22-23, 1974 ) a cease of hostilities was declared. Intelligence though, had obtained crucial information of an imminent Turkish attack on the Nicosia International Airport


Thus, in the morning of July 23 , A'MK was ordered to move to the airport & strengthen the defense positions. The Airport defended an ELDYK (Greek Forces in Cyprus) detachment of 120 men & an even smaller force of the Cypriot National Guard (approx. 30-40 men). A 106mm recoiless gun & five old M-8 greyhounds were at their disposal.
A' Moira Katadromon-1st Commando Squadron

CO: Major/Tagmatarches Georgios Papameletiou

XO: Major/Tagmatarches Angelos Avramides

-41st Commando Company (Captain/Lochagos Plato Kolokotronis)
-42nd Commando Company (Captain/Lochagos Demosthenes Roukas)
-43rd Commando Company (Captain/Lochagos Ioannis Kioutsoukis)

From the Theological Seminary, A'MK moved to the airport on civilian buses. The buses followed diversionary routes in order to evade raising suspicions. Following their arrival, Maj. Papameletiou ordered his troops to man perimeter defensive positions and maintain reserve/counterattack force. The Turks, not knowing of the Commando deployment and thinking that the only force defending the airport was a light National Guard detachment of 150 men, commenced an initial morning attack of battalion force (700 men) supported by two M-47 tanks. The Turks attacked in two echelons


Due to the open terrain though, they took heavy casualties. Both tanks were destroyed by direct hits from the 106mm recoiless gun. A M2 Browning .50 caliber MG was set on the Control Tower


manned by 1st Lt/Ypolochagos Stavros Benos


inflicting appalling casualties on the Turks. Within the next hour, 600 dead or heavily injured Turks were lying all around the airport area. Soon, the Turks launched a new offensive, with a force consisting of about 2,000 men. Enormous casualties were sustained by the Turks, as the disciplined & well trained Commandos orchestrated a series of counter attacks. Finally, in the morning of Wednesday July 24 , the Turks unable to overrun the Greek positions & uncapable to capture the airfield, appealed to the UN General Secretary Kurt Waldheim


for a cease fire. In the evening, the Greek Commandos surrendered the airport to the UNFICYP forces. Because of the determined stand by the Greek Commandos, the Turks failed to capture one of their prime objectives: The Nicosia International Airport.
Casualties: Master Sergeant/Archilochias Athanasios Photopoulos was killed in the clash. Commando/Katadromeas Androulakis lost his right hand. The Turkish casualties accounted for several hundred (or as a Greek Commando stated after the battle: "The force that attacked the airport, this force was destroyed" )


Turks are praying over the graves of their dead comrades

A' MK remained in Cyprus for the rest of the conflict as 35 MK (Moira Katadromon-35th Commando Squadron).

NOTE : THE CANADIAN AIRBORNE REGIMENT members assigned to Cyprus (UNFICYP) were present on the island at the time of the coup. The Regiment's soldiers thus found themselves in the middle of a shooting war. The remaining half of the Regiment was deployed after the Turkish invasion. The UN forces, principally the Canadians with British support, positioned themselves in the Nicosia International Airport to deny it to both sides and prevent escalation of the conflict. Their primary role was to patrol, report, and try to maintain order without taking sides. The CAR did so with significant help from the British forces in Cyprus. The Regiment performed well in peace-restoring operations. By the end of the operation, more than 30 men had been wounded and two had been killed


The Nicosia International Airport as it is today



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Posted: Wed Apr 05, 2006 1:51 pm

The Palestinian Terrorist Incident/the bizarre Egypt-Cyprus clash, February 18-19, 1978

The crisis began on February 18, 1978 when the editor of a prominent Egyptian newspaper and friend of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Youssef el Sebai, was assassinated at the Nicosia Hilton by two gunmen (Sari Moham Qatam, Zayet Ali). Negotiators then agreed to allow the perpetrators to leave Cyprus with 11 hostages-including Egyptians-in a Cypriot Airlines DC8. The airliner flew from the Larnaca International Airport to Libya, but the Libyan governent denied access to its airfields. The aircraft exhausted its fuel and force landed at the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport for refuel. However, the plane was forced to return to the island after other states refused to allow it to land. In the mean time, Egypt blamed Cyprus for the bloodshed and said that would send special forces to help save the hostages and capture the terrorists. At 17:30 of February 19 , the hijacked plane lands at Larnaca. At 18:00 an Egyptian C-130 requests permission to land in Larnaca also. The pilot claims that an Egyptian delegate is aboard, assigned to negotiate with the hijackers. However, suspisions rose as the Egyptian military attache to Nicosia (Commander Faruk Taqi) arrived suddenly at the airport. When the Cypriot authorities ascertained the truth, that the Egyptian transporter was actually carrying a fully equipped Special Forces Company, permitted the C-130 to fly into Larnaca, but gave strict instructions to the Egyptians not to interfere. Egyptian commandos though, launched an all-out assault on the DC8 even as Cypriot negotiations had apparently secured the hostage-takers' surrender. An attempt by one Cypriot Commando officer to order Egyptian soldiers already lying in their firing positions to surrender was described as an act of "insane bravery". The Egyptians denied & all hell broke out: Men of the 35 MK (Commando Squadron) of the Cypriot National Guard, having already been deployed in & around the airport, opened fire on the Egyptian anti-terror unit resulting in a 50-minute fight between the two sides. A 106mm shell directly hit the Egyptian C-130. Most of the Egyptian commandos were forced to seek cover in a nearby empty airliner after their Hercules was destroyed. The crisis ended after the Cypriot National Guard overpowered the Egyptian commandos and the DC8's crew persuaded the gunmen to give up their weapons. The Egyptians had 15 Commandos killed. One Cypriot Commando was also killed in the exchanged of fire. Wounded Egyptian (16) and Cypriot (7) commandos were rushed to Larnaka hospital. The rest of the Egyptians were captured & held as prisoners for a day. In the morning of February 20 , Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Butros Gali, arrived in Cyprus & returned home with the bodies of the dead Egyptian Commandos, the wounded, the captured & their equipment. This bizarre incident almost led the two countries to war


The Crest of the Cypriot National Guard Commando Battalions



Cypriot National Guard Commandos



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Posted: Sun Apr 30, 2006 7:31 pm

The Fifth battle of Thermopylae, April 24, 1821



Make me a good tomb;
Make it wide for the weapons and long for the spear
And in one side make a little window
For the birds to come in and out, the nightingales of spring;
And for the beautiful girls who pass by to wish me good morning
[traditional Greek klephtes' song*]

Athanassios Diakos (Greek for Athanassios the Deacon), was born Athanassios-Nickolaos Massavetas


He was drawn to religion from an early age and was sent away by his parents to the Monastery of St. John the Baptist for his education. He became a monk at the age of 17 and, due to his devotion to his faith, was ordained a Greek Orthodox deacon not long afterwards.
Soon after the outbreak of the Greek uprising, Diakos and a local brigand captain and friend (Bousgos) led a contingent of fighters to capture the town of Livadeia


On April 1, 1821 , after three days of vicious house-by-house fighting, and the burning of Mir Aga's residence, including the harem, the town fell to the Greeks. Hursid Pasha sent two of his most competent commanders from Thessaly, Omer Vryonis and Kjose Mehmet , at the head of 8,000 men with orders to put down the revolt in Roumeli and then proceed to the Peloponnese and lift the siege at Tripolis.
Diakos and his band, reinforced by the fighters of Panourgias and Dyovouniotes, decided to halt the Ottoman advance into Roumeli by taking defensive positions at Thermopylae. The Greek force of 1,500 men was split into three sections. Dyovouniotes was to defend the bridge at Gorgopotamos, Panourgias the heights of Chalkomata, and Diakos the bridge at Alamana.
Setting out from their camp at Lianokladi, near Lamia, the Ottoman Turks soon divided their force. The main force attacked Diakos. The other attacked Dyovouniotis, whose force was quickly routed, and then Panourgias, whose men retreated when he was wounded. The majority of the Greek force having fled, the Ottomans concentrated their attack on Diakos's position at the Alamana bridge. Seeing that it was a matter of time before they were overrun by the enemy, Bousgos, who had been fighting alongside Diakos, pleaded with him to retreat to safety. Diakos chose to stay and fight with 48 men ; they put up a desperate hand-to-hand struggle for a number of hours before being overwhelmed.
The severely wounded Diakos was taken before Vryonis, who offered to make him an officer in the Ottoman army if he converted from Christianity to Islam


Diakos refused the offer. His last words were.."I was Born a Greek, I shall Die a Greek". He was impaled and roasted alive οn a spit (literally BBQ-ed!). At the time of his sacrifice he was 33 years old. The brutal manner of Diakos's death at hands of the Turks (being roasted on a spit) initially struck fear into the populace of Roumeli, but his final stand near Thermopylae, echoing the heroic defence of the Spartan King Leonidas, made him a martyr for the Greek cause

His birthplace, the village of Ano-Moussounitsa, was later renamed Athanasios Diakos in his honour


A statue of Diakos at his birthplace


The monument of Athanassios Diakos (left) and the statue of Leonidas at Thermopylae, today. Separated by a gap of a few hundred yards & 23 centuries, both men are united in their love for freedom

*Klephtic song & its tradition dates back to the 16th century, and has become an essential part of the Greek folk (or country) music. Karl Mendelssohn-Bartholdy , a very famous historian & scholar of the 19th century wrote:
'Klephtic songs are like frothy streams that flow not from human lips, but from the mountains of Oeta & Olympus'



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Posted: Fri Jun 23, 2006 5:02 pm

Structure of Hellenic Air Force (current)
Hellenic Air Force General Staff-Genikon Epiteleon Aeroporias (GEA)
Motto: "Aien Ypsikrateen" ("Always Dominate the Heights")

Chief: Lieutenant General-Antipterarchos Georgios Avlonites





Tactical Air Force Command/Archegeon Tactikes Aeroporias
Est.: 1952
Motto: "Romi meta Phroneseos" ("Reasoning Power". Taken from an Isocrates' speech given to Demonicus: "...especially cultivate your own reasoning power; for a sound mind in a man's body is the greatest thing in the smallest compass. Try to be in your body a lover of toil, and in your soul a lover of wisdom, that with the one you may be able to execute your resolves, and with the other may know how to foresee what is expedient" )

BATTLE WINGS



110 Battle Wing/Pteryx Maches .
Formed in 1912 at Larissa, Thessaly, as 1st Aviation Company . In 1934 is known as Larissa Air Base before its name changed in 1951 (110 Battle Wing).
Motto: "Machemotatoe oe Ischyontes" ("The Bravest are the Strongest". Taken from Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics": "...therefore they fight like armed men against unarmed or like trained athletes against amateurs; for in such contests too it is not the bravest men that fight best, but those who are strongest.."
-337 All Weather Interceptor Squadron/Moira Pantos Kairou
Operational since 1947.

Code name: The Phantoms. Since 2004, 337 MPK is flying the F-16 C/D Block 50.
-348 Tactical Reckonnaissance Squadron/Moira Tactikes Anagnoriseos

Formed in 1954. Code name: Matia/Eyes. Is flying the RF-4E II.This squadron is unique in that it is the only squadron of the Air Force that is continually active since its establishment, the only one to have not moved from its original base and the only one that has never changed its role.
-346 Squadron/Moira

Formed in 1990. Code name: Iason/Jason. Operates the F-16 Block 30.


111 Battle Wing/Pteryx Maches
Formed in 1950, at Nea-Anchialos near Larissa.
Motto: "Andreias ethelomen Kindyneven" ("Courage gained by habit". Taken from Thucydides' "Pericles' funeral oration": "If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the better for it?"
-330 Squadron

Formed in 1989. Code name: Keravnos/Thunder. Is equipped with the F-16 Block 30.

-341 Squadron HARM

Formed in 1954. Code name: Velos/Arrow. Since 1998 it uses the F-16 Block 50

-347 Squadron LANTIRN

Formed in 1954. Code name: Perseus. Since 1998 it uses the F-16 Block 50.
-S.MET/Advanced Training Sq

Formed in 1991. Code name: Alexandros/Alexander. Is flying the F-16 C/D Block 30/50

A 111 BW aircraft on a SMET (OCU) flight


113 Battle Wing
Formed in 1954 as 113 Battle & Training Wing, at Salonika. Since 2001 is undergoing major changes.
Motto: "Thneske yper Patridos" ("Ready to die for the Fatherland").
-355/1 Tactical Transport Flight-Smenos Tactikon Metaphoron

113 BW has no fighters in its charge. 113 BW is the only unit to operate two Air bases in Sedes and Mikra.


114 Battle Wing
Formed in 1956 at Tanagra, near Athens.
Motto: "Phylakees Mnesasthe" ("Keep your Watches". Taken from Homer's Iliad (Book XVIII). Hector is giving a speech to his fellow Trojans: "...take your suppers in your companies throughout the host, and keep your watches and be wakeful every man of you"
-331 All Weather Squadron/Moira Pantos Kairou

Formed in 1988. Code name: Aegeas. Is equipped with the Mirage 2000 EG & BG. 331 Squadron will receive the Mirage 2000-5 on order.
-332 All Weather Squadron

Formed in 1989. Code name: Hawk/Ierax. Is equipped with the Mirage 2000 EG & BG.
-366 Training Flight
Formed in 1976. Code name: Evripos/Euripus. Is flying the T-33A

-S.MET/Advanced Training Sq

Formed in 1990. Is flying the Mirage 2000 EG/BG
-Maintainance Sq/Moira Syntereseos

Formed in 1976.


115 Battle Wing
Formed in 1954, at Souda bay, in the island of Crete. Since 2005 this BW is undergoing many changes. Until 2005 it operated the A-7H and TA-7H Corsair II.
Motto: "Areta Vaene dia Mochthon" ("Virtue's path leads through troublous ways". Taken from Euripides' tragedy "The children of Hercules (The Heracleidae)"
-334 All Weather Squadron/Moira Pantos Kairou

Formed in 1974. Code name: Talos. Operates the F-16 Block 52+.
-340 Interceptor-Bomber Squadron/Moira Dioxis Vomvardismou

Formed in 1953. Code name: Alepou/Fox. Operates the F-16 Block 52+.
-343 Sq

Formed in 1955. Code name: Asteri/Star. Operates the F-16 Block 52+



116 Battle Wing
Formed in 1962, at Araxos, Epirus.
Motto: "Para Dynamin Tolmetae" ("Adventurous beyond Power". Taken from Thucydides' "Peloponnesian War": "...they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine;"
-335 Squadron

Formed in 1941 at Aqir, Egypt. Code name: Tigris/Tiger. Operates the A-7H II, TA-7C.
-336 Squadron

Formed in 1943 at Al Maza, Egypt. Code name: Olympus. Operates the A-7H II, TA-7C.


117 Battle Wing
Formed in 1961 at Andravis, Peloponnese.
Motto: "Echtrhrous Amynou" ("Repel the Enemy". Written by Stobaeus, compiler of a valuable series of extracts from ancient Greek authors).
-338 Interceptor-Bomber Sq/Moira Dioxes-Vomvardismou

Formed in 1952. Code name: Aris. Operates the F-4E Peace Icarus 2000 [improved F-4E, SLEP (Structure Life Extension Program), AUP (Avionincs Upgrade Program), by DASA, Germany. The upgrade included an AN/APG-65GY radar, Honeywell H-764G navigation system which is a combination of laser inertial navigation system (LINS), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Elbit Systems Modular Multi-Role Computer (MMRC), the LITENING targeting pod, and the ability to launch the AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and the AGM-130 stand-off weapon)
-339 Interceptor-Bomber Sq

Formed in 1952. Code name: Aeas/Ajax. Operates the F-4E Peace Icarus 2000.
-S.MET/Advanced Training Sq

Formed in 1979. Operates the F-4E Peace Icarus 2000.


120 Training Wing/Pteryx Ekpaedephseos
Formed in 1977 at Kalamata, Peloponnese.
Motto: "Ames de g'essometha pollo karrones" ("We shall overtake you". Verses from a popular song of ancient Sparta)
-361 Basic Training Sq/Moira Vassikes Ekpaedephseos

Formed in 1963. Code name: Pelops. Operates the Raytheon T-6A/NTA Texan II.
-362 Advanced Training Sq/Moira Prokechoremenes Ekpaedephseos

Formed in 1957. Code name: Nestor. Operates the T-2E Buckeye.
-363 Operational Training Sq/Moira Epicherisiakes Ekpaedephseos

Formed in 1972. Code name: Danaus. Operates the T-2E Buckeye.


121 Training Wing
Formed in 1964, at Dekeleia.
Motto: "Ames de g'essometha pollo karrones" ("We shall overtake you". Verses from a popular song of ancient Sparta)
-360 Initial Training Sq/Moira Archikes Ekpaedephseos

Formed in 1964. Code name: Thales. Operates the Cessna Τ-41D Mescalero & Grob G.103 Twin Astir (glider)


350 Guided Missiles Wing/Pteryx Katephthynomenon Vlematon
Formed in 1960. Motto: "Cheres Amynen eisi kai emin" ("We have the means to defend ourselves". Taken from Homer's Iliad (Book XIII)
Operates the Patriot (PAC-2) Guided Missiles System.


Center for Advanced Tactics/Kentron Aeroporikes Taktikes
Formed in 1983, at Andravis Peloponnese.
-Weapons and Tactics School/Scoleion Oplon Tactikes

Official badge unofficial badge
Formed in 1983
-Electronic Warfare School/Scoleion Electronikou Polemou

Formed in 1987

BATTLE GROUPS



126 Battle Group/Smenarchia Maches
Formed in 1974 at Heraklion, Crete.
Motto: "Thele Areten kai Tolmen e Elephtheria" ("Freedom demands Virtue and Boldness". Taken from one of Andreas Kalvos’s Odes)
Operates the S-300M & TOR-M1 Guided Missiles Systems.


130 Battle Group
Based at the island of Lemnos. Readiness of 111 BW.


134 Battle Group
Based at the island of Santorini. Readiness of 117 BW.


135 Battle Group
Based at the island of Skyros. Readiness of 114 BW.

INDEPENDENT SQUADRONS



353 Naval Cooperation Sq/Moira Naphtikes Synergasias
Formed in 1969. Code name: Triaena/Trident. Operates the P-3B/C Orion


354 Tactical Transport Sq/Moira Tactikon Metaphoron
Formed in 1950. Dismandled in 1977. Since 2004 is operational, equipped with the C-27J Spartan. Code name: Pegasus




355 Tactical Transport Sq
Formed in 1947. Code name: Ephaestus. Operates the Canadair CL-215 & Dornier Do.28D-2 Skyservant.


356 Tactical Transport Sq
Formed in 154. Code name: Heracles/Hercules. Operates the C-130B/H Hercules


358 S.A.R Sq/Moira Erevnas kai Diasoses
Formed in 1983. Code name: Phaethon. Operates the AS-332C-1 Super Puma Helicopter


380 Airborne Early Warning Sq/ASEPE
Formed in 2001. Operates the SAAB-340Β & ΕΜΒRAER-145Η ΑΕW&C

SCHOOLS


Air Force Academy (School of Ikarians)/Scholi Ikaron
Est: 1931, at Dekeleia. Motto: "Ames de g'essometha pollo karrones" ("We shall overtake you". Verses from a popular song of ancient Sparta)


School of Administrative Non Commissioned Officers/Scholi Ypaxiomatikon Dioeketikon
Est: 1954, at Sedes, Salonika


School of Air Force Technical NCO/Scholi Technikon Ypaxiomatikon Aeroporias
Est: 1949. Motto: "Sophronen te kai Petharchen" ("Be Sensible & Disciplined". Taken from Xenophon's "Socrates Memoirs")


Radio-Navigator School/Scholi Radionaphtilon
Est: 1942 at Rodesia. Motto: "Astroes ten Odon Etekmairou" ("The Stars lead the way")

Source: http://koti.welho.com/msolanak/diafora.html
http://www.hellasarmy.gr
http://www.haf.gr



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Posted: Wed Aug 23, 2006 4:31 pm

1955-2006, 51 years of the Army Parachutist School (Scholee Alexiptotiston or SCH.AL/ΣΧ.ΑΛ)


'It's true that we would never have thought, what Major Kallinskis' crazy idea would entail! With his legendary patience, he, 'out of obduracy', was the only source of inspiration for the rest of us, who built this School, almost 50 years back'
[Lieutenant-General (ret.) Pericles Papathanassiou, first CO of SCH.AL]


Major-General Andreas Kallinskis, the first Director of the Special Forces Directorate of the Hellenic Army & the highest decorated officer of the Greek Special Forces ever. During WWII, he was an active member of the 'Sacred Company/Ieros Lochos' under Colonel/Syntagmatarches Tsigantes. He was the father of the Greek Special Forces. The Jump wings he wears, are the Sacred Company's wings

Sacred Company's jump wings

Scholi Alexiptotiston/Parachutist School

SCH.AL is a Greek Army base, located NW of Athens in the heart of the Thriasian plain. Sch.Al is the home of the Greek Army Parachutist School, the 2nd Para Regiment (2 SAL), the 2nd Para Squadron (2 MAL) & the ETA (Special Parachute-Airborne Unit)

History

Sch.Al was established on March 12, 1955 thanks to the initiative & efforts of Major-General/Ypostrategos Andreas Kallinskis. General Kallinskis wholehartedly wished to turn his 'boys' from Commandos to Paras. He used to say to his friends: 'My dream is to establish a combat unit of Parachutists in our Army' . In 1951 , General Kallinskis sends three of his officers (Major/Tagmatarches Pericles Papathanassiou, Cpt/Lochagos Constantine Kretikos & Cpt/Lochagos Louizos Christodoulides) to Fort Benning (US Army) for airborne-air assault training. On their return home, Army General Staff decided to establish a training school for parachutists under the guidance & support of the Americans. Thus, in 1955 the American Military Mission to Greece was formed (JUSMAG), under lt.Col John Philips (killed in July 1955 during a jump), with headquarters in Sch.Al. First CO of the School was Lt.Col/Antisyntagmatarches Pericles Papathanassiou, with XO Major/Tagmatarches Stratos Paliatsaras, a veteran Commando of the British Force 133

Cpt/Lochagos-Jumpmaster/Ekpaedephtees Kyriakos Tsingounis, with Sch.Al's mascot, the German Shepperd Hoys, named after the first post-war German President Theodor Heuss. The dog was a gift from the German government. Greek Commandos to 'honour' the Germans named the dog after their President. It was too early for the Greeks to forget the devastation the German occupation brought to the country

The Parachutists who completed their training course, received their jump-wings from the hands of their 'father', Major Gen Andreas Kallinskis


SCH.AL Today

To become a member of the Parachutist Units, prospective Parachutists must begin with 5 weeks of Basic Parachutist Training (BPT). It is important to know, that in the Greek Army, due to compulsory military service, Para training is available only after the completion of basic training (9 weeks) and the soldier volunteers to attend BPT. If the soldier has from the beginning of his service been selected for Commando/Katadromeas, then he attends Advanced Individual Training (AIT) to obtain his Specialty.
To be eligible for the HALO badge, an individual must have met the following requirements:
-Participated in a minimum of 30 jumps
-Must have been rated excellent in the low-pressure chamber of the Air Force Medicine Centre

HALO wings are received by the Parachutists, after 5 weeks of HALO training and after having participated in a minimum of 5 jumps.
Today, the School's mission is to provide training for:
-Basic, Master, Senior Paras for Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Police.
-Jumpmasters
-Army Pathfinders
-HALO Paras
-Special Forces Medical Corps
-Unarmed self-defense (Martial Arts) courses






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Posted: Fri Aug 25, 2006 3:41 pm

Sevastianos Phoulides: A Greek 'Branderburger'

The Brandenburger Regiment was a German commando unit during World War II

The emblem of the Branderburger Regiment

The unit was originally founded by Wilhelm Von Canaris


of the Abwehr (German Military Intelligence. Abwehr I were responsible for the creation of spy networks across Europe, Abwehr II were responsible for sabotages, Abwehr III were responsible for counter-espionage).
The original regiment, the Baulehr-Kompanie zbV 800 Deutsche Kompanie (800 Special Constructions Company), was founded officially on 25 October 1939 by Hauptmann/Captain Theodor von Hippel , who was the army and intelligence officer responsible for the formation and training of the 'Special Constructions Companies'. On 15 December they became the Bataillon Brandenburg (Brandenburg Battalion). The name was due to the fact that at first the unit was stationed at Stendal in the old Mark of Brandenburg and trained there

Von Canaris (center) & Von Hippel (right, with the helmet), inspect a Branderburger unit

Sevastianos Phoulides

Phoulides was a Pontian Greek (i.e. from the shores of the Black Sea, NE of Turkey, the Pontus). Due to his nationalistic views & actions in the area of Pontus, he had troubles with the Turkish secret police & left for Tzarist Russia. After the communist revolution, Phoulides, dominated by strong anti-communist sentiments, left for Holland. There, Abwehr recruited him as part of their espionage ring and sent him to Athens as a 'tobacconist'. In Athens he set up a spy network, with members Greek sailors of merchant ships sailed to Odessa and other ports of the southern russian coast on the black sea. When Phoulides' true identity as a German spy revealed to the Greek authorities (thanks to a very capable Secret Service Officer, Spyridon Paxinos ), he offered himself to become double agent (with the unwilling acquiescence of the Germans). With the German invasion (April '41) and the German occupation, Phoulides was forced to leave Greece (there are some letters ascribed to him, in which he begs Canaris to '...recollect his descent [Von Canaris had descendance from the Canaris family of Hydra] & to beg Hitler not to invade Greece' ).
After the German invasion to the USSR (July 1941), Phoulides left for Germany together with some 'Russian friends' he recruited to 'the club'. There, he received several courses in military training & was sent with two Russians to Kiev, behind the Soviet lines

German Branderburger Commandos dressed as Soviet troops during operation Barbarossa

For his actions from July-August 1941 , he was promoted to Oberleutnant/1st Lieutenant for Gallantry. In 1942 (with five Russians and a German radio operator), Phoulides was sent to the Crimea to help 11th German Army to capture Sebastopol. In the eves of his returning back to Germany, he captured the staff officer of the 138th Soviet Division Colonel Tserkov . He evaded his hunters, during his Crimean odyssey, by boarding on a Focke Achgelis Fa-223 Drache helicopter (the first ever combat operation that used a helicopter, worldwide)


His return to Germany was triumphal. He was promoted to Hauptmann/Captain for gallantry & his men were decorated.
Phoulides' last operation took place in December 1942 . He was sent to Caucasus, to gather intelligence, escorted by a German radio operator. During this long range penetration mission behind enemy lines, he was spotted by a Soviet patrol & was killed

Sevastianos Phoulides



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Posted: Fri Sep 15, 2006 8:05 pm

'Out of every 100 men, 10 should not be there, 80 are nothing but targets, and 9 are the real fighters and we are blessed to have them, for they the battle make. Ah, but one, ONE of them is a warrior, and he will bring the others home'
-Heraclitus 535-475 BC



During the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in July 1974, Cretan Commando Georgios Bikakis with his fellow countryman & pair Bikhanakis (in the field, the special forces detachments or teams, break down into pairs of specialists in weapons), were ordered to defend the area nearest to a hill called Anonymous against an overwhelming Turkish force in the outskirts of Nicosia. Bikakis' only weapon was a M-67 90mm Recoiless Rifle with 8 rounds . The constant bombardment of mortar shelling (4.2" mortars) by the Turks was so defeaning, the bursts of shellfire all around them was so intense, that the two friends were lost. In fact, Bikhanakis believed his friend dead, he left his post & returned to his outfit, where he reported Bikakis as MIA. Bikakis on the other hand, although left alone, returned to his post & engaged the Turks. He spoted 6 Turkish Μ-48Α2 approaching slowly but steadily. He knocks out the first tank at a range of 300 metres/328 yards and the second at 270m/295 yards. He kept engaging the tanks & he destroyed the last one at the astonishing range of 750m/765 yards!!! The last 2 rounds he fired at a building where the infantry had taken cover and set it on fire. He also depleted about 1000 rounds from an abandoned .30 caliber MG. When all ammo was gone he pulled back and the other day managed to rejoin his outfit. He literally stoped a whole turkish battalion supported by a tank platoon alone . His CO nominated him for the gold medal for valor/chrysoun aristeion andreias. Bikakis died tragically in the '90s in a car accident



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Posted: Mon Sep 18, 2006 1:11 pm

'It's difficult to imagine Greek Special Forces without Anogeians'*
[Gen.(ret) Nicholaos Douvas, former chief of Army]



Gen. Nicholaos Douvas is interviewed by a journalist of the local Anogeian newspaper 'Anogi'

General sir, please describe for our readers the situation in Cyprus, after A' MK (Commando Squadron) set foot on the island

Gen: Chaos, unforgivable cursoriness, our troops were left there with no battle plan. Cypriot National Guard showed signes of total disarray after the coup d'etat organized by the dictators

What about A'MK?

Gen: A'MK though faced with stressful and dangerous situations, showed remarkable strength, fearlessness & especially true military spirit. Our motto was: 'Train-train-train'. We had good officers. Fortunately, a couple of them, knew Cyprus very well

What was the first major land battle of A'MK in Cyprus?

Gen: The Nicosia Airport. We were transported there with buses. Major/Tagmatarches Vassilios Manouras was my CO
When we reached the airport, the Turks, had already started their offensive. I remember we had just started to close the distance when shots began from the Turks, approximately 200 yards just in front of us. We spent the rest of the day
fighting the Turks who were trying to capture the airport. We inflicted severe casulties on them. We were just 300 men & they were several hundred, perhaps even 2,000. Of cource they did not know how many we really were

What about Major Manouras?

Gen: Well, let me tell you about him. After the cease-fire, UN members met with a delegation sent by us [I was the translator]. I remember that an Austrian Officer, told Manouras: 'It's an order from your authorities; Ambassador Lagakos orders you to hand us the airport'; then Manouras said this famous phrase: 'Who's Lagakos, Major Manouras here!'. In short, after the negotiations we first secured the Turkish withdrawal & the next day we 'delivered' the airport to the UN

Major Manouras

Tell us please about Major Manouras

Gen: Manouras was our Ops Officer. He was a true professional soldier, he was our mastermind. He knew the place very well. His plans were perfect. In the next battle [i.e battle of Gregoriou School] we had only 3 wounded. We did not burry dead

General sir, please tell us for an another Anogeian, Georgios Chroniares

Gen: The only thing I can say is that Chroniares was from Anogeia. This explains everything. He was a concientious & disciplined soldier, a brave man. It's very difficult to describe what he did...especially in August of '74 who engaged in clandestine penetration missions conducted by our unit...let's leave it there; I can only say this: In October '74, Chroniares sent a letter to his beloved wife: '...give my love to my mother & tell her that I did not digrace my self or my home..'

Commando Chroniares

We should be proud for Bikakes, Chroniares, Manouras, Kavrochorianos, Mares, Chnares, Phthenos, Economakes & the others. It's difficult to imagine Greek Special Forces without Anogeians

* Anogeia [pron. An- o -yia, stress on -o-]. A mountainous area in the Rethymnon Prefecture, Crete


Its people are considered to be among the bravest & fearless in Greece. It's famous for a series of revolts in the years of the Ottoman occupation of the island. The most famous revolutionary was Ioannis Daskalakes or Daskaloyannes

It's a tradition among the Anogeians to volunteer for the Special Forces.
Anogeians are famous also for their daggers, the inseparable companion of every Cretan in the old times, accompanied them wherever they went, either as travelers or as immigrants, when in hard times some of them where forced to abandon their beautiful island


Daskaloyannes' dagger

The typical Cretan dagger with the form it preserved todate was born in the late 18th century and has a shape reminding of a dart. In the first the hilt's end resembles a bird's beak, in the second the shape of the hilt's end is the same as in the 18th and 19th century cutlasses and in the third, which is the classical Cretan type, the hilt's end is V -shaped



It is said, that a true Cretan, rarely draws his dagger, for it is a shame to put it back with the blade bloodless



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Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 4:44 pm

The War of the stray dog, October 22, 1925


The incident at Petritsi (or Petrich in Bulgarian) from the name of the Bulgarian bordertown Petrich, which was shortly occupied by the Greek forces, occurred on 22 October 1925 . It allegedly started when a Greek soldier ran after his dog, which had strayed across the border from Greek Thrace; thus, it is some times speculatively referred as the War of the Stray Dog. The border was guarded by Bulgarian sentries, and one of them shot & killed the Greek soldier. Given the tense political climate*, escalation was inevitable; in response, the Greek dictatorial government under General Theodoros Pangalos


sent soldiers into Bulgaria and occupied Petrich, only to vacate the area a week later under the pressure of the League of Nations


Bulgaria ordered its troops to provide only token resistance, trusting the League of Nations to settle the dispute.
The League did indeed condemn the Greek invasion, and called for both Greek withdrawal and compensation to Bulgaria. Greece ceded to this demand and was imposed a fine of £45,000/$284,000 (1925). Over 50 people were killed before Greece complied.

*NOTE: The relations between Greece & Bulgaria, following the Bulgarian defeat in WWI, were characterized by a mutual distrust. The main irritant to Bulgarian-Greek relations after the 1910's was Thrace. Bulgaria always looked to districts of Ottoman Thrace and Eastern Macedonia for expansion. Greece's defense doctrine on the other hand have been always: 'be prepared for a double bite attack' (from Bulgaria & Turkey). After all, the Metaxas Line was a chain of fortifications constructed along the line of the Greco-Bulgarian border, designed to protect Greece in case of a Bulgarian invasion. Unfortunately, it was proved that the Greek fears were justified, when during WWII, in April 1941 , the Bulgarian Army entered the Aegean Thracian region, hoping to gain an Aegean Sea outlet in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia, and occupying territory between the river Struma and a line of demarcation running through Alexandroupolis and Svilengrad west of river Evros with the cities of Alexandroupolis, Serres, Drama and Kavala and the islands of Thasos and Samothrace




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Posted: Wed Oct 18, 2006 12:48 pm

The Battle of Sarandaporon; the first battle of the Balkan Wars
October 9-10, 1912


Greek mobilization, September 1912

The Battle of Sarandaporon took place on October 9-10, 1912 . It was the first battle between the Greek & Ottoman army, in the First Balkan War. The Greek Army of Thessaly/Stratia Thessalias , under Crown Prince Constantine

with General Panagiotis Danglis as his chief of staff

Gen. Danglis (left) with PM Venizelos

crossed the Greek-Ottoman border on October 5

Order of Battle
The army of Thessaly consisted of 6 divisions (I-II-III-IV-V-VI) with the VII Division forming at Larissa, a Cavalry Brigade (Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Soutsos) and 4 independent Euzone battalions (Gennadis' detachment under Colonel/Syntagmatarches Gennadis). After small-scale engagements with Turkish border forces (I Division under Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Manousoyannakis captured the town of Tsaritsani with 9 KIA & 20 WIA, II Division under Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Kallaris captured the Papalivado Plateau with 4 KIA & 9 WIA, III Division under Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Damianos reached the river Peneos without encountering any opposition, IV Division under Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Moschopoulos captured the village of Vlachoyanni without firing a shot, V Division under Maj.Gen/Ypostrategos Matthaeopoulos advanced to the village of Reveni while VI & VII Division remained back at Larissa), the army of Thessaly occupied Elasson and reached the Sarantaporo straits on October 7 .
The Ottomans deployed their 8th Corps , with 2 divisions under Hasan Taksin Pasha, against the Greek Army, hoping to hold the Sarantaporon straits, which had been extensively fortified by a German mission before the war. The total Turkish force equalled 14 infantry battalions with further 11 in reserve, supported by substantial artillery and three machine-gun companies

The Battle


The Greek offensive began on Tuesday October 9 , with the I, II and III Divisions attacking the Turkish main line frontally, the IV Division attempting a flanking move to the west, in order to bypass the fortifications and thence occupy the Pota straits in the rear of the Turkish positions, while the V Division was ordered to execute an even broader maneuvre. Hasan Taksin Pasha deployed 9 Infantry battalions (22nd Division), 12 guns & 2 MG companies on the western front. On the central front, 5 Infantry battalions (Anaselica Division) with 10 guns awaited the enemy's advance & on the eastern front 4 Infantry companies, one MG company & 2 cavalry troops had being placed in position fronting the Greeks

With blue the Greek advance, with red the Turkish fortifications

The advance of the Greek troops commenced at 06:30 (Gennadis' Euzones) on open terrain, under Turkish artillery fire (Krupp 75mm) that caused many casualties. By the night the three Greek divisions had established contact with the main Turkish line. The V Division run into stiff resistance, but the IV Division moved quickly & managed to push back the Turkish flank and to occupy its designated objective (in this battle IV Division earned the name 'the winged division'). The 9th Euzone Battalion under Major/Tagmatarches Ioannis Velissariou


attacked the Turkish flank at Deskate and captured the town

A popular lithograph presenting the Euzone attack on Deskate

During the night the Turks, after becoming aware of the IV Division's move, retreated in good order under the cover of the darkness and the heavy rain to avoid being completely encircled.
The battle, although not very successful, was nonetheless of major significance to the Greeks. Despite the somewhat clumsy Greek plan, the Greek soldiers performed well, and the victory helped expunge the stain of the 1897 catastrophe. Furthermore, the Sarandaporo straits were the only position where the numerically inferior Ottoman Turkish forces had any hope of stopping the Greek Army. Indeed, Field Marshal von der Goltz had confidently preclaimed that the straits would prove to be 'the graveyard of the Greek Army'

Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm-Freiherr von der Goltz or Goltz Pasha

The Greek losses accounted for 182 KIA (18 officers) & 995 (30 officers) WIA. The Ottoman casualties were severe



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Post subject:

Posted: Thu Oct 19, 2006 12:28 pm

The Battle of Bizani, December 1912-February 1913
The liberation of Epirus


Greek Infantry bugler calls for attack. Bizani, 1913

The Battle of Bizani was an action in the Balkan Wars fought on 20-21 February 1913 between the Hellenic Army and the last Ottoman army ever to enter Macedonia and Epirus. The Ottoman defeat lead to the capture of Ioannina (the capital of Epirus) & the liberation of the region after 500 years of Ottoman occupation

The opposing forces

Ioannina had been extensively fortified by a German mission before the war under Goltz Pasha (Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm-Freiherr von der Goltz). This fortification (Bizani fortress) was further extended to include the entire Ioannina region (a series of bunkers, 6-10 km/4-6 miles around the town) by the Ottoman Lt.Colonel/Binbaşı (of Artillery) Vehip Bey. The Ottoman plan anticipated a generalized Greek offensive from both the north (Metsovon & Paramythia) and the south (Arta, Preveza). Essat Pasha, the Ottoman c-i-c, deployed the bulk of his forces (15,000 men) at the area Aetorrachi-Kaneta-Avgo. The overall Ottoman force consisted of 20,000 men (Yanya Division) under Essat Pasha & in December 1912 after the capturing of Bitola by the Serbs, by the withdrawing force of 15,000 men of the Monastir Division (under Zeki Pasha).
The Greek Epirus Army/Stratia Epirou consisted of 4 Divisions (II-IV-VI-VIII), a cavalry troop & heavy artillery (II Siege Artillery Squadron of 150mm guns) under Maj.General/Ypostrategos Sapountzakis

The Battle


with blue the Greek advance, with red the Turkish fortifications

On December 1 , the Greek offensive began with a full frontal assault on the left & right flank of Bizani but the Greeks were repulsed with severe losses due to the constant Turkish artillery fire. On December 6-8 the Ottoman forces counterattacked with full strenght, causing great problems on the Greek side. On December 8 , the Greek High Command ordered for a short suspension of the offensive operations, awaiting tensely for reinforcements.
Reinforments arrived under Crown Prince Constantine early January (Independent Cretans Regiment under Lt.Colonel/Antisyntagmatarches Epamenondas Zymvrakakis, IX Infantry Division under Major General/Ypostrategos Arvanites, the 2nd & 4th Infantry Regiments from the Ist Division) & a generalized frontal assault was decided to be launched as early as the middle of January. A fortuitous event though, hastened the Greek preparations: an Albanian who was at the service of the Greek HQ, deserted to the Ottomans. Thus, the Greeks decided to attack on January 7 .
At dawn of January 7 , the Greek mass attack began into the three-echelon formation. At the center, a bayonet charge by the 1st Euzone Rgt (3rd-7th-10th battalions) routed the Turks & captured Aetorrachi

The Euzones at Aetorrachi

At the left, the Cretans pressed rapidly forward, routed the first line, pushed the second back into the prepared defenses & captured Manoliassa. At the right, during the night of January 7-8 , Avgo was captured. Under Crown Prince Constantine the High Command ordered the Divisions to concentrate their efforts in the capturing of the fortified area of Bizani . The Greek offensive plan hoped for a diversionary attack from the North, while the main force would concentrate in the left flank of the Ottoman forces which was considered inaccessible due to deep snow. On February 19 the Greeks advanced as planned & turned westwards surrounding the Bizani area. In the morning of February 20 , after a heavy artillery preparation and barrage fire (12,000 shells hit Bizani)

Greek Artillery fires againts the Ottoman fortifications before the eyes of Crown Prince Constantine

the Ottomans were isolated and surrounded by the Greek forces. Then, Essat Pasha, decided in order to avoid further bloodshed to ask for a truce. Essat Pasha's delegation, escorted by Major/Tagmatarches Ioannis Vaekissariou met the Greek Crown Prince at the Emin-Aga inn where he surrendered unconditionally. In the morning of February 21, 1913 , Crown Prince Constantine entered Ioannina in triumph


Crown Prince Constantine in Ioannina



Greek Army enters Ioannina

32,000 Turks (1,000 officers) & 110 artillery guns were captured by the Greeks. Greek losses accounted for 935 KIA (32 officers). Ottoman losses were severe


Crown Prince Constantine decorates the standards of the Units participating in the capture of Ioannina



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Post subject:

Posted: Fri Oct 20, 2006 4:21 pm

October 26, 1912
The liberation of Thessaloniki


King George I & Crown Prince Constantine enter Salonika

After the Greek success at Yannitsa (see here: battle of Yannitsa ), the road to Salonika or even Monastir (Bitola) was open. Crown Prince Constantine, thought that the best tactic would be to advance towards Bitola (North)


aware of the big Ottoman presence there (Monastir Division) that threatened his entire left flank. Greek PM Venizelos though, having been based on intelligence indicating that the “probability” of a Bulgarian entrance in the city is now certitude*, rushed Constantine to move towards Thessaloniki & not Bitola. In fact, he took advantage of his office & sent an urgent message to Crown Prince, ordering him: 'Your Highness, I forbid you to advance to Monastir, you will move towards Thessaloniki' .

PM Eleutherios Venizelos

On October 18 , Greek Torpedo boat Nr.11, under Lieutenant/Ypoploiarchos Nickolaos Votsis


entered the port of Salonika & fired two torpedoes at the Turkish Battleship Fetih Bulent . Fetih Bulent, harrassed and annoyed the Greeks with her guns. This incident, demonstrated the Greek dermination & persuaded the Ottoman authorities to surrender. On October 25 , the consuls of the major European countries accompanied by General Sadilk, met with a Greek delegation under Cpt/Lochagos Ioannis Metaxas


(the Greek governor in 1940)


& asked for an unconditional surrender.
Thus, on October 26 , two Euzone battalions (VII Division) entered the city

Crown Prince Constantine & the Euzones enter Salonika

while the bulk of the Greek army (I-II-III-IV) took up battle positions on strategic points in & around the city. On October 27 , 25,000 troops & 1,000 officers of the Ottoman army under Hasan Taksin Pasha , surrendered to the Greek authorities

Hasan Taksin Pasha surrenders his sword to the Greek Crown Prince

The Bulgarians though, did not cease their efforts to make Thessaloniki seem like a city under their control too. In fact, Bulgarian General Todorov, demanded on October 26 a freely & unconditional entry of the Bulgarians in the city. After negotiations with the Greeks, they finally reached an agreement to allow two Bulgarian battalions enter the city. Both armies were ready for the second round: 2nd Balkan War was imminent


Greek troops in Salonika

*NOTE: The Balkan states had made no preliminary agreement on the partition of the conquered territories. The gained territory, went to the occupying power



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Post subject:

Posted: Tue Oct 24, 2006 4:22 pm

I'm looking for information on the surname Ketseas.
Have you come accross it at all in your studies?
Thank you.
_________________
Polivios Ketseas



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Post subject:

Posted: Wed Oct 25, 2006 1:25 pm



Hi, polivi, yes I have, see here: The epic battle for height 731 (towards the end of the page)

Lt.Col. Themistocles Ketseas



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Post subject:

Posted: Wed Oct 25, 2006 4:12 pm

Thanks. I'm trying to put together some family information, and resources here in the States are scarce.
_________________
Polivios Ketseas



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Post subject: October 28, 1940

Posted: Sun Oct 29, 2006 11:22 am

This is my first attempt to make a video...so, don't judge me harsh :wink:

http://www.youtube.com/v/fE0tCYIAu0Y

The song is "The Children of Greece", performed by our "singer of victory", Sophia Vembo in 1940


Last edited by valtrex on Fri Nov 24, 2006 5:35 pm; edited 1 time in total



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Post subject:

Posted: Sun Oct 29, 2006 4:42 pm

:shock: :shock: :shock:


Large class!:!:
Very good work :!:



ORKE



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Post subject:

Posted: Sun Oct 29, 2006 11:51 pm

WOW I am impressed



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